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ABSTRACT 
 
Julia Scatliff O’Grady: Citizens of the Air:  
Perceptions of Safety in the Social Imaginary of Flight 
(Under the direction of V. William Balthrop) 
 
 
 
Despite technological advances in aviation that have made flying more reliably safe, 
certain rhetorical practices have also normalized the experience of human flight for the 
U.S. public and have contributed to the perception of flight’s safety in what I identify as 
the Social Imaginary of Flight. I argue that three iconic stories—that of the Wright 
brothers and the origin story of human powered flight, the story of Amelia Earhart’s 
aviation career, and the heroic narrative of the Tuskegee Airmen of World War II—
acknowledged but ultimately downplayed the risks of flying. My project reveals the 
rhetorical construction of these stories and their circulation in their respective eras and 
their subsequent recirculation in public memory in order to demonstrate how they each 
not only generated excitement about flying but also offered reassurance to a public 
interested in, but a little skittish about, becoming “citizens of the air.” In thinking about 
the “citizens of the air” through a web of discourses related to the sky, I use archival 
research, critical theoretical frameworks, and discursive analysis. Chapter 2 explores the 
rhetorical construction and circulation of the Wrights’ origin story of flight, which 
transformed flight from sport and spectacle into a (nascent) form of safe passenger travel, 
if always provisional. My study considers both the circulating texts related to the story 
	   iv 
and the public memory of the Wright Brothers National Memorial. Chapter 3 revisits the 
nine-year aviation career of Amelia Earhart, and using such critical frameworks as 
feminine style and feminist standpoint theory, demonstrates how a public memory 
focused on her disappearance has mostly obscured the discourse about flight’s safety that 
she participated in during her career. Chapter 4 considers safety in air combat and the 
heroic narrative that was retrospectively overlaid on the history of the Tuskegee-trained 
African-American pilots who served as escorts for white bomber pilots in World War II. 
Using critical race theory—specifically Kirt Wilson’s “rhetoric of place”—I complicate 
that narrative and reconsider the safety that the pilots famously provided.  
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I was lucky in my doctoral committee. I took my first class in rhetorical criticism with 
Carole Blair. Since then, I have aspired to write about flying in the same manner in which 
Carole interpreted the Vietnam Veterans Memorial. As the former Chief Historian for the 
U.S. Air Force and a scholar of peace, war, and defense, Dick Kohn introduced me to 
aviation history, both through Antoine de Saint Exupery’s Wind, Sand, and Stars and Clyde 
Edgerton’s book Solo. In my class with Eric K. Watts, we read Passing by Nella Larsen; that 
course in African-American Rhetoric also challenged my understanding of Booker T. 
Washington, and that nuanced understanding is reflected in my project. I tested the waters of 
Communication Studies in a seminar about George H. Mead with Julia T. Wood, a friend and 
colleague, who changed and continues to change my life. My advisor, Bill Balthrop, has 
taught me to how to care about the details while never forgetting the big picture. He reminds 
me “when one takes off, one also must also land.”  
This doctoral project began as an ethnographic study of air traffic controllers at 
Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson Airport’s Terminal Radar Approach Control facility (TRACON) 
facility in Peachtree City, Georgia. I am grateful to Jim Allerdice and to the many air traffic 
controllers he introduced me to. For two years, I periodically visited the facility and 
documented the work lives of several air traffic controllers. As a result of these visits, my 
fascination with aviation, its apparatus of safety, and the sky as a space of both transit and 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
vii 
wonder grew. As my research progressed, however, I became more interested in early flight 
and its rhetorical construction. On a cold day in 2010, the air traffic controllers organized a 
goodbye lunch for me at a nearby Chinese restaurant. Then, I drove another hour South on 
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Amelia Earhart Papers at Purdue University, the Robert Hinckley Collection at the 
University of Utah, the Collett E. Woolman Collection at Louisiana State University 
Archives, and the Lindbergh Papers at the Missouri History Museum.  
I received an off-campus dissertation fellowship from the UNC-Chapel Hill Graduate 
School, which allowed me to travel to several archival repositories around the country. 
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Monument, 2011). I want to especially thank Emily Brewer. Your lessons about writing and 
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Chapter One 
 
  INTRODUCTION 
 
“Our language needs new words to express the conception of air travel.” 
—Florence Kernick, thirteen-year-old winner of an essay contest on flight, 19401 
 
 
 Once the sole domain of birds, the sky has always inspired human wonder.2 
Dante’s Paradiso registered this awe in the fourteenth century; da Vinci’s sketch 
notebooks demonstrate such awe in their fantastical images of the sky and flying 
apparatuses. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, balloons and dirigibles made it 
possible for humans to join the birds. The question of how humans could enjoy sustained, 
controlled flight intrigued and stumped the earliest pioneers. Only in the twentieth 
century was the conundrum of flight solved when two hardworking brothers from Ohio 
successfully launched their motorized biplane off the dunes of the Outer Banks.    
 As inventors crafted and adventurers flew new and improved models that made 
ever-longer flights and with better safety records, the realm of the skies slowly opened up 
to the greater public over a few decades. As the barnstorming phenomenon faded and 
commercial aviation dawned, how did the American public perceive this new 
opportunity? How did the public weigh the risks of flying against the novelty, thrill, and 
promise of greater efficiency? Was this new form of transportation safe? Then as now, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Florence Kernick, “Cultural Value of Flying,” National Aeronautic Association, Feb. 1, 1940, p. 4, in the 
Robert H. Hinckley Collection, MS 102 Box 67 Fd 1, Robert H. Hinckley Papers, Special Collections, J. 
Willard Marriott Library, University of Utah (Salt Lake City, UT). 
 
2 Graham Coster, ed., The Wild Blue Yonder: The Picador Book of Aviation (London: Picador, 1997). 
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order for passengers to board a plane and to feel safe doing so, they had to trust that there 
would be a safe landing.  
 Despite the technological advances contributing to safety, the commercial 
aviation industry grew to be such a thriving and successful enterprise based in part on a 
series of rhetorical practices that normalized the experience of human flight for the 
American public and contributed to the perception of flight’s safety. During early 
aviation, the perception of safety once in the air was critical to the public’s decision to 
fly. In this study, I borrow Kenneth Burke’s perspective on dialectics, or “linguistic 
transformation,” in order to think about how it was possible to entice a public to risk 
flying. I look at the rhetorical practices that define risk by the converse promise of 
safety.3 Dialectics, such as action-passion, mind-body, and being-nothing—the three 
major pairings Burke identifies—demonstrate how words “mutually modify one another” 
to contribute to make a new “whole.”4 This interplay suggests what is possible when 
words and their transposed meanings retain the possibility for both mergers and divisions 
in our reception. In this dissertation, I examine three iconic stories of early flight that 
changed the way the public viewed aviation and paved the runway for the development of 
commercial aviation. In so doing, I investigate how the people I identify as the “citizens 
of the air” relied upon dialectics of risk and safety in order to construct a sky that was 
safe enough for humans to enter.  
 One of the most consistent ways in which flight was represented as safe during 
early aviation was to mediate its potential risk through various assurances to the public of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Kenneth Burke, A Grammar of Motives (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: U of California P, 1945), p. 
402. 
 
4 Burke, A Grammar of Motives, p. 402. 
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its safety. This practice of telling stories in order to reassure potential flyers of the 
possibility, if not the reality—of safe flying, dates back to ancient Greece, to the 
mythological tale of Icarus.5 The story of Icarus is often cited on aviation historical 
timelines as the first milestone event of human flight. Icarus’ father, Daedalus, a great 
craftsman made two pairs of wings by adhering feathers with wax to wooden frames for 
his son and himself. Daedalus outfitted his son, but cautioned him not to fly too near the 
sun lest the wax melt the wings. Icarus, however, ecstatic with the ability to fly, forgot his 
father’s warning and dared to fly too close to the sun. As his father predicted, the wax 
melted, the feathers loosened, and he plunged to his death in the sea. The hubris and 
tragedy of Icarus is a cautionary tale, and embedded within it is the warning to heed the 
rules of engagement in order to enjoy the wonder of flight. If Icarus had listened to his 
father, he would have experienced the ecstasy of flight while making a safe journey 
home. Such advice foresees the dialectic of risk and safety evident in the three iconic 
stories of flight that I explore in the pages to come. 
 This dissertation examines how the circulation of three iconic stories in the 
history of flight promoted the perception of flight’s safety by acknowledging but 
ultimately downplaying its risks. These stories—that of the Wright brothers and the 
origin story of flight, the story of Amelia Earhart’s aviation career, and the heroic 
narrative of the Tuskegee Airmen of World War II—circulated in their respective eras 
and subsequently re-circulated as public memory. It is the work of each chapter of my 
project to reveal the rhetorical construction of these stories in order to demonstrate their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Francis Bacon, “The Flight of Icarus, also Scylla and Charybdis, or the Middle Way,” Wisdom of the 
Ancients (London: Longman, 1857). 
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role in generating both excitement about flying and reassurance to a public set on, but a 
little skittish about, becoming “citizens of the air.” 
 
Golden Age of Aviation 
The heart of my project lies in the Golden Age of Aviation, that era bookmarked 
by the two World Wars when the thrill and novelty of seeing humans as pilots and 
passengers peaked. Each of the three iconic stories I study depends upon the historical 
record, circulating texts, and public memory between 1903 and 1945, with the Golden 
Age of Aviation representing this time period’s crescendo. A firm grasp of this era is 
necessary to appreciate the rhetorical messages about aviation that circulated and how 
they shaped the imagination of the U.S. public. I turn now, therefore, to a brief review. 
In order to understand the Golden Age of Aviation, it is critical to review the 
impact of World War I on U.S. aviation. The Wright brothers had only in 1903 
demonstrated that controlled motorized flight was possible, but, by the beginning of 
World War I in 1914, the new technology had already found a practical military 
application. Despite Orville Wright’s disappointment at seeing his invention turned into a 
weapon of war, airplane technology was destined to transform the experience of warfare 
forever, and, like so many inventions invented or adopted by the military, eventually that 
technology would filter down to the general public. The German airship and airplane 
attacks on Britain, which began in 1917, had, by war’s end, claimed the lives of more 
than 1,400 people and injured almost 4,000 more. In response, the Allies, which had been 
slower to create the technology, developed bombers and trained bomber aircrews to 
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retaliate.6 After the war’s end, the U.S. government realized that those bomber aircrews 
were experienced in long-distance flying and night flying, and that the large aircraft made 
to carry ammunition could be modified to carry passengers and freight instead of bombs. 
Thus, aviation historian R. G. Grant reminds us, “strategic bombing in World War I 
helped pave the way for the development of commercial aviation.”7 By the end of the war 
in 1918, Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States were all producing, on 
average, 2,500 planes a month.8 In the immediate aftermath of the war, with no more 
haste to outfit air forces, aircraft manufacturers almost collapsed. Surplus military 
aircraft, such as the Curtiss Jn-4 or “Jenny,” flooded the market at bargain rates, and 
thousands of military pilots sought civilian employment using their flying skills. 
Historian Roger E. Bilstein said these planes “captured the imagination of . . . young 
Americans,” most notably Charles A. Lindbergh.9 For the first time, certain individuals 
could afford to purchase their own aircraft for recreational purposes.  
 Flying in the early days after that first war was a harrowing venture. For instance, 
the first airmen to cross the Atlantic—a feat achieved in 1919—traveled in an open 
cockpit with the deafening sounds of the roaring engine and few instruments to assist 
them (and those unreliable, at best). They flew through often-turbulent weather, with zero 
visibility, disorienting lightning flashes, hail, snow, iced-up wings, darkness, and 
exhaustion. Therefore, milestone, record-breaking flights such as that one both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See R. G. Grant, Flight: 100 Years of Aviation (New York: DK Publishing, Inc., 2002), p. 103. 
 
7 Grant, Flight, p. 103. 
 
8 Richard P. Hallion, Taking Flight: Inventing the Aerial Age from Antiquity through the First World War 
(New York: Oxford U P, 2003), p. 378. 
 
9 Roger E. Bilstein, Flight in America: From the Wrights to the Astronauts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U P, 
2001), pp. 3-40. 
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showcased aviation’s potential and highlighted its dangers.10 After that flight, it would 
still be another nine years before Earhart would rise to national fame, and in that period 
of time, aviation did develop some safety measures. However, when Earhart was selected 
to be the first female passenger to cross the Atlantic in 1928, flying was still a very 
dangerous endeavor and her presence as a passenger was meant to demonstrate that 
anyone could travel by air, despite the potential for untold disaster. 
 Carrying the mail provided a foundation for the nascent but ambitious commercial 
airline industry.11 In 1918, the United States Post Office Department had begun using 
government-owned aircraft to experiment with delivering mail via plane, and many of 
those early airmail pilots risked injury or death to deliver mail marginally faster.12 
Government-owned and operated planes delivered Air Mail letters and packages for its 
first eight years of service; then, in 1925, U.S. Congress passed “The Kelly Act,” which 
was intended to encourage the development of commercial aviation. This Act authorized 
the Postmaster General to contract out Air Mail Service.13 From that point forward, the 
U.S. Post Office Department contracted with commercial air carriers to survey, establish, 
and operate service over a variety of new routes. Commercial airlines could not yet 
compete with the comparative reliability and flexibility of ground transportation, and so 
they depended on contracts with the U.S. Government to remain solvent. From the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Grant, Flight, p. 111. 
 
11 Michael J. H. Taylor, The Times Aviators: A History in Photographs (New York: HarperCollins, 2005), 
pp. 116-39. 
 
12 For more, see A. D. Jones, Aerial Mail Service: A Chronology of the Early United States Government Air 
Mail, March – Dec., 1918 (Mineola, NY: The American Air Mail Society, 1993), pp. 53-113; and William 
M. Leary, Aerial Pioneers: The U.S. Airmail Service, 1918-1927 (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution 
P, 1985).  
 
13 45 Stat. 594 (1925); P.L. 359, 68th Cong. 
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perspective of the infant commercial air industry, citizens who entrusted their letters to 
airplanes might next entrust their loved ones or themselves to airplanes. Each time 
citizens sent mail by air to friends or business associates and successfully received 
replies, the public faith in the utility of flight grew. However, the lack of federal 
regulations made flying still a perilous endeavor, and U.S. Air Mail Service pilots faced a 
high fatality rate.14  
 Meanwhile, a number of other jobs appeared in the 1920s for enterprising pilots: 
skywriting advertising; crop dusting; aerial survey photography; Hollywood stunt 
piloting; and, most prominently, barnstorming. Barnstormers awed crowds with highly 
publicized aerial acrobatics. They performed circus tricks, such as wing walking, hanging 
by trapeze underneath the plane, crossing midair between one plane’s wing to another’s, 
illusory death falls, and staged crashes to please the crowds. These dare devils—like the 
Air Mail pilots—risked death or injury for a paycheck and the possible thrill of flight 
itself. At the same time, press magnates and wealthy flight enthusiasts who were 
“airminded”—by which I mean they were advocates and enthusiasts of flight and 
unafraid to fly—sponsored contests for record-breaking flights, backed by cash prize 
money.15 A number of brave and talented pilots answered their call, some dying 
spectacularly in the process. Those who succeeded—most notably Lindbergh and 
Earhart—became national heroes and icons. Therefore, despite the postwar recession and 
then the Great Depression, the Golden Age of Aviation developed in the 1920s and 
1930s.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 From 1918-1927, 38 U.S. Airmail Service Pilots, mechanics and field personnel died. See “Fatalities in 
the Line of Duty,” Air Mail Pioneers (Web); accessed Feb. 28, 2015. 
 
15 The term “airminded” was a common term in the 1920s and 1930s used to describe those Americans who 
embraced the new technology and participated in aviation. 
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A federal response to the barriers and risks faced by aviation came with the Air 
Commerce Act of 1926, which responded to some of the public concerns over air safety. 
Prior to government intervention, aviation was, as one Earhart biographer describes it—a 
“chaotic industry.”16 While there was increasing safety in flight after the Air Commerce 
Act, the in-flight conditions were harsh. Thomas A. Heppenheimer’s account of Henry 
Ford’s newly produced transport aircraft, the “tin goose,” illustrates the state of flight in 
1925: 
Trimotors could fly high enough to top mountains . . . but had no pressurization or 
adequate cabin heating. An airline might cruise at twenty thousand feet but 
passengers would freeze. Some passed out. Some died walking into a propeller. 
Many got airsick. Western Air Express advertised that people could fly with the 
windows open or shut. Some stuck their heads out to throw up. Planes had to be 
hosed down after a flight.17 
As Heppenheimer’s description suggests, the early commercial aviation industry had the 
challenging duty to promote a form of transportation perhaps more efficient than ground 
transit, but besmirched by tales of sickened passengers and even fatal trips.  
 Persuading a public to take the risk of flight, despite the uncertainties and the very 
public accounts of duress, would require rhetorical messages that could convince people 
that the discomfort up in the air was worth it. As a result, flight and its safety had to be 
sold, not only as a (potentially) more efficient transportation option, but also as one 
associated with excitement and novelty. To sell this message, the industry leaned on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Susan Ware, Still Missing: Amelia Earhart and the Search for Modern Feminism (New York: Norton, 
1993), p. 65. 
 
17 Thomas A. Heppenheimer, From Turbulent Skies: The History of Commercial Flight (New York: Wiley, 
John, and Sons, Inc., 1995), p. 25.  
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record-setting pilots who demonstrated not only that the sky was a place of great wonder, 
bravery, and adventure and that it also offered a safe path home. It was in this 
environment that the first commercial air services began. The nascent industry promised 
passengers a completely novel perspective on the earth, adventure-filled travel, and the 
opportunity to experience the most modern mode of transit. Unsurprisingly, relatively 
few civilians experimented with flying. Even with the development of enclosed cabins, 
passengers had to endure deafening noise, body-rattling vibration, stomach-churning 
turbulence, and extreme temperatures. In addition, those early commercial flights were 
unpredictable: they had to be canceled during bad weather and they frequently made 
forced landings.18  
 That conundrum—about how to make flight safe for humans—was an old 
problem. It had plagued the first inventors. The Wright brothers had dedicated four years 
to testing the safety of their earliest gliders prior to their first human powered flight in 
1903.19 Even in the decade that followed their first successful flight, the risks involved in 
flying were still tremendous: there were no safety measures, such as seat belts, enclosed 
cockpits or ground-to-air communication, for instance. Yet, by 1911, a dozen aviation 
companies had emerged that foresaw the commercial potential of producing, selling, and 
improving airplanes. More than fifty firms were then making airplane parts. The demands 
of WWI had pushed the industry to increase aircraft production. War contracts had 
catalyzed the industry and narrowed the competition from seven firms to four, making 
monitoring easier. Indeed, as Earhart became a household name in 1928, there was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Grant, Flight, p. 132. 
 
19 “Inventing A Flying Machine,” Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, n.d. (Web), accessed Nov. 
4, 2014.  
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already a campaign in place that encouraged Americans to give flight a chance.20 In 
addition to heightened volume in production, there were great leaps in aviation 
innovations. Compare, for example, the photograph of the 1903 Wright Flyer, 
constructed out of a spruce wooden frame, covered in a finely-woven cotton cloth, to 
Lindbergh’s The Spirit of Saint Louis, with its enclosed cockpit, 425-gallon gasoline tank, 
and mild carbon steel fuselage. Both of these planes are exhibited at the National Air and 
Space Museum: the Spirit of Saint Louis hangs next to air- and spacecraft in the 
Milestones of Flight Gallery. The Wright Flyer is on display in a second floor room. As 
the placement of these two iconic planes at the NASM registers, the era of early aviation, 
which produced them both, was a dynamic one. 
 By the late-1930s, as the U.S. military began preparing for the possibility of 
entering World War II, airplanes had become a critical component to the war effort, and 
there was a need to recruit and train pilots. The exigency of war convinced the military to 
consider recruiting and training not just white male pilots, but African-American male 
pilots, too. The story and the war record of the Tuskegee Airmen, which this project will 
explore, intersect with many technological innovations in air combat. Men enlisted in the 
Tuskegee Experiment from all over the U.S., expressing both their patriotism and also 
their desire to learn how to fly during an era when there were few opportunities for 
African Americans to attain a pilot’s license. Once troops were sent to North Africa, 
pilots of the 99th pursuit squadron flew the P-39 Airacobra, an essential U.S. fighter 
aircraft of WWII that featured tricycle landing gear and the engine behind the cockpit. A 
second fighter aircraft, the Curtiss P-40 Warhawk, was one of the most durable fighters 
but rarely “outperformed” its opponents. Most Tuskegee Airmen were associated with the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For more detail, see Bilstein, Flight in America, pp. 41-83. 
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P-51 Mustang, an aircraft most famous as an air-to-air combat interceptor and escort and 
whose tail when painted red fetched the Tuskegee Airmen the nickname “Red Tails.”21 
All three aircraft were workhorses of WWII and made it possible for African Americans 
to serve as escort pilots to the white bomber crews.  
 World War II brought greater public understanding not only for aviation’s 
potential for destruction but also for its everyday utility. After the war, Americans took 
for granted that airplanes were part of the transportation system, and, increasingly, they 
began to picture themselves riding inside them. Therefore, the beginning of the Second 
World War serves as an appropriate bookend to the Golden Age of Aviation. The risks 
inherent in flying continued, but as the tools developed for the war filtered down to 
commercial aircraft, flying became an increasingly safer mode of transit. This 
dissertation focuses less on this later period, because flying had become statistically so 
much safer. Instead, I examine those years before war’s end and look carefully at the 
stories that circulated and that assured potential new passengers that flying was safe 
enough.  
 
Critical Contexts 
My study sits at, and even nudges, the boundaries of the communication 
discipline. My concerns in this project echo those of communication scholars more 
broadly: safety and risk, citizenship, race, class, and gender. In my work, I engage two 
primary theoretical constructions—the social imaginary and public memory—and use as 
bricks and mortar a wide variety of texts that circulated primarily during the twentieth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 For more information about the P-39, P-40, and P-51, see “Aviation Models,” The Aviation History 
Online Museum, accessed Feb. 25, 2015. 
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and twenty-first century. The textual fragments I found in archives, libraries, and 
online—newspaper articles and newsmagazines (from both the white and black press), 
published memoirs, congressional testimony, and commemorative events and 
structures—date in large part from the first half of the twentieth century, and, when 
considered collectively, animate fleeting debates and messages about the perception of 
safety from the earliest days of human motorized flight in the United States.  
 In conducting a study of the rhetoric of flight’s safety from the beginning of the 
20th century until the mid-1940s, along with later interpretations of this era in public 
memory, I have carved a new path that branches out from existing lines of inquiry. 
Organizational communication has been interested in the ways that various disciplines 
have represented concerns about safety and risk—primarily within the health sciences 
and physical sciences, and in technical communication. Such research has mostly been 
quantitative in nature and based on studies of institutional and individual behavioral 
responsiveness to risk. Such studies have considered external dangers, such as sickening 
food or dangerous work conditions, and how risk can be ameliorated through the 
implementation of safety practices. While studies about occupational risks or the dangers 
of  ’tween online dating practices, for example, attend to perspectives on civic safety, 
they do so primarily within the boundaries of quantitative analysis.22 What distinguishes 
my study from the quantitative studies concerning risk and safety is the premise from 
which I work: that it is possible for the perception of safety to be attained not just by 
specific behaviors or methods, but also through the telling, retelling, and shaping of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 See for example Jennifer Welbourne, Tara Hartley, Sybill Ott, and Sherrilyn Robertson, “Effects of Risk-
Focused and Recommendation-Focused Mental Imagery on Occupational Risk,” Health Communication 
23.5 (2008): 473-82; Sonia Livingstone, Kjartan Olafsson, and Elizabeth Staksrud, “Risky Social 
Networking Practices Among ‘Underage’ Users: Lessons for Evidence-Based Policy,” Journal of 
Computer-Mediated Communication 18.3 (2013): 303-20.  
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stories. My project, at its core, is an analysis of the stories that circulated about flight, 
beginning with the first reports of the Wright brothers’ initial success. 
 Within organizational communication, a subset of researchers has studied the 
safety of commercial flight. My own purview is a step removed: I study the discourse that 
circulated about how safe and how risky the public perceived flight to be, both in 
commercial flight (Chapters Two and Three) and in air combat (Chapter Four). In my 
work, I have benefited from and been inspired by the contributions of colleagues in 
organizational communication who have a shared this topic of interest. Scholars in this 
more narrow field have considered how air traffic controllers, pilots, flight attendants, 
and airline passengers communicate—and how their communication reflects risk and 
safety to passengers, both on the ground and up in the air. Their findings have been 
productive. For example, research on human communication among air traffic controllers 
has found how unclear exchanges of phrases and protocol have led to dangerous 
outcomes in flight.23 To cite a second example, I point to two studies by Alexandra G. 
Murphy, whose work helped me see aviation in a new light and inspired me to further 
investigate some of the communicative practices she observed.24 In her work, Murphy 
interprets the discrete yet everyday routines of flight attendants as performances or 
discursive practices. The public expects flight attendants to smile through turbulence and 
to adhere to strict codes concerning dress and make-up routines that reflect a calming 
presence up in the air. Flight attendants, Murphy argues, play a powerful role in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See Karen Ashcraft and Dennis Mumby, “Organizing a Critical Communicology of Gender and Work,” 
Journal of the Sociology of Language 166 (2004): 19-43; John W. Howard, III, “Tower, Am I Cleared to 
Land?: Problematic Communication in Aviation Discourse,” Human Communication Research 34 (2008): 
370-91. 
 
24 See Alexandra G. Murphy, “An Analysis of Communication and Sensemaking during In-Flight 
Emergencies,” Journal of Applied Communication Research 29 (2001): 30-53; Murphy, “Hidden 
Transcripts of Flight Attendant Resistance,” Management Communication Quarterly 11 (1998): 499-535. 
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projecting confidence of the safety of the plane and the flight. Murphy’s identification of 
and interpretation of the performativity of safety inspired me to investigate the rhetorical 
practices and performances involved in assuring the public of the safety of flight.  
 What, then, have fellow scholars of rhetoric investigated along these lines? Most 
rhetorical inquiry related to the dialectic of risk and safety in human aviation has hitherto 
focused on the spectacle of risk. Spectacular disasters, such as the explosions of the 
Hindenburg and the Challenger and the controversy surrounding the Enola Gay 
Smithsonian exhibit, have prompted researchers both in and outside of Communication 
Studies to study disasters as representations of risk. 25 Out of the eight iconic photographs 
that Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites chose to interpret in their book, No Caption 
Needed, two are photographs of aircraft disasters: the Hindenburg and the Challenger.26 
Hariman and Lucaites draw out the dialectical relationships between progress and risk 
and control and catastrophe.27 They found that the rupturing of the Hindenburg also 
ruptured humanity’s illusion of control.28 While the U.S. public saw the Hindenburg 
blow up in a photograph in the pages of a newspaper and in film, the Challenger blew up 
on live TV before the eyes of millions. President Reagan described the astronauts as 
brave adventurers, and quoted John Gillespie Magee, Jr.’s poem “High Flight” to say that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See Richard H. Kohn, “History and the Culture Wars: The Case of the Smithsonian Institution’s Enola 
Gay Exhibition,” The Journal of American History 82.3 (1995): 1036-63; Hubbard, Bryan and Marouf A. 
Hasian, Jr., “Atomic Memories of the Enola Gay: Strategies of Remembrance at the National Air and 
Space Museum,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 1.3 (1998): 363-85. 
 
26 My understanding of the iconicity of these disasters depends on Robert Hariman and John L. Lucaites, 
No Caption Needed: Iconic Photographs, Public Culture, and Liberal Democracy (Chicago: U of Chicago 
P, 2007). 
 
27 Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, p. 244.  
 
28 Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, p. 250.  
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the astronauts “slipped the surly bonds of earth” to “touch the face of God.”29 Hariman 
and Lucaites mention President Reagan’s rhetorical efforts to restore the public’s 
confidence in flight’s safety, yet they study these two flights primarily as examples of 
humanity’s gambles. Their research has certainly reshaped the field and how scholars see 
visual communication, and I borrow from them the idea of the appropriation and 
reappropriation of images when I write about how iconic stories of flight have circulated. 
However, their focus on spectacle and disaster and risk and control perhaps kept them 
from seeing the role that stories can play, not to stir up fear, but to inspire and reassure 
the public. That is the focus of my project. 
 Some rhetoricians have studied the dialectic of risk and safety in various 
discourses—just not in regard to human flight. For example, Donyale R. Griffin-Padgett 
and Donnetrice Allison coined the phrase “restorative rhetoric” to characterize the 
responses of mayors Rudolph Giuliani and Ray Nagin to 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina, 
respectively.30 This scholarship considered the rhetorical process of restoring hope and 
attending to the dialectical nature of risk and safety. Other recent scholars have followed 
similar lines of inquiry. Bryan Taylor and Judith Henry examined the terminology used to 
talk about nuclear weapons. They argued that the term “stockpile stewardship” 
rhetorically frames the storing of nuclear weapons as a safe and generative practice.31 Yet 
another pair of rhetoricians, Lisa Corrigan and Amanda Edgar, identified the “jazz 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Qtd. by Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, p. 254. 
 
30 Donyale R. Griffin-Padgett and Donnetrice Allison, “Making a Case for Restorative Rhetoric: Mayor 
Rudolph Giuliani and Mayor Ray Nagin’s Response to Disaster,” Communication Monographs 77.3 
(2010): 376-92.   
 
31 Bryan C. Taylor and Judith Hendry, “Insisting on Persisting: The Nuclear Rhetoric of “Stockpile 
Stewardship,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 11.2 (2008): 303-34. 
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vernacular” that Spike Lee used in his post-Katrina documentary, When the Levees 
Broke,32 arguing that it is Lee’s choice to play a soothing jazz soundtrack behind images 
of devastation that, in fact, amplifies his portrayal of the hurricane disaster. In all of these 
examples, Communication scholars have pointed to how rhetorical invention has been 
used to interpret tremendous risk. It follows, then, that messages of safety have the ability 
to reframe risk and to possibly restore public confidence. My study depends upon the 
precedent of such critical perspectives concerning messages of safety.  
 
Publics and Citizens 
For my project, I poll a population I call the “citizens of the air.” They were the 
early adopters of human flight: the pilots, crew, passengers, and on-the-ground 
enthusiasts who constructed the earliest rhetorical messages that were aimed at 
convincing people of the safety of human flight. In thinking about the citizens of the air, I 
acknowledge that Communication scholarship has offered many definitions of 
“citizenship,” and that our understanding of what and who comprises citizens and 
members of the public has evolved over the years. Political philosopher John Dewey long 
ago defined “the public” as the interaction among strangers who are hardly impartial to 
the actions of others.33 Taking it a step further, Robert Asen and Daniel Brouwer asserted 
that the very act of discourse alone is itself an act of citizenship.34 Finally, David 
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33 John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Holt, 1927), p. 126. 
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Cisneros interrogated how citizenship can reflect a hybridity when an immigrant to the 
U.S. self-identifies neither as “alien” nor fully American.35 Rhetorical inquiry, therefore, 
does not see stable entities in its understanding of what a public is and in its efforts to 
illumine and define citizenship. Rather, to borrow from Asen and Brouwer, the public is 
an “ephemeral phenomenon built through public perception.”36 This concept is 
foundational for me since the citizens of the air that I identify and study in my project 
inhabited several public identities. All were “airminded,” but their opportunities varied 
widely depending on their race, class, and gender. Flight had become a religion for some, 
a “Winged Gospel”—to borrow a phrase from Joseph Corn—an experience or 
technology with exuberant promise.37 
Not all scholars insist that a public sphere must be material. Communication 
scholar Thomas Farrell demarcated “the polis,” traditionally understood as the place of 
citizenship, as extending beyond mere physical location to relationships, and, indeed, to 
habits.38 Similarly, Gerald Hauser did not limit citizenship to a bounded geography. 
Instead, he interpreted individual discourses and practices by how they imbue “people’s 
shared sense of the world,” without reference to any material claims.39 While such 
assertions of the public as removed from materiality are provocative, they diverge from 
any articulations of the sky as a public sphere in this study.  	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37 See Joseph J. Corn, The Winged Gospel: America’s Romance with Aviation, 1900-1950 (New York: 
Oxford U P, 1983). 
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How we define what the sky is and where it begins is not an exact science. The 
demarcation line between what we call “the ground” and “the sky” has changed over the 
years. For the Wright brothers, entering “the sky” on December 17, 1903 meant elevating 
ten feet above ground. One hundred years later, commercial pilots and passengers—from 
the luxury of pressurized cabins—probably do not think they have entered “the sky” until 
they are above the trees or the clouds; they think nothing of cruising in the sky at 30,000 
feet.   
Second, because the sky is not a place we inhabit, it is impossible to return to a 
particular place in the sky in the way that we can return to a place on the ground where an 
event occurred.  President George W. Bush acknowledged this limitation at the 
dedication of the Air Force Memorial in 2006: “A soldier can walk the battlefields where 
he once fought. A Marine can walk the beaches he once stormed. But an airman can 
never visit the patch of sky he raced across on a mission to defend freedom.”40 Therefore, 
when trying to remember and commemorate things that happened up in the sky, there can 
be no material commemoration.  
 The naked eye observing the sky may have only the sun, moon, and stars as 
guides, but, in an era of commercial flight, private flying, and satellites, the sky is a 
vectored and monitored space. While there may be no “patch of sky” to commemorate, 
the air traffic control radarscope reflects a dome that has been vectored and represented in 
splashes of green, purple, and orange in a weather report. While the sky reflects a 
teeming public sphere of aircraft, satellites, and people, the material concerns of this 
project cannot be understood through the cartography of air traffic control. Rather, I 
understand the sky to be a material space that reflects a web of discourses, the 	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relationships and meaningful interactions among pilots, crew, and passengers that take 
place inside and among aircraft. Because of the materiality of the aerial public sphere, 
geographic locations on the ground are mirrored in the sky space above them. In some 
very profound manner, there is little separation between ground and sky. In order to 
support the claim that the public sphere is a material one, it is important to theorize the 
role of people in the aerial public sphere. 
When I write about “citizens of the air,” I am depending on the theoretical 
framework provided by Michael Warner in his research on publics and counterpublics. 
Warner’s research transformed our understanding of what a public is. He liberates publics 
from the confines of a room and from the gathered audience of a speech. Instead, Warner 
identifies publics in many settings and groupings and argues that no single text can 
characterize a public. Instead, it is the “ongoing space of encounter for discourse” that 
forms how a public interprets, promotes, and is transformed by what they see, hear, and 
experience in everyday life.41 In his book, he makes seven claims about publics, four of 
which are particularly pertinent to my project. When these claims are applied to the focus 
of my study—the rhetorical construction of flight’s safety—they take on even greater 
importance. The first of these claims, that a public is a relation among strangers, means 
that people who do not know one another can all share a common identity, but it also 
means that you never know who you might encounter from moment to moment. Warner’s 
public works on the premise that strangers may have in common a set of beliefs, but they 
do not necessarily know—nor are even necessarily familiar with—one another. In the 
early years of human flight, the public that became enthusiastic about the possibility of 
flight and shared an exuberance about flying—or even hoped to fly themselves—were 	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described as “airminded.” The “airminded” public can be read in this study as the citizens 
of the air.  
Warner also claims that a public is a social space created by the reflexive 
circulation of discourse. The excitement for flying depended upon the circulation of 
newspapers in the U.S. and all around the world. The stories told in the print media bore 
witness to this new technology and also to the possibility of its being safely adopted by 
the public. This reflexive circulation of discourse is pertinent to my study.  
Additionally, Warner asserts that publics act historically according to the 
temporality of their circulation. There is a specific time frame in which a discourse 
emerges. During the Golden Age of Aviation, flight caught the imagination of the public 
and inspired people, even though few of them at the time had the opportunity to 
themselves fly. The conditions of flight in the 1910s and ’20s and ’30s were rough, but 
the activity was novel and the possibilities plentiful. The public was airminded because 
they had an excitement for flying. Post-World War II, flying became commercial, 
democratic, and readily accessible to everyone, and because of such conditions, the 
excitement dissipated and, to a large extent, disappeared. Today, few gather around to 
celebrate flying; it is too mundane. Flying at the turn of the century, however, was special 
and novel, and that is why there was a public gathered around it.  
Finally, for my purposes, Warner claimed that a public is poetic world making.42 
The way that public discourse circulates is in part utilitarian in the way it provides 
information, but there is also a certain character in how discourse travels. Through that 
travel, we see the world in a certain way. The vocabulary coined in those decades sought 
to describe the new experiences and technology that could be seen in the sky. Much of 	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that vocabulary has been lost to history. For example, planes were once called “airships,” 
and individual flights were called “hops.” There is a poeticism to this vocabulary. As this 
engagement with archaic vocabulary terms illustrates, in order for me to investigate the 
circulation of discourse that described early flight during the Golden Age of Aviation, I 
have needed in my project to include historical accounts and circulating texts in order to 
make the rhetorical analysis legible. I provide accounts of the Wright brothers and how 
they came to understand the principles of flight. The advances in aviation in those early 
decades were phenomenal, but the actual physical conditions of flight in the 1920s might 
surprise and startle twenty-first century readers, who need that description in order to 
appreciate the hesitation of the public to consider flight. In order to understand Earhart’s 
accomplishments, for instance, it is necessary to understand the limitations she faced, her 
relationship with her publicity-savvy husband, and the fact that she struggled to gain 
sponsorship for her flights. Earhart’s financial struggles prompted her to attempt ever-
riskier flights and to make a spectacle of herself in order to fund her flying. In order to 
understand the accomplishments of the Tuskegee Airmen, to cite another example, it is 
helpful to have eyewitness accounts of the Jim Crow South that describe how its rules 
hindered black pilots from getting licenses and how oppressive this climate was for 
airminded blacks compared to the climate in Chicago. The story of the Tuskegee Airmen 
cannot be fully appreciated without understanding the role that the Roosevelts played, 
and public memory has drawn an oversimplified version of the Roosevelts’ involvement 
in Tuskegee; the reality was much more complicated. Therefore, in Chapter Four, I 
describe the Roosevelts’ visits to Alabama and the complicated relationship they had with 
Booker T. Washington and the Tuskegee Institute, and I describe how the imminent 
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threat of World War II created the exigency for black pilots. All of these accounts, found 
primarily within circulating newspapers during this era, bring this poetic world making of 
that historic discourse to life. 
Like Warner, Benedict Anderson provides a conceptual framework for the public 
sphere by destabilizing a modern geography demarcated by fixed lines on a map and 
replacing it with demarcations inspired by the social practices, texts, and discourses of 
particular groups of people, as a way to define the borders of a country.43 The imagined 
community is one that is defined by text and nationalism, not fixed borders. Instead of 
nationalism, what becomes common or definitional are the shared beliefs and values that 
emerge from imagined relationships. 
The citizens of the air that I identify and describe were all citizens of the United 
States. Their citizenship, however, reflected an airmindedness that got them to participate 
in the risk of flying. There was also a level of patriotism involved in flying. At the turn of 
the century, there was a race among nations—particularly France, Germany, England, 
and the United States—to be the first to invent the airplane. The Wrights claimed to be 
the first to invent sustained, controlled flight, and they did so within a competitive 
environment, particularly between U.S. and French aviators. For the purposes of my 
project, it is important not just that humanity gained the ability to fly in 1903, but also 
that it was two Americans who accomplished this feat first. The citizens of the air that I 
study were American. Warner acknowledges that citizenship can be an entity independent 
of institutional affiliation, but in my project, citizenship must be understood in relation to 
relevant regulations by federal and sometimes military institutions. Ever since the Air 	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Commerce Act of 1926, flying has been a regulated activity, and those participating in it 
have been screened and licensed. Warner does consider the barriers presented by 
institutions, but for him, they are just possibilities; in my project, they are not optional.44  
 
Counterpublics 
 According to Warner, a counterpublic “maintains at some level, conscious or not, 
an awareness of its subordinate status.”45 While counterpublics share similar 
communities and cultural traditions, they also share the barriers of individual and 
institutional racism, and limited access to educational and economic opportunities.  A 
search for counterpublics in aviation history reveals that it was white women and 
communities of color who were excluded from invitations to flight. From the first 
circulation of news about the Wright brothers’ feat in Kitty Hawk, human flight appears 
to have been intended for white male pilots; other demographic groups threatened to 
impose on this sacred space, or, worse, threatened the safety of those below. 
Race and gender are civic identities that both intersect with and diverge from the 
airminded identity. My focus in Chapter Three, on perhaps the most famous airminded 
woman of the Golden Age of Aviation, Amelia Earhart, demands a consideration of how 
her identity as a woman—a woman noted for her androgyny—helped to shape her 
experiences. Julia T. Wood argues that gender, as parsed in feminist scholarship, cannot 
be studied apart from “other aspects of identity and cultural life.”46 This dilemma is 
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particularly pointed in most analyses of Earhart, which tend to focus either on her 
feminism (to the exclusion of her flying), or on her aviation career (without regard for the 
particular constraints she experienced as a woman pilot in the 1930s). To situate such 
constraints within their historical context, I heed the lessons of Karlyn Kohrs Campbell 
and her elucidation of the double bind experienced by public women and the lessons of 
Robin Jensen et al., who have argued that Earhart endures as a “transcendent persona” 
who utilized her “symbolic capital” and performativity to promote her vision for the 
world.47 I build upon this characterization in my study to elevate the political and civic 
influence not only of Earhart, but also other well-known aviators. In Chapter Four, I 
focus on race as a civic identity in aviation. Focusing on characterizations of the 
contributions of the African-American “Tuskegee Airmen” of World War II, that chapter 
analyzes texts, reports, and speeches through Kirt Wilson’s theoretical analysis of race 
relations in the U.S. and his definition of a “rhetoric of equality,” or a “rhetoric of 
place,”48 in order to evaluate the role that race played in discourses about the black pilots. 
The dream of flight was not one among whites alone. African Americans during the 
1920s and 1930s identified flying and airmindedness as part of the rhetorical construction 
of the New Negro.49 My project, therefore, builds on the work of Communication 
scholars and critical theorists in order to re-enliven the messages of safety and risk that 
circulated among the citizens of the air in the early decades of human motorized aviation. 
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Circulating Texts 
 While critical rhetorical inquiry extends far beyond the podium, methodologically 
there remains an imperative for critics of rhetoric to justify how and why they have 
brought together certain circulating texts within a piece of rhetorical criticism. This 
project’s object of study is represented in the newspaper articles, news magazines, 
archival texts, and historic sites that circulated within and constituted the social 
imaginary of flight. Without the natural boundaries of a speech to delimit a study, such 
knitting together of related but disparate texts must be made transparent. When a speech 
functions as the primary rhetorical artifact, then any newspaper articles, photographs, or 
administrative documents, for example, can be identified and worked with as the context 
related to the critic’s primary text or object of study.  
 In an analysis that seeks to “unframe” these existing rhetorical models, Jenny 
Edbauer traced a rhetorical lineage of “public distribution” studying how they became 
oversimplified by sender-receiver-text models.50 Edbauer extended her analysis beyond 
the confines of “situations” to more porous “affective ecologies.” Instead of funneling 
rhetorical analysis into the confines of one situation—a fixed entity with fixed 
conditions—that public formation can be constituted through an “ecological model,” one 
defined by an “ongoing circulation process” with theoretical commitments to a 
“distributed emergence” and networks that can be interpreted by their movement and 
connections.51 Edbauer offered an “ecological model” that reclaimed rhetoric from the 
constraint of situations. If there are to be useful rhetorical models, she argued, they must 
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respond to the “temporal, historical, and lived fluxes” of everyday life. This “rhetorical 
publicness” is the result of a circulation of texts that Charles Taylor associated with the 
formation of popular belief and philosophies.52   
 It behooves critics of rhetoric to justify why they link together the particular texts 
they have chosen. One way in which to justify such rhetorical inquiry between and 
among texts has been by the cultural myths and ideologies of geographic place. 
Constituted publics and their beliefs can also be identified by shared political beliefs. 
This kind of rhetorical construction can be witnessed within rhetorical criticism from the 
mid-1990s in Kathryn Olson and Tom Goodnight’s analysis of the public controversy 
between pro- and anti-fur advocates.53 Interpreting social controversy bolsters 
understandings for textual movement that travels “from the ground up.”54 Summing up 
and interpreting the parts of a larger discourse afford the promise of seeing the big 
picture, be it controversy or other social concerns.  
 Controversy, according to Olson and Goodnight, spawns rhetorical engagements 
that determine the scope of their respective public and private spheres.55 Instead of being 
able to determine the limits of controversy by contiguous borders or by a particular event, 
any “arguer” who invents alternatives to established social conventions embodies the 
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greater controversy.56 The boundaries of a controversy are not limited by location, but 
rather travel pluralistically, following many different paths at once. 
 While Olson and Goodnight’s analysis reflects demarcation and contestation of 
boundaries within circulating texts, they must also be scrutinized by their patterns of 
recognition and representation. Burke explains that the dialectic affords “brief 
excursions” from any one meaning, to a newly constituted one from its two terms. Burke 
elaborates on such mergers as “near” and “far” and how they reflect one concept of 
“distance.” Both terms maintain the integrity of their own meaning, even after the 
collapse of their separate meanings. And sometimes, the meaning of one term becomes 
concealed after being paired with another term.  This question is essential to how the 
dialectic of risk and safety can be evidenced within the three iconic stories of flight.   
 
Social Imaginaries and the Social Imaginary of Flight 
 Since the publication of Modern Social Imaginaries in 2004, Communication 
scholarship has found useful intersections with political philosopher Charles Taylor, as 
Edbauer’s research proves. Taylor points to the change in societies since the vertical, 
hierarchical world of monarchies gave way to the horizontal structure of democracies. 
With this book, he issues a call to a new kind of inquiry, into what he calls the “social 
imaginary” which is constituted by a set of beliefs embodied and espoused by a group of 
people. He is not necessarily focused on discourse, but on the mobility of beliefs and 
philosophies—how they travel and how they come to shape society. The shift he 
identifies with the onset of democratic societies brought the possibility that beliefs could 
be communicated across and among people, as opposed to by edict or dictate from above, 	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or from a philosopher. Beliefs, he said, arise organically from the people and travel from 
person to person. In its early days, flight provided a way for people to imagine being able 
to travel at high speed in any direction they wanted to, much like beliefs and everyday 
perspectives move with greater mobility in Taylor’s imaginary. The very image of an 
airplane is, arguably, a visual metonym for human achievement and the triumph of 
ingenuity, bravery, and technology over nature. What in this project I call the “social 
imaginary of flight” is all of the social beliefs and perspectives that people during the 
Golden Age of Aviation, up through the beginning of World War II, associated with 
being up in the air: that flying was a transformative experience—that they could return 
from flight as different people—and that they could enjoy lasting benefits in their daily 
lives from having flown. These lasting benefits could have included opportunities for 
happiness, adventure, employment, and the new perspective gained from having seen the 
world from above. It was the airminded—the people whom I call citizens of the air—who 
helped to construct this heretofore-nonexistent public sphere. These people were more 
than just a public. I call them citizens to acknowledge their particular agency; they, after 
all, put themselves at risk in order to become a part of this burgeoning public sphere. In 
formulating this idea, I liberally borrow from Taylor, who has helped us understand that 
we are all participants in how we see and interact with the world.   
In 1903, the year the Wright brothers made their first successful flights, the social 
imaginary of flight that I represent in this study became a democratic proposition. When 
the Wrights first embarked on breaking the code and solving the problem of flight, they 
assumed they would be participating in a sport. However, they soon discovered that they 
would need the backing of science and industry to be successful in their quest to solve the 
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problem of flight. In 1905, when they found that they could pilot their planes sitting up 
and could therefore accommodate passengers, they began to see their invention’s 
commercial potential. Soon thereafter they acknowledged the potential military 
application of the new technology and began trying to sell their planes to American and 
European militaries. All along, the Wrights had to be strategic about keeping the 
invention of their aircraft, and their story about the first flights in 1903, in the eye of the 
public. While their invention had no real peer within the social imaginary of flight, the 
brothers had to keep their story in circulation in order to be credited with and celebrated 
as the inventors of human powered flight.  
With the invention of human flight, questions about its safety arose on at least 
three different levels: the level of administrators, the level of aviators, and the level of 
everyday Americans witnessing the formation of this new mode of transportation. These 
questions represent what circulated in the social imaginary of flight in its earliest days. 
Administrators asked practical questions about legislation: Should the sky be 
demarcated? Who owned the sky? Does altitude affect health? Should women fly when 
they are menstruating? What types of questions should aviation reporters ask, and what 
kinds of stories should they tell? What benefits could be reaped from this newly opened 
space, and how could it be legislated? How should pilots be trained? How could landings 
be predicted? How should pilots be licensed? Who should be allowed to become a 
licensed pilot?  
Aviators asked their own kinds of questions in the earliest days of flight, when 
there were few schools and no manuals: How do I afford a plane? How do I learn how to 
fly? What do I pack for the journey? Who do I bring along? Additionally, the questions 
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asked by white and black pilots were very different. Black pilots would have wondered 
who might have helped them if their plane landed off course? What might put the pilot in 
harm’s way, both up in the sky and back on the ground?  
Aside from the wonder of flight, citizens of the air were concerned about the 
safety of flight. In the earliest days of aviation, planes flew very low. Everyday 
Americans certainly wondered, for instance, whether an airplane might fall on their 
house. Landing presented its own set of challenges. Would the aircraft get tangled up in 
electrical wires flying over a neighborhood on the way to a runway? Would navigational 
aids be reliable? Before the infrastructure of flight was built, there were not enough 
runways. Would highways and city streets need to be commandeered by an airplane 
landing?  
The period I study in my project really ends with World War II, even though I pay 
attention to the way that public memory keeps these stories in circulation. The types of 
questions that arose in the social imaginary of flight changed radically with the onset of 
commercial air travel. It was no longer a radical concept that a human being could travel 
like a bird. Over time, the distances people traveled by airplane and the ease with which 
they traveled and the cost of traveling made the experience more and more commonplace. 
My project seeks to animate the beliefs and discussions that circulated in those earliest 
years of human aviation, before mass adoption of commercial flight.  
In the chapters that follow, I focus on three iconic stories from these early decades 
of flight and examine how they circulated. Taylor identified the kinds of texts that might 
circulate in an imaginary, and he thus sanctions the study of stories and legends and 
30
images, like the ones I study.57 He acknowledges that the imaginary is comprised of 
beliefs based on stories that may never have been true, but nonetheless have been 
influential to the public. Taylor’s social imaginary is constituted by people’s imaginations 
and by the everyday interactions of groups of people as evidenced in stories, legends, 
images, and common understandings through the circulation of texts. In the early days of 
flight, everyday Americans were seeing people doing something that they did not fully 
understand. The mere act of flight was so exotic that there was a desire to join aviators in 
the air (even though few could do so). The ones who did get the opportunity to become 
aviators were glorified.  
Taylor writes of a social “embeddedness” to one’s identity that comes out of such 
conceptions of reality.58 My study adopts Taylor’s premise, that there are rhetorical 
perspectives to be gleaned from the circulation of texts and images. In the circulation and 
recirculation of texts, my study finds the larger public perspectives about risk and safety 
during the early period of aviation and how they were negotiated by public memory.  
 
Chapter Summaries 
In each chapter, I interpret the circulation and recirculation of one iconic story of 
flight, and how that story contributed to the rhetorical construction of flight’s safety. I 
point to the texts and images that accomplished this task and that have come to shape the 
social imaginary of flight.  
Chapter Two: The Wright Brothers and the Origin Story of Flight. That Orville 
and Wilbur Wright were the first pilots to successfully accomplish controlled, motorized 	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flight in their biplane on December 17, 1903 has been a source of national and state pride. 
The story of those first four flights on that windy December day on the Outer Banks has 
become what I call “the origin story of flight.” The fact that the Wrights were two 
hardworking, methodical preacher’s sons from the Midwest seemed to suggest that their 
invention was something that everyday Americans who valued safety over risk could 
embrace. Before the Wrights, the inventors who had attempted flight had all been 
eccentric, wealthy adventurers. In this chapter, I put in context the Wrights’ origin story 
of flight, review the competing narratives and subplots that got drowned out as the 
Wrights’ claims became popularly adopted, and track the journey of their story over one 
hundred years as it circulated through newspapers and in politician’s speeches, and in the 
construction and development of the National Parks Historic Site on the Outer Banks that 
commemorates and documents the origin story. As this chapter demonstrates, the story 
was a touchstone for many subsequent milestones in aviation: from Lindbergh’s 
accomplishments, to the expansion of commercial flight during the 1960s, to the 1969 
landing on the moon, to the centennial celebration in 2003. Alongside the circulation of 
the story, I consider three events that threatened to tarnish in the Wrights’ image or 
destabilize their claim: the first air passenger death in a plane piloted by Orville Wright, 
Glenn Curtiss’s flight of failed competitor Samuel Langley’s Aerodrome in 1912, and the 
relocation of the 1903 flyer to London in 1928 after a skirmish with the Smithsonian. My 
detailed treatment of the Wright Brothers National Memorial explores the evolving 
nature of the origin story of flight and its public memory. This chapter can be read as a 
prequel to the two subsequent chapters: the shaping of the origin story of flight inspired 
other fliers who incorporated the legacy of the Wright brothers into their own rhetorical 
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platforms. Despite the many threats and challenges from other aviators, the Wright 
brothers’ iconic story of flight has remained intact.  
Chapter Three: Earhart: Reassuring a Skittish Public of Flight’s Safety. This 
chapter highlights the circulating texts of the 1920s and 1930s that related to Earhart’s 
nine-year aviation career. The attention she garnered after her disappearance bolstered 
her iconicity in the public imaginary, but overshadowed her achievements. During her 
lifetime, Earhart played a significant role in the development of the commercial air 
industry as both spokeswoman and cheerleader tasked with reassuring the American 
public of the 1920s and 1930s that flying was safe. The fame she garnered from her 
spectacular feats gave her a platform and a ready-made audience, and with a public 
relations-savvy spouse, she wrote three memoirs, delivered lectures, and gave interviews 
to ladies’ magazines. Unlike the discourses and texts of record-setting male pilots, such 
as Lindbergh or Wiley Post, those of Earhart’s aviation career reflect not only her 
achievements as a record-setting pilot but also a persistent rhetorical assignment of 
reassuring a mostly non-flying public to consider risking flight. It is ironic that the 
aviatrix who became a spokesperson of the commercial aviation industry and encouraged 
the public to see flying as safe, while downplaying its inherent risks, became, in her 
disappearance, an example of the risks involved in flying. 
Chapter Four: The Tuskegee Airmen and the Color Line in the Skies. The public 
memory of the so-called Tuskegee Airmen has come to serve a different function than 
have historical narratives. Chapter Four sets aside the public memory of the Tuskegee 
Airmen in order to examine texts related to the “Tuskegee Experiment”: a social and 
military experiment in World War II to determine if African Americans were sufficiently 
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competent to fly in combat. However, the collective term “Tuskegee Airmen” became 
popularized ten years after the war’s end, and, since then, has been conscripted into the 
broader public imaginary. The heroic narrative of the Tuskegee Airmen became a “safer” 
version of the Tuskegee Experiment in the way it omitted specific acts of racism during 
WWII. Rhetorical inquiry can afford further understandings of how public memory 
participates in ongoing negotiations with a historical record.   
The stories that circulated about the Tuskegee Airmen after WWII highlighted the 
claim that they “never lost a bomber.” Setting aside for a moment the fact that this was 
both an exaggeration and an unfair standard to be held to, this claim telegraphed the 
message that the white bomber pilots who flew for the United States in WWII were safer 
for having the black escort pilots who looked out for them. I read this claim through what 
Kirt Wilson calls the “rhetoric of place”: that white America expected blacks to know 
their place. 
 
Public Memory 
 This study could have focused solely on evidences of the circulation of texts 
during the Golden Age of Aviation, but I found it useful to consider some of the texts’ 
recirculation in public memory and how they illustrate the way that the shared beliefs 
within the social imaginary carry on. In order to think critically about how particular 
stories about flight have served as symbolic messages of safety, this rhetorical project 
incorporates public memory scholarship. The work of Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and 
Brian L. Ott offers insights as to how these iconic stories of flight might have operated 
within public memory, particularly the story of the Wrights as commemorated at the 
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Wright Brothers National Memorial.59 Dickinson, Blair, and Ott’s Places of Public 
Memory situates the work of public memory firmly within a rhetorical tradition. The 
chapter opens with a definition of rhetoric as “the study of discourses, events, objects, 
and practices that attends to their character as meaningful, legible, partisan, and 
consequential.”60 By this definition, the authors affirm the need for rhetorical study, and, 
like Edbauer and Taylor, evince an understanding of publics and how texts circulate and 
extend beyond formal public address and how they relate to one another and influence the 
public sphere. As a result of such circulation, rhetorical stances form, which in my study 
is representative of the social imaginary of flight.61  
 Dickinson, Blair, and Ott consider six “consensual assumptions of public 
memory,” all relevant to the recirculation of the iconic stories of flight in my study: 
First, public memory reflects present exigencies, not representations of the past. 
V. William Balthrop, Blair, and Neil Michel’s analysis of the World War II Memorial 
illustrates this point in a commemorative process of the WWII Memorial, that says “more 
about the present than about the past.”62 In this memorial, the exigencies of the present 
are channeled through particular current ways of remembering the war, from the vantage 
point of a new millennium. All acts of commemoration engage in this practice of relating 
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60 Dickinson, Blair, and Ott, eds., Places of Public Memory, p. 2. 
 
61 Dickinson, Blair, and Ott, eds., Places of Public Memory, p. 3. 
 
62 V. William Balthrop, Carole Blair, and Neil Michel, “The Presence of the Present: Hijacking ‘the Good 
War’,” Western Journal of Speech Communication 74.2 (2010): 170-207. 
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the past to a current audience by interpreting history through the needs of the 
contemporary moment.  
 Second, public memory narrates a public identity.63 Chapter Four of this study 
reckons with questions of collective identity and public memory in the exploration of all 
that is obscured when individual black pilots become remembered as Tuskegee Airmen. 
Any individual acts of racism, bravery, or fear become insignificant in light of this one 
united face to flight.  
 Third, public memory is “animated by affect,” but most explorations have been 
misguided either as “irreducible” or as an opportunity for “phenomenological 
explorations of trauma.”64 Both are insufficient in that not all responses to public memory 
are ones founded in trauma, nor is all public memory born of a traumatic event. Instead, 
there is always a great range of emotions, including that of apathy or neglect. Somewhere 
between emotion and dispassion, trauma and everyday, lies the stance of inquiry. Such 
questions animate the public memory of Amelia Earhart, which is more obsessed with the 
questions prompted by her disappearance and less with the successes of her aviation 
career.  
 Fourth, public memory, like the greater scope of rhetorical inquiry, is “partial, 
partisan, and thus frequently contested.”65 Certain memories are emphasized over others. 
As is in the case of my study, certain stories of flight are privileged over others, for the 
same reason that flying has necessitated a focus on safety in order to convince the public 
to take the risk of flight. Public memory is “partial, partisan, and frequently contested” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Dickinson, Blair, and Ott, eds., Places of Public Memory, p. 7. 
 
64 Dickinson, Blair, and Ott, eds., Places of Public Memory, p. 7. 
 
65 Dickinson, Blair, and Ott, eds., Places of Public Memory, p. 9. 
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because within a circulation of texts, certain people and institutions hold the power and 
the sway to influence how stories get told.  
 Fifth, public memory depends upon “language, ritual performances, 
communication technologies, objects, and places” to affirm and lend meaning to the 
“infrastructure” of such collective memory.66 All three stories of flight continue to 
recirculate as a result of such infrastructure, reified by historic sites and the display of 
their airplanes, along with regular accounts of their successes in museum exhibits, books, 
periodicals, and newspapers.  
 Finally, “public memory has a history” and is situated within particular “cultural 
practices” and intellectual perspectives.67 The many biographies of Amelia Earhart reflect 
not only a chronology of events, but also their relationship to cultural expectations and 
aspirations of the era in which they were scribed. One biography considers how the 
choice to put Earhart on the cover of Ms. Magazine responded to the exigencies of 
feminism, while another biography’s portrayal of Earhart as victim to the abusive 
authority of her husband, George Putnam, draws out a whole different set of concerns 
related to women, domesticity, and the roles they could play in public life. Both 
portrayals speak as much, if not more, to the public memory of Earhart during the time in 
which both were circulated.  
 Places of Public Memory makes clear that, most often, there remains a “trace” of 
the “real event” in all that is circulated about a historical figure or event.68 Such traces are 
evident in all three iconic stories of flight. The photograph of Orville Wright prone on his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Dickinson, Blair, and Ott, eds., Places of Public Memory, p. 10. 
 
67 Dickinson, Blair, and Ott, eds., Places of Public Memory, p. 10. 
 
68 Dickinson, Blair, and Ott, eds., Places of Public Memory, p. 13. 
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aircraft evidences the trace necessary to propel and remind the public of the origin story 
of flight. Representations of Earhart’s departure from Miami on June 2, 1937, offer the 
trace of her possible return. The shooting down of a German plane by a black pilot 
provides evidence of victorious air combat, singularly claimed by one of the Tuskegee 
Airmen. But how these stories circulate and strengthen the identity of one historical 
figure or a collective identity becomes the work of public memory.  
 In my study, I pay more attention to the social imaginary of human powered 
flight—more specifically three iconic stories of flights—than their public memory 
because, with the exception of the origin story of flight, public memory has come to 
redefine or obscure the original circulation of texts of Amelia Earhart and the black pilots 
of WWII. However, it is essential to engage with their public memory in order to see how 
the story has been appropriated and adapted over time. This work, then, contributes to 
Communication research as rhetorical analysis that stands at the pivot point of theoretical 
concerns regarding the social imaginary and public memory.      
 
Methodology and Terminology 
 
For my project, I conducted extensive archival and historic site research. Gaining 
proficiency with the more than forty years of history covered by my three iconic stories 
of flight has been essential to the rhetorical inquiry. At each research site, I focused on 
those texts that represent aspects of the rhetorical construction of the three iconic stories 
of flight’s safety. This journey included visits to Amelia Earhart’s birthplace in Atchison, 
Kansas; the 99s69 Museum in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; the National Air and Space 
Museum Archives; the Library of Congress; the American Heritage Center in Laramie, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 In 1928, Earhart founded and served as the first president of the 99s, an organization that continues to 
encourage and support women aviators. 
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Wyoming; the Tuskegee University Archives; and the National Park Service Archives at 
Tuskegee Airmen Historic Site. While in Tuskegee, Alabama, I traveled to Montgomery 
to conduct research visits at the Air Force Historical Research Agency at Maxwell Air 
Force Base. I made several trips to the Wright Brothers National Memorial and 
conducted research at the nearby Outer Banks History Center. In Dayton, Ohio, I visited 
several sites at the Dayton Aviation Heritage National Historic Park and the National 
Museum of the United States Air Force. Additional archival visits included the Women 
Air Service Pilots (WASP) Collection at Texas Woman’s University, the Amelia Earhart 
Papers at Purdue University, the Robert H. Hinckley Collection at the University of Utah, 
the Collett E. Woolman Collection at Louisiana State University Archives, and the 
Charles A. Lindbergh Papers at the Missouri History Museum.  
This rhetorical inquiry of flight’s safety depends upon the texts and images found 
at the above archival sites. How they circulate and recirculate to shape public 
perspectives and beliefs about safe flying is what I refer to as the social imaginary of 
flight. This naming represents the union of Taylor’s theoretical construct of the social 
imaginary and my study’s particular concern with how human flight required constant 
and changing reassurances of its safety in order to be widely adopted by the public.  
 While I examined both public and private communication during archival visits, 
the texts of this study are mostly public documents from 1903 to 1945, meaning there is 
evidence that they circulated, as Taylor would say, among strangers. However, the 
private communications that I discovered informed my understanding of the period and 
of the development of commercial aviation. Telegrams sent and received by Earhart, for 
example, give clues regarding her public speaking duties and showcase her daily 
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logistical negotiations with her husband and with other colleagues, such as Eugene Vidal, 
the director of the Bureau of Air Commerce. The Wright brothers were prolific diarists 
and correspondents. Much of their correspondence did not circulate until after Orville 
Wright’s death, making them influential to their public memory, but only after 1948. 
Some of these observations have been included in this study.  
 I identify the three stories of this study as iconic. They have reached a wide 
audience and continue to recirculate in public memory. This appropriation of what it 
means to be iconic follows Hariman and Lucaites’s logic of iconicity, that like the 
photographs in No Caption Needed, the iconic stories of flight are “recognized as such 
immediately,” and that they do the “heavy lifting required to change public opinion,” 
which in the case of these particular iconic stories of flight has influenced public opinion 
with regard to flight’s safety.70 I borrow Hariman and Lucaites’s observations about the 
appropriation of iconic photographs—how images become part of our everyday culture— 
to further define how iconic stories have circulated within the social imaginary of flight.71 
While there are other iconic stories of early human flight, the three in this study attain the 
same measures of iconicity as the photographs identified by Hariman and Lucaites. Just 
as photographs get appropriated to frame and amplify tenets of a Democratic Society, so 
too these iconic stories of flight that evidence perceptions of safety.   
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, pp. 12-13. 
 
71 Hariman and Lucaites, No Caption Needed, pp. 35-36. 
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Limitations of this Dissertation 
It goes without saying that Charles Lindbergh is a central figure in aviation 
history. He was internationally famous, wrote five memoirs, and inspired a generation.72 
He was the superhero of the 1920s. If I were not focused on the dialectic of risk and 
safety in the manner in which I am, I might have included a separate chapter on 
Lindbergh. This dissertation is strengthened by his presence in each of the chapters. That 
being said, Lindbergh’s contribution to a discourse of safety was limited to the safety 
checklist he made for pilots.73 He saw himself as a record-breaking pilot and an 
inspiration to the public, but he broke records without reassuring fearful flyers of flight’s 
safety. He was a solitary figure and he did not make it a point to address the issues of the 
public’s safety in flight.   
 A longer project would also examine the commemorative sites marking the 
contributions of Earhart and the Tuskegee Airmen, since those sites tell a story about the 
aviators’ role in public memory. Although I do not have space in this project to treat 
these important sites, I acknowledge the ways that they influenced me. The Tuskegee 
site, in particular, deserves treatment, but since it is relatively new and in a state of 
development right now, it did not seem prudent to analyze it here. When I first visited the 
Tuskegee site in 2010, the visitor’s center was a temporary structure, no larger than a 
one-room schoolhouse, with an introductory film and a small exhibit, and a book listing 
biographical information about the airmen. Since then, the site has added two hangars, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 See Scott A. Berg, Lindbergh (New York: Putnam, 1998). 
 
73 Lindbergh’s daughter, Reeve Lindbergh, said, “Some people believe the most important thing Charles 
Lindbergh contributed to the field of aviation was not the flight in the Spirit of Saint Louis but the safety 
check list”; qtd. in David Courtwright, Sky As Frontier: Adventure, Aviation and Empire (New York: Texas 
A & M U P, 2005), p. 74. 
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each housing a separate exhibit. The focus of the site, particularly with the addition of the 
second hangar, is the heroic narrative of the Tuskegee Airmen, and over the course of my 
several visits there, I became convinced that to do justice to the enormously complicated 
history of the Tuskegee Airmen Historic Site would send me beyond the scope of this 
project. The Tuskegee Airmen National Historic Site will eventually warrant the same 
treatment I give in Chapter Two to the Wright Brothers National Memorial. 
 A third limitation of my project concerns the treatment of air combat. In my 
prospectus, I set a research boundary that I soon realized was naive. I said that, “while 
effective representations of flight do come from fighter pilots, I will not focus on military 
flight in this project and will instead concentrate on exemplary missions in civilian 
life.”74 This statement suggests that it was possible to interpret discourses of flight’s 
safety to the exclusion of air combat. For a long time, I tried to avoid representations of 
combat. In order to represent the story of the Tuskegee Airmen prior to their 1943 
entrance in WWII, I emphasized the Civilian Pilot Training Program and domestic flight 
training and its public memory. However, after reviewing black and white newspapers 
from 1938 to 1945, I became fascinated by the purported relationship between the white 
bomber pilots and crew and the black escort pilots—and also the expectations white 
bomber pilots had of their black escort pilots. I saw how this relationship was 
represented, most especially in newspaper articles about air combat. While I had little 
prior knowledge about military aircraft or air combat, I knew that it would be 
irresponsible to sidestep representations of air battle. With regard to air combat, there are 
still concerns about safety. After all, it was not just commercial air passengers who hoped 	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for safety; it was also the bomber pilots. The presence of the escorts offered some level of 
reassurance regarding their safety while in combat. Chapter Four deals with issues of 
flight safety, but does so in a manner that chapters Two and Three cannot. 
 
Conclusion 
To date, motorized human flight has been interpreted within Communication 
research primarily as a phenomenon characterized by possible or actual disaster. In this 
study, the risk associated with flight has been tempered and mediated through rhetorical 
constructions of safety. The study has been inspired by Burke’s framing of the dialectical 
relationship between the codependent states of risk and safety in the telling and retelling 
of three stories that make us feel safer about flying. The stories—the Wright brothers and 
the origin story of flight, the story of Earhart’s aviation career, and the heroic narrative of 
the Tuskegee Airmen—contributed to the public’s belief in flight’s safety. This study sets 
out to demonstrate that taking the risk of flying has been the result not only of 
technological advancement but also confidence-building narratives. This study has the 
potential to encourage future research on how stories about risk, adventure or 
technological advances have the power to shape the public’s perception about the safety 
of those pursuits.  
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Chapter Two 
 
  THE WRIGHT BROTHERS AND THE ORIGIN STORY OF FLIGHT 
 
“We had taken up aeronautics as a sport. We reluctantly entered upon the scientific side of it.” 
—Orville and Wilbur Wright1 
 
 
Most of the inventors who built and flew the earliest aircraft models could be 
described either as quixotic, madcap, or flamboyant, or as clever, wealthy adventurers. 
The earliest devices—hot air balloons, dirigibles, and gliders—along with their 
passengers, made it possible to enter the skies 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Some of these early, lighter-than-air aircraft 
made extensive trips and elevated to impressive 
heights. However, inventing heavier-than-air 
aircraft that could successfully get up in the 
air—with a man or woman aboard and then 
safely land—eluded every one but two 
brothers. These brothers came to be known to 
the public as a pair of hardworking, sober 
preacher’s sons from the Midwest who worked 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Orville and Wilbur Wright, “The Wright Brothers’ Aeroplane: with pictures from photographs supplied 
by the authors” in New Century Magazine 5 (Sept. 1908), n.p., 15 pp. The photograph featured on this page 
of Orville and Wilbur Wright is archived at the Library of Congress. I have not sought institutional 
permission to publish the images in this dissertation because they are in the public domain or are archived 
in government repositories, and all follow the guidelines of the Fair Use Statute, which follows trends in 
court decisions that define fair use in academic settings.   
Figure 1: Orville and Wilbur Wright, 1909  
(Library of Congress) 
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with singular focus and who shunned the limelight.  
When the Wright brothers first decided to dedicate themselves to solving “the 
problem of flight,” as it was called at the turn of the twentieth century, they first assessed 
the state of aeronautics.2 At the time, in the U.S., the best-known and most amply funded 
attempt at advancing human powered flight came from Samuel Langley. Langley, the 
Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, had garnered a great deal of public attention for 
having invented—and, in 1896, having successfully launched—his steam-powered 
aircraft, the Aerodrome. The Wrights acknowledged Langley’s—and others’—
contributions, but pointed to three critical problems that needed to be solved before a 
human could safely fly. Putting aside for a moment the technical terms for the items on 
their wish list—such as “wing warping” and “airfoil curvature”—the Wrights’ greatest 
contribution was, perhaps, their recognition that the pilot needed to be able to exercise 
control over the aircraft.3 With six years of research and experimentation, they broke the 
code. 
 Their first successful motorized flights in Kitty Hawk proved that they had begun 
to solve the “problem of flight.” However, their success was not readily apparent to a 
public used to stories of lighter-than-air balloons and dirigibles that went up thousands of 
feet in the air and stayed up for a long time. Indeed, Alberto Santos-Dumont’s stunning 
flights around the Eiffel Tower in his dirigible in 1901 seemed to have pushed the 
envelope with regard to the public’s understanding of human flight. Dumont’s flights 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The “problem of flight” circulated frequently during this era to represent the hopes and concerns faced by 
early aviators in their quest for greater and greater altitude and control. See “The Problem of Flight,” 
Washington Post (May 6, 1907), p. 6. 
 
3 Tom D. Crouch and Peter L. Jakab, The Wright Brothers and the Invention of the Aerial Age 
(Washington, DC: National Geographic Society, 2003), p. 48. 
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around the towering structure of the 1889 World’s Fair honored the traditions of 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century balloonists who always flew in the whirr of 
spectacle.4 That is why when the Wrights successfully achieved their goal of human 
powered flight on December 17, 1903, near remote and sandy dunes with the few 
eyewitnesses, the reading public expected to hear about spectacle, not about four flights 
that that flew only 852 feet. The earliest newspaper report greatly exaggerated their 
accomplishment citing the brothers had soared three miles over land and sea.5  
How could the Wrights help the public view their simple Flyer as revolutionary—
and help it appreciate the invention of human powered flight, despite the fact that their 
aircraft neither ascended very high nor stayed aloft very long? Since they made their 
initial, successful flights far away from the crowds that had so often gathered to watch the 
lighter-than-air feats that preceded their heavier-than-air flights, could they convince the 
public that the future of human flight was a sober, unglamorous venture that rose above 
the spectacle and sport that had characterized the efforts of their predecessors and 
contemporaries?  This chapter grapples with these questions and follows the rhetorical 
public conversation that trailed the Wrights’ first flights. The circulating texts of the 
opening decades of the twentieth century tell a fascinating story about the effort and 
twists and turns that went into crafting an origin story for human flight that has long since 
entered public memory. The Wrights told and retold their simple tale of their hard work, 
discipline, and research, and of the resulting first four flights. That simple story came to 
be adopted as a national touchstone of pride, especially as it was crystallized, interpreted, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See Alberto Santos-Dumont, My Airships: The Story of My Life, 1904 (New York: Dover Publications, 
Inc., 1973), p. 68. 
 
5 “Flying Machine Soars,” Chicago Tribune (Dec. 19, 1903), p. 3. 
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and celebrated at the Wright Brothers National Memorial in Kill Devil Hills, NC. In this 
chapter, I argue that the circulation and recirculation of the Wright brothers’ origin story 
of flight reframed successful flying as privileging safety over spectacle. While the story 
about two, methodical, hardworking men from America’s heartland, who traveled to a 
remote location in North Carolina to solve the “problem of flight” was first shared with 
the public on December 18, 1903, it continues to circulate not only to mark invention but 
also to genuflect toward the promise, if always provisional, of flight’s safety.  
 
Predecessors in Flight 
Before focusing on the Wrights and the origin story of flight they crafted, it is 
helpful to place the Wrights in the context of the greater story of human attempts to fly. 
Remember the story of Daedalus and Icarus, whose sun-melted waxen wings seemed 
ever-more cautionary now that the Wright brothers were attempting similar endeavors in 
Kitty Hawk. The mythology of Icarus presented the spectacle of flight, but also warned 
that without moderation, flying can end in disaster. 
Despite the many disasters, there were successful aerial events along the way that 
did reinvigorate the seemingly innate longing to gain the perspective of birds. A little 
more than one hundred years before the Wrights, another pair of brothers, Joseph and 
Etienne Montgolfier, both French paper manufacturers, began to experiment with hot air 
balloons. In June 1783, they launched their first balloon in a public demonstration of 
flight in Annonay, France. Their paper-lined silk hot air balloon flew 1.5 miles for 
twenty-eight minutes, reaching an altitude of 3,000 feet. The Montgolfiers prepared for 
their public demonstration by first testing flight with non-human passengers: a sheep, a 
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duck, and a rooster. They launched the animals up in the air from the palace at Versailles 
in order to test the strength of their trial balloon.6 The Montgolfier brothers are credited 
with inventing the hot-air balloon, but for this honor they competed amid a field of other 
French inventors, some who were powering their balloons with helium gas. Public 
memory can typically accommodate only one inventor (or pair of inventors), and so it 
was the Montgolfiers who achieved credit for the first successful human flight in a 
balloon.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Thomas Crouch, Lighter than Air: an Illustrated History of Balloons and Airships (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins U P, 2009), pp. 16-62.  
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                 Figure 2: The Montgolfier brothers’ hot air balloon flight at Versailles, 1783  
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A second pair of brothers who also preceded the Wrights—Otto and Gustav 
Lilienthal from Germany—modeled the kind of rigorous testing that the Wrights would 
emulate. Otto researched the physics of flight, built his own monoplane glider, and made 
thousands of test flights, which he and his brother meticulously recorded and studied. In 
1889, Otto published his book, Bird Flight as the Basis of Aviation, which was the most 
advanced study of the era about the mechanics of flight.7 Wilbur Wright believed that 
Lilienthal was the most influential thinker and actor in the field of aviation, in part 
because he continued to let the direct experience of flight inform his research. Otto 
believed that advances in aviation warranted the taking of risks. When he died from 
injuries sustained after a glider accident, he was credited as saying from his deathbed that 
“sacrifices must be made.”8 It was on this point that the Wrights disagreed. They intended 
to solve the “problem of flight” as meticulously, but would temper the possibility for 
physical risk with measures of safety.  
 While there were aeronauts like the Wright brothers who bet on gliders to solve 
the problem of flight, there were still others who banked on dirigibles. Alberto Santos-
Dumont, who flew around the Eiffel Tower in a dirigible in 1901, had an aeronautical 
career that was mixed with high-profile success and failure. He made front-page news in 
the New York Times after a near disaster in Monaco when his dirigible crashed into the 
Mediterranean Ocean. From his yacht, the Prince of Monaco, who along with a crowd of 
spectators was watching the flight, rescued Santos-Dumont.9 Of his survival, The Atlanta 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Lawrence Goldstone, Birdmen: The Wright Brothers, Glenn Curtiss, and the Battle to Control the Skies 
(New York: Ballentine Books, 2014), p. 3. 
 
8 Goldstone, Birdmen, p. 5. 
 
9 “Santos-Dumont’s Mishap,” New York Times (Feb. 15, 1902), p. 1. 
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Constitution said, “Santos-Dumont was more fortunate than Icarius [sic] for it seems that 
his friends never trusted him,” as they were waiting in the boats to rescue him.10 The 
Monaco near-drowning demonstrated the potential peril of all spectacle, when an event 
designed for the public’s entertainment could just as easily turn into a disaster. Santos-
Dumont would have to diversify his tactics, in order to be seen as a viable aeronaut.  
 After the “mishap,” to quote from the headline in the New York Times report, 
Santos-Dumont diversified his flying campaign in efforts to educate the public about the 
potential everyday use of flying.11 Just a few months after the accident in Monaco, 
Santos-Dumont extended his public campaign to the U.S. in order to meet Thomas 
Edison to discuss the possibility for motorized flight. Santos-Dumont brought along a 
motor and started it for Edison. But instead of feeling great enthusiasm, Edison said he 
“did not care to spend time on an invention that was of no commercial value.”12 Edison’s 
response seemed consistent with the reaction Santos-Dumont had met from others on his 
visit to the U.S. It appeared that most did not want to back someone who demonstrated a 
greater appetite for risk over any sense of reason or business smarts. While Santos-
Dumont had developed a motor and had proved his competence as a pilot, he had yet to 
succeed at convincing the public that human powered flight could be adopted for 
purposes greater than the spectacle of competition.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 “Santos-Dumont in the Role of Icarius,” [sic], Atlanta Constitution (Feb. 27, 1902), p. 6. 
 
11 The Baltimore Sun included an article about Santos-Dumont’s use of his “Little No. 9 Air Ship “as 
practical as an automobile” and how he intended to launch it from a landing stage outside the window of 
his Paris apartment; See Sterling Heilig, “Santos-Dumont’s Airships,” Baltimore Sun (Jul. 12, 1903), p. 12. 
See also fn. 9 for the New York Times headline. 
 
12 “Santos-Dumont at Edison’s” Baltimore Sun (Apr. 14, 1902), p. 2. 
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Another competitor, the aforementioned Samuel Langley, shared the same 
proclivity for spectacle as Santos-Dumont. While Langley methodically researched and 
studied the basic laws of aerodynamics and published a book, Experiments in 
Aerodynamics, in 1891,13 he also staged events in order for spectators to view his 
Aerodrome, a steam-powered flying machine with two pusher propellers that resembled 
two oversized seagulls flying in formation over a fifty-two-horsepower, five-cylinder 
radial engine that launched from a houseboat.14  
 
Figure 3: Outline of the Langley Aerodrome  (NASA) 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Crouch, Lighter than Air, p. 54. 
 
14 See Langley Aerodrome A, “Smithsonian Institution”; accessed Feb. 7, 2015: 
http://airandspace.si.edu/collections/artifact.cfm?object=nasm_A19180001000 
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The aircraft traveled, on average, 3,000 feet through the air at 20-25 mph, from an island 
in the middle of a lake near Quantico, VA.15 Unlike the Wright brothers, Langley had 
ample financial support for his aeronautical pursuits. President McKinley became 
interested in his experimentation and directed the War Department to give him $50,000.  
 When Wilbur Wright wrote to the Smithsonian on May 30, 1899 to inquire into 
the published research on human aeronautics, he was directed to Langley’s book.16 
Langley’s career in aeronautics reemerged around the same time that the Wright brothers 
were planning their motorized flights. On October 7 and on December 8, 1903—just days 
before the Wrights’ first four flights—Langley recruited a pilot to attempt the first 
manned flight of the Aerodrome. The Aerodrome twice crashed upon takeoff into the 
Potomac River. After the disaster, the Aerodrome was stored at the Smithsonian.  
 
The Origin Story 
 
On December 17, 1903 at 10:35 a.m., Orville Wright lay prostrate on a heavier-
than-air, motored biplane glider for a twelve-second flight in Kitty Hawk, North 
Carolina.17 Wilbur took strides alongside the aircraft, as ground control. Wilbur and 
Orville had asked a member of the local life-saving station to document the first flight. 
The photograph that John T. Daniels snatched would become iconic:18   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 William Baxter, “Samuel P. Langley: Aviation Pioneer” (Smithsonian Libraries, n.d.) Web. Subsequent 
references to this source will be cited as “Samuel P. Langley.” 
 
16 Wilbur Wright to the Smithsonian, May 30, 1899, and June 14, 1899, “Stories From the Smithsonian: 
The Wright Brothers: Pioneers in Aviation,” Smithsonian Institution Archives; accessed Jan. 29, 2015. 
http://siarchives.si.edu/history/exhibits/stories/letter-dated-may-30-1899 
 
17 The engine was 12 horsepower and 180 pounds. 
 
18 For the criteria for an iconic photograph, see Robert Hariman and John Lucaites, No Caption Needed: 
Iconic Photographs, Public Culture, and Liberal Democracy (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2007), pp. 243-86. 
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The brothers alternated as pilots for three more flights, the fourth of which lasted 59 
seconds and covered a record 852 feet. As the Wrights paused to consider an even longer 
flight, a sudden gust of wind mangled the flyer.19 Later that day, the Wright brothers sent 
a telegram to their father: “SUCCESS FOUR FLIGHTS.”20 Upon receipt of the telegram, 
their sister Katharine telegraphed Octave Chanute, an engineer and aviation enthusiast 
from Chicago and one of the brothers’ greatest promoters. In the next day’s morning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Thomas Crouch, The Bishop’s Boys: A Life of Wilbur and Orville Wright (New York: Norton, 1990), p. 
269.  
 
20 Ed Dean, “Flying Machine Soars 3 Miles in Teeth of High Wind over Sand Hills and Waves at Kitty 
Hawk on Carolina Coast,” Virginian-Pilot (Dec. 18, 1903), p. 1; qtd. in Crouch, Bishops’ Boys, p. 270. 
 
Figure 4: Photograph of the First Flight, Dec. 17, 1903 
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edition, the Virginian-Pilot published a story based on that three-word telegram, 
exaggerating the brothers’ feats. In this first public communication of the Wright 
brothers’ origin story of flight, the assumption that flight meant spectacle seemed to lead 
the Virginian-Pilot to vastly overstate the truth.   
 Stories—mythic or human—endure in public memory. Like no other story of 
invention, the first four flights of the Wright brothers have circulated throughout the U.S. 
and abroad, in exclamations such as “twelve seconds that changed the world.” 21 That 
story, which lives in public memory, comes to us today as a simple transcription of 
memory. However, the Wright brothers actually constructed an origin story that not only 
would represent the wonder of flight but would also enhance the perception of safety in 
the air.  
 The Wright brothers knew that in order to be remembered as the inventors of 
flight and as safe-minded flyers, they had to carefully document their story and share it in 
a way that would bring them credit for their work. Perhaps they knew that inventors who 
have a great story to accompany their inventions are more memorable. Rare it is to find a 
well-crafted story about major advances in transportation history. For example, the name 
Richard Trevithick (inventor of the steam engine) is obscure, and there is no single 
person credited with the invention of the automobile. As contrast, Wilbur and Orville 
Wright had every intention of being remembered.  
 In order to construct the origin story of flight, the achievement of the Wright 
brothers has been compared to the advancements and struggles found in the narratives of 
lighter-than-air aviators. Even though mythological, the figures of Daedalus and Icarus, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 “The Road to First Flight,” Wright Brothers National Memorial, National Park Service, accessed Feb. 3, 
2015: http://www.nps.gov/wrbr/historyculture/theroadtothefirstflight.htm 
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by contrast, resonated with the origin story of flight. Daedalus had cautioned his son to 
fly neither too near the sun nor too close to the water, but it was Icarus who became 
ecstatic with the ability to fly and forgot his father’s warning. Like Daedalus, the 
Wrights’ father, Milton Wright, had inspired his sons’ fascination with flying—with the 
gift of a wooden toy helicopter in 1878.22 Likewise, as a preacher and a bishop, Milton 
encouraged his sons to use self-discipline and to practice moderation. Unlike Icarus, 
though, the Wright brothers are remembered for having heeded their father’s guidance. 
 Because I argue that the origin story not only represents the wonder of invention 
but is also a cautionary tale to the public that flying depends more on the privileging of 
safety over spectacle, it helps to step back and think about the components of an origin 
story. One of the first ingredients of the origin story of flight was the Wrights’ emphasis 
on experimentation in a remote and desolate location. The Outer Banks was an ideal 
location for the Wright brothers’ flight experimentations with kites, gliders, and manned 
aircraft. The only way to access the Outer Banks was by ferry, a sand bar prevented 
access by commercial vessels. The nearest railroad station and town for provisions was 
thirty miles away. Kitty Hawk—the site of the first four powered flights— was a fishing 
community of 300 residents. The village postmaster at Kitty Hawk encouraged the 
brothers to come, touting in his letter to Orville the “stretch of sandy land one mile by 
five with a bare hill in center eighty feet high, not a tree or bush anywhere to break the 
evenness of the wind current.”23 The postmaster offered the brothers accommodations 
and the help of the life-saving station. The brothers were attracted to the 200 miles of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 “Orville Wright’s Story,” Dayton Aviation Heritage, National Park Service, accessed Feb. 7, 2015: 
http://www.nps.gov/daav/learn/historyculture/orvillewrightslifestory.htm 
 
23 Qtd. in John Hairr, Outer Banks (Charleston, SC: Arcadia, 1999), p. 31. 
56
  
 
barrier islands, which sat between the Atlantic Ocean on one side and the Albemarle and 
Currituck sounds on the other. 
 On December 14, 1903, three days before their successful flights, Wilbur Wright 
made his first attempt at flight. After the flyer lifted from a sixty-foot-long monorail, the 
left wing hit the sand and the aircraft broke into several parts. Instead of continuing on 
that day, the brothers decided to wait until they could properly repair the flyer and the 
weather conditions were better.  
 The weather conditions were considered to be optimal on December 17, 1903, at 
least from the perspective of wind, which that day had a velocity of 20-27 mph. The wind 
added potential dangers to flying, and yet, the brothers considered the velocity to be an 
advantage in the resistance it would provide for landing.  When Orville Wright reflected 
back in 1913 on the first powered flight, and from the vantage point of thousands of 
subsequent flights since, he said he would never again fly under the wind conditions they 
endured that day:  
I look with amazement upon our audacity in attempting flights with a new and 
 untried machine under such circumstances. Yet faith in our calculations and the 
 design of the first machine, based upon our tables of air pressures, secured by 
 months of careful laboratory work, and confidence in our system of control, 
 developed by three years of actual experience in balancing gliders, had convinced 
 us that the machine was capable of lifting and maintaining itself in the air and that 
 with a little practice it could be safely flown.24  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Orville Wright, “How We Made the First Flight,” Flying, Dec. 1913, excerpt found in Smithsonian 
National Air and Space Museum’s online article, “The Wright Brothers, The Invention of the Aerial Age,” 
(Web): http://airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/wright-brothers/online/classroomActivities/8-12_excerpt.cfm 
 
57
  
 
This characteristic of the Wrights—to make careful calculations and to study the 
materials and environment obsessively—made them practical, prudent flyers and 
inventors. By relating this method in their first statement to the public, they demonstrate 
their eschewal of spectacle. During their early flight trials, they did not believe that 
human powered flight could be safely achieved if intended to thrill onlookers, the kind of 
conditions courted by lighter-than air aviators. The Wrights’ flyer overturned right after 
its successful four flights, and crumpled. Thankfully, it took no lives with it and there was 
no discerning public that would emphasize the near disaster over the success of four 
flights.  
 
Proof Beyond Doubt 
 Because the origin story of flight took place in a remote geographic location and 
far away from any crowds, some form of proof would be required beyond the two 
brothers’ word. There were the men from the life-saving station who witnessed and could 
vouch for the flights. The Wright brothers arranged for a photograph, which would plant 
the image of the successfully flying plane in the imaginations of all who saw it in 
circulation. When John T. Daniels, one of the members of the life-saving station was 
asked about serving as the photographer, he said he would. At the moment of flight, 
however, he almost forgot to squeeze the bulb. Similar to the text of the origin story, the 
photograph demonstrated both the risk and safety in the moment of first flight. The five 
life-saving station crewmembers and two children stood both behind the Wright Flyer 
and the camera. The photograph shows the desolation of the windswept, cloudy Outer 
Banks, and the dark sand where water had previously pooled. The terrain was devoid of 
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life.  In the photograph, Orville is lying prone in the aircraft, in the hip cradle. While it is 
possible to see his outstretched body, the most prominent feature being the soles of his 
shoes, with his head obscured. The photograph was taken at lift off, as the Flyer elevated 
from the rail that were guiding its motorized departure into the air. In contrast to earlier 
photographs of the gliding experiments of 1901-1902, the flyer on December 17, 1903 
barely lifted off the ground. Wilbur ran alongside his brother, a forty-foot run, to hold the 
wing of the plane steady until it released from the track. Wilbur’s stance is active, 
watchful over his younger brother, as he lies on top of the canvas.  
 
After December 17, 1903 
 
Even though the flights were conducted in secrecy, in order to legitimize the 
event, the Wright brothers knew their accomplishment had to circulate. Upon receipt of 
the telegram, “SUCCESS FOUR FLIGHTS,” Bishop Wright had his son Lorin contact 
the editor of the Dayton Daily News. The editor, however, evidently deemed a 57 second 
flight not newsworthy. On December 19, 1903, the Norfolk Virginian-Pilot ran an article 
that was picked up by a few other newspapers about the four flights, saying Wilbur 
Wright flew for three miles along the ocean. The article also said the aircraft launched 
from the summit of the 100-foot sand dune.25 Instead of getting the details wrong, like the 
Virginian-Pilot had, most prominent newspapers, including the New York Times and the 
Washington Post, did not run a story the next day. 26    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 “Flying Machine Soars,” Chicago Tribune (Dec. 19, 1903), p. 3. 
 
26 Lawrence Goldstone, Birdmen (New York: Ballentine Books, 2014), pp. 82-83. 
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 After the first four flights in North Carolina, there was confusion among 
journalists over whether it was the Wright brothers or Santos-Dumont who could claim 
the title as inventor of powered flight. It was not only the French who added to the 
confusion. The Dayton Daily News, when they did publish an article, titled it, “DAYTON 
BOYS EMULATE GREAT SANTOS-DUMONT,” indicating that the “local boys” had 
accomplished something that had been attained already by the world famous Santos-
Dumont.27 Whether it was a lack of information or an inability to distinguish between 
lighter and heavier-than-air flight, the headline in the Dayton newspaper suggested that, 
from its first circulation, there was confusion over the achievements of the Wright 
brothers and its relation to the lighter-than-air flights of Santos-Dumont.28 
  Nearly three weeks after the first four flights, circulating rumors and exaggerated 
reports about their first flights prompted the Wrights to publish an official statement, 
which was picked up by the Associated Press and reproduced in American newspapers 
across the country. Their response was four rather long paragraphs with attention paid to 
such factors as the wind conditions, the length of the monorail, and the distance of the 
fourth flight (see Appendix B).29 The Wrights’ prepared statement also cited the height 
off the ground as only eight to ten feet, a statistic rare to see circulate then and since, 
perhaps out of a fear that such a meager height would diminish the overall achievement, 
among a public grown accustomed to spectacle. The Wright brothers’ account describes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Qtd. by Crouch, Bishop’s Boys, p. 272. 
 
28 The Wrights evidently have a second contender besides Santos-Dumont, Connecticut lawmakers have 
passed a bill for “powered flight day.”They claim Gustave Whitehead flew for two miles over Bridgeport, 
CT, on August 14, 1901. See Catherine Cozak, “Connecticut Reigniting the Controversy over Who Was 
First in Flight,” Island Free Press (June 12, 2013). 
 
29 “Four Trips in the Air: Wright Brothers Tell of Their Flying Machine,” Washington Post (Jan. 7, 1904), p. 
5. It also ran in such papers as Atlanta Constitution and Baltimore Sun.  
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how the aircraft addressed the wind, as “into the teeth of a December gale.” The brothers 
justified or explained why the plane remained so low to the ground: “It had previously 
been decided that for reasons of personal safety these first trials should be made as close 
to the ground as possible.” The goal in such a statement was to make flight just as safe in 
“boisterous winds” as “calm air,” but also to manage the public’s higher expectations. At 
the end of the statement, the brothers say they are not prepared to distribute pictures of 
the “machine” as they do not have individual or institutional backing beyond themselves, 
seemingly a direct reference to Langley.30 The Wright brothers began to fly again once 
they returned to Ohio. A few journalists made their way to Huffman Prairie, where the 
Wrights flew. In a May 1904, article, the Washington Post described the Flyer as a “box-
like machine, having the appearance at a distance of an open streetcar.”31 Without a 
circulating photograph, the Wright Flyer would necessarily be compared to current 
transportation options in everyday life.  
 In the wake of the Wright brothers’ first four flights, Santos-Dumont was 
determined to conquer heavier-than-air flight. In 1906, he took off from a Parisian Air 
field and flew into Paris in a self-designed bi-plane. He was the first European to 
accomplish motorized flight. Even though Santos-Dumont achieved his first heavier-
than-air flight three years after the Wright brothers, he did so in the presence of thousands 
of spectators, increasing the likelihood that word of his achievement would circulate 
among the public.  To this day, there are historians that say Santos-Dumont was first, in 
the absence of what they characterize as a reliable witness to the first four flights in Kitty 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Washington Post (Jan. 7, 1904), p. 5. 
 
31 “Machine Flew Thirty Feet,” Washington Post (May 27, 1904), p. 3. 
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Hawk.32 Earlier circulation of the photograph that documented the first flight may have 
helped, but the Wrights refused to publish it until 1908.  
 
A First Fatality 
By September 1908, the Wrights had a refined flyer, and they were seeking to 
monetize their invention to recoup the time and money they had invested in their 
endeavors. They conceded to separate, in order to give demonstration flights on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Their star was on the rise, particularly after publishing a long essay, 
that month in The Century Magazine. In that essay, the Wrights traced their interest in 
flight and how that interest had matured from sport to science.33 The article included the 
first-ever publication of the photograph taken by John T. Daniels, five years before. Its 
publication not only provided visual proof of the origin story of flight, but it also signaled 
that the Wright brothers appeared to be less worried about the competition stealing their 
flyer specifications. While the article did detail a number of technical concepts, it also 
alluded to problems that they had encountered that were “too technical for explanation 
here.” They promised that once they had recouped their losses, they would prepare for 
publication the “results of our laboratory experiments, which alone made an early 
solution of the flying problem possible.”34 For contemporary audiences curious about 
these two brothers and the growing interest in their work, the lengthy article 
demonstrated the Wrights’ competence and perseverance, and, just as importantly, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Andrew Downie, “A Century On, Brazil Still Claims Flight’s First,” Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 23, 
2006: http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1023/p07s02-woam.html 
 
33 Orville and Wilbur Wright, “The Wright Brothers’ Aeroplane: with pictures from photographs supplied 
by the authors” in New Century Magazine 5 (Sept. 1908), 15 pp.  
 
34 Ibid, pp, 8 and 14. 
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included, for the first time, photographs of the Wrights’ flying machines, beginning with 
their original glider, then their motorized glider from the December 1903 flights, and then 
the successors.  
The same month that the article appeared—September 1908—Wilbur traveled to 
Le Mans, France, to participate in air races with French aviators, while Orville traveled to 
Fort Myer, Virginia, to conduct trial flights for the military. Both were exhibiting their 
latest machine, one that they had built to the specifications of the Army Signal Corps in 
hopes of attaining a lucrative $25,000 military contract.35 During his first week of flight 
demonstrations, which began on September 3, Orville attracted small crowds, but—
perhaps because word was leaking of the records he was setting for distance, height, and 
duration of passenger flights—by September 17, he had a crowd of 2,000 onlookers.36 It 
was before this record crowd that Orville carried the young Lieut. Thomas E. Selfridge, a 
self-professed flight enthusiast, a secretary of the Aerial Experiment Association (AEA), 
a propeller engineer, and one of the three military officers assigned to overseeing these 
flight trials. The flight did not rise as quickly as previous two manned flights had done, 
but it nonetheless made its ascent and successfully rounded the parade grounds three 
times before the left propeller broke off and the plane crashed. While the cause was never 
definitively declared, the Times speculated that the weight of two men, along with the full 
tank of fuel, and the engine, “may have been too much a strain upon the blades.” The 
Times’s detailed account of the event and the crash described how the police cavalry had 
to run over the crowds of people to get to Orville and Selfridge.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The Wrights’ machine had to maintain an average speed of 40 miles per hour during the tests. There 
would be a bonus of $2,500 for each additional mile per hour and a similar penalty for each mile per hour 
less. 
 
36 See “Fatal Fall of Wright Airship,” New York Times (Sept. 18, 1901), p. A-1.  
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Figure 5: Crash of the plane piloted by Orville Wright carrying Lt. Selfridge, 1908 (Library of Congress) 
 
Orville survived—though the injuries he sustained to his thigh and ribs gave him pain the 
rest of his life—but Selfridge died at the hospital just hours after the crash. Selfridge’s 
death was to be the first military air casualty.  
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 The question of how to defend the competence of Orville Wright in light of this 
very public crash was a conundrum, but, ultimately, the story continues to circulate 
within public memory as forgiving of Orville. In Bishop’s Boys, Crouch writes that upon 
hearing the news “Wilbur was convinced that things went wrong when he was not there 
to prevent it.”37 Both the photograph and the written accounts show that it was not only 
the absence of his brother but also the large crowd present that day that were unfamiliar 
to Orville Wright. Finally, there is often an emphasis on how Selfridge’s status as 
competitor may have addled the pilot. Regardless of such conjectures, the tragedy 
became ignominiously known as the “Selfridge Incident,” and it shook the confidence of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Crouch, Bishops Boys, p. 377. 
Figure 6: Injured Lt. Selfridge, attended by doctors, Fort Myer, VA, 1908 (Library of Congress) 
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both Wrights, but it eventually became a footnote to the larger story of their 
accomplishments.  
After Langley’s death, their greatest competition was Glenn Curtiss, an aviator 
who owned a competing aircraft company. In 1914, Curtiss requested the use of the 
Langley Aerodrome, which was at the time stored in the Smithsonian Institute basement 
and retrofitted it with one of his own engines, added pontoons, and then flew it short 
distances over a lake in New York State. After Curtiss’s successful flights, the Langley 
Aerodrome was put on display at the Smithsonian with a plaque that said, “capable of 
sustained free flight.” The claim exacerbated a controversy between Orville Wright and 
the Smithsonian that lasted until Orville’s death. The celebrated Aerodrome once again 
haunted the Wrights and threatened to supersede their Flyer’s place in history. In 
response, Wright made an extended loan of the 1903 Flyer to the South Kensington 
Science Museum in London in 1928. Much later, in 1946, Lindbergh would honor the 
Wrights’ legacy by requesting that his plane, the Spirit of Saint Louis, be moved within 
the Smithsonian to make room for the arrival of the 1903 Wright Flyer. 
 
Wright Brothers National Memorial: Place of Origin 
The first half of this chapter traced the evolving understanding about the Wrights 
and their place in the history of aeronautics in the first decade of the twentieth century. 
This second half of the chapter makes bigger leaps in chronology in order to document 
the decisions debated in Congress and the National Park Service about how to 
commemorate the Wrights’ contributions and their story of the origin of flight. In this 
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half of the chapter, I will interpret the major commemorative structures that have been 
erected at the Wright Brothers National Memorial beginning in 1928.   
Because the Wrights hailed from Dayton, Ohio, but made their first successful 
flights on the Outer Banks of North Carolina, public commemoration of them is split, 
somewhat rancorously, between Ohio (“Birthplace of Aviation”) and North Carolina 
(“First in Flight”).38 My focus here is on the Wright Brothers National Memorial 
(WBNM) in Kill Devil Hills, NC, because it commemorates the origin story of flight, at 
its location. Visitors to the site—who venture to one of the most isolated geographic 
locations in the Eastern United States—will likely feel the nearby ocean’s wind and the 
shifting sand and will experience some approximation of the origin story of flight. The 
Dayton [Ohio] Aviation Heritage National Historical Park may claim to be hometown of 
the Wright brothers, but only the WBNM can claim the place of human powered flight’s 
origin.39  
The Outer Banks of North Carolina afforded a temporary—and perfectly 
secluded—home for many of the Wright brothers’ flight experiments. From 1900 to 1908, 
the brothers experimented with gliders and motorized flyers and purposefully did not 
enter innovation contests with monetary prizes in order to protect their research from 
competitors.40 They chose to come to North Carolina—to the remote location of the 
Outer Banks—where the sand dunes afforded soft landings and predictably high winds: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 These mottos have been adopted by their respective states and appear on license plates. 
 
39 Other NPS National Historic Sites commemorate both the space of invention and the inventors. For 
example, the Thomas Edison National Historical Park in West Orange, NJ, includes the laboratory, where 
he invented electricity; the George Washington Carver Museum, part of the Tuskegee Institute National 
Historic Site, focuses on Carver’s innovations in agriculture and education. 
 
40 Bishops Boys, p. 278. 
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the ideal conditions to aid powered flight. It was on these dunes that they birthed the 
origin story of flight. 
I interpret the Wright brothers’ origin story of flight through its commemoration 
at the WBNM as a means to explore how such perspectives about flight—both in its 
spectacle and its expectations of safety—appear as unique and interrelated trajectories at 
the WBNM. In her book For Space, geographer Doreen Massey argues that trajectories 
maintain the connection between the present and future in the form of adaptable stories.41 
Through this conceptual frame, she demonstrates the importance of the physical place of 
invention. I depend on Massey’s spatial turn in arguing how the WBNM has represented 
the origin story of flight through various forms of commemoration at its location.  
The WBNM is situated in Kill Devil Hills, and from North Carolina Hwy 12, it is 
possible to see the monument atop the fortified Big Kill Devil Hill. The Visitor Center 
and the parking lot serve as the first point of entry. Inside the Visitor Center is a 
reproduction of the 1903 Flyer, a portrait gallery of aviators, an exhibit about the Wright 
brothers, and a gift store. Beside the Visitor Center are the First Flight Field and the 
Wright brothers’ living quarters and hangar. Straight paths lead south from the camp and 
hangar to a road that circles the monument with curvilinear paths to the top of a fortified 
Big Kill Devil Hill and the Wright Brothers Monument. On the south side of Big Kill 
Devil Hill is the sculpture representing the December 17, 1903 flight based on John 
Daniels’s photograph of Orville Wright’s twelve-second ascent with the addition of 
cheering North Carolina citizens who were not featured in the photograph but present as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Doreen Massey, For Space (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2005).  
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witnesses to the first four flights. An operating airport is to the west of the First Flight 
Field.  
 
A Commemorative Site for the Golden Age of Aviation 
During the late 1920s, commercial aviation had only just begun. With the 
exception of mail delivery, there was little air commerce and few air passengers. 
Therefore, to keep the story about the Wrights in circulation, the origin story of flight had 
to be rhetorically reframed as the predecessor and sine qua non of the popular aerial 
entertainers. Pre-World War I aviators, such as Louis Bleriot, a French aviator, and 
Harriet Quimby, the first woman to attain a pilot’s license, were celebrated for their 
record-setting flights over the English Channel in 1909 and 1912, respectively. But by the 
late 1920s, there was greater societal enthusiasm for a new generation of aviators.42 
Between 1903 and 1927, a roll call of accomplished aviators made record-setting flights, 
but it was not until Charles Lindbergh—and, soon thereafter, Amelia Earhart—became 
household names that there was a perceived need to trace their lineage back to the 
Wrights. At this juncture, there began to be interest in commemorating the origin story of 
flight at the very site of its occurrence. A permanent site there would ensure that the 
Wrights’ story would remain in public memory and not get lost, forgotten, or 
overshadowed by subsequent record setting flights.43 Thus, Rep. Hiram Bingham (R-CT) 
introduced a House Bill for the construction of a memorial at Kill Devil Hills. On the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Joseph J. Corn, The Winged Gospel: America’s Romance with Aviation, 1900-1950 (New York: Oxford 
U P, 1983). 
 
43 Charles Lindbergh’s record-setting transatlantic flight was 3,600 miles and up in the air for 33 hours, 30 
minutes, dwarfing any of the Wright brothers’ aerial achievements, especially the time and distances set at 
Kitty Hawk.  
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same day, Dec. 17, 1926—the 23rd anniversary of the first four flights—he introduced 
legislation in Congress to “commemorate the first successful attempt in all history at 
power driven airplane flight.”44 The Wright Brothers Memorial Act passed unanimously 
on March 2, 1927 and was signed into law by President Calvin Coolidge.  
The decision to invest money constructing a memorial at Kill Devil Hills was not 
wholly uncontroversial, however. The Dayton magazine Slipstream published the 
following commentary in its November 1927 edition: 
We wonder if those who voted for the measure knew that Kill Devil Hills were 
 inaccessible to the motoring public? We wonder if they knew it would require a 
 huge subscription of funds to build roads and a great bridge in order that those 
 few who happen to travel in this out of the way tract could get to the memorial? 
 Furthermore, we wonder if they knew that citizens of Dayton, Ohio, the home 
 town of the Wright brothers had already bought and set aside a tract of ground on  
 the very spot where the Wrights first assembled their flying machine. . . .  
 Certainly it is in Dayton that a Wright Memorial should be located.45 
This argument did not gain traction beyond Dayton, but it does register the beginning of 
the decades-long contest between Ohio and North Carolina over which state has the 
greater claims to the Wrights’ successes.  
A subsequent congressional act appropriated $25,000 for the design competition 
of the Wright Brothers National Memorial (WBNM), to begin in 1928 with the 25th 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Hiram Bingham, “To Commemorate The First Successful Flight By Power-Driven Aircraft,” S.4876, 69th 
Congress, Second Session, Jan. 8, 1927. 
 
45 “In Honor of the Wrights,” Slipstream 8.11 (Nov. 1927): 9-10; qtd. in Ann Honious, What Dreams We 
Have: The Wright Brothers and Their Hometown of Dayton, Ohio (Eastern National for the National Parks 
Service, 2003), Chapter 12 (Web), accessed Feb. 10, 2015: 
http://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_books/daav/chap12.htm. 
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anniversary of the first four flights. For that anniversary, the National Park Service 
introduced the First Flight Marker, a six-foot high, rock-faced granite marker placed at 
the approximated site of that historic first liftoff. Also on that day, they dedicated the 
cornerstone of a proposed larger monument, which would be constructed between 1931 
and 1932. Over the subsequent decades, new structures were added to the Memorial, 
designed to respond to the different societal exigencies of each decade.  
Each trajectory enmeshed at the WBNM represents a historical accretion of 
meaning through an additive process of commemorative structures that reflect the origin 
story of the First Flight, but in response to different exigencies. In the bounded space of 
the North Carolina Outer Banks, next to a well-trafficked beach highway, multiple 
trajectories course through the WBNM, defining it not only as the place where something 
big happened on a December morning in 1903, but also as a location where the story of 
First Flight has been represented by a great convergence of varied trajectories. After a 
granite Monument was completed on October 15, 1932, many of the other 
commemorative structures were also built as separate but interrelated representations of 
the origin story of flight in a historic mall of commemoration. 
 
Setting the Stage for the Origin Story of Flight 
While the commemoration of the origin story of flight is in its geographic 
location, there remains a great paucity of related artifacts on site. The importance of 
authenticity for commemoration must be considered, and nothing signals authenticity 
better than artifacts.46 The artifacts related to the origin story of flight have been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See Michael S. Bowman, “Tracing Mary Queen of Scots,” Places of Public Memory: The Rhetoric of 
Museums and Memorials, eds., Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and Brian L. Ott (Tuscaloosa, AL: U of 
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disbursed primarily to three locations: the National Air and Space Museum of the 
Smithsonian, the Aviation Trail in Dayton, Ohio, and the WBNM. Visitors to the WBNM 
might be surprised to learn that the original 1903 Flyer that performed the first four 
flights is actually housed at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum. The 
Wright brothers’ possessions and bicycle shop tools are in Dayton. The fact that the 
artifacts related to the origin story of flight are scattered threatens to detract from the 
authenticity of the WBNM site.  
The question of authenticity has plagued the WBNM in its inability to claim the 
majority or most essential of the material artifacts of the origin story of flight. The 
artifacts of the origin story of flight have been fought over, whisked away overseas, 
replicated, reproduced, and mostly disbursed to other locations.47 With the exception of 
the Big Kill Devil Hill (the original sand dune), and the sewing machine that Wilbur 
Wright used to repair a tear in a wing, every other object had to be reproduced or 
replicated in order to dramatize the origin story of flight.48 In the absence of artifacts, 
most especially the Flyer, the origin story of flight has had to be reproduced and 
reenacted at the WBNM.  
The original landscape of 1903, as depicted in Daniels’s photograph, had been 
constituted of wind, water, and sand, but in the intervening years, different landscape 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Alabama P, 2010), pp. 191-215; Carly S. Woods, Joshua S. Ewalt, and Sarah J. Baker, “A Matter of 
Regionalism: Remembering Brandon Teena and Willa Cather at the Nebraska History Museum,” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 99.3 (2013): 341-363. 
 
47 Kirk Savage characterizes the skirmishes and battles over the design, placement, and reception of 
monuments in Washington, DC as disputes that will “never cease to evolve” (p.22). See Savage, Monument 
Wars: Washington, D.C., the National Mall, and the Transformation of the Memorial Landscape (Berkeley, 
CA: U of California P, 2009).  
 
48 The WBNM has a local family’s sewing machine that Wilbur Wright used to fix a wing on display. Big 
Kill Devil Hill was fortified in 1930 as proof of the Wright Brother’s gliding experiment location from 
1899 to 1901.  
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designs had significantly changed the “stage” of the first flights. Before the dedication of 
the Monument in 1932, residents planted shrubs and sand grass.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 1980, in an effort to restore the land to its original condition, a “low profile vegetative 
cover” was planted and 170 acres of trees and shrubs were removed from along the First 
Flight Field.49 Presently, most of the historic sand cover has been replaced with grass. 
The intent of such actions may be less about beautification of the property and more 
about sand retention and erosion of the “stage” of first flight. Such adaptations, however, 
take away from any sense of the ground conditions in 1903. With plans for a monument, 
any expectation for authenticity was gone.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Susan L. Hitchcock, Wright Brothers National Memorial: Cultural Landscape Report (Washington, DC: 
National Park Service, 2002), p. 48.  
 
Figure 7: Dedication of the Wright Brothers National Monument, 1932 (Library of Congress) 
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Building the Monument 
The commemoration of the origin story of flight began with a design competition 
for a Monument, and the New York design firm Rodgers and Poor edged out 34 other 
competitors with its design, which the New York Times described as “a symbolic bird’s 
wing in its elevation scheme.”50 In the sepia-toned drawings submitted for the 
competition, marine beacons shine on top of the Wright Brothers Monument (hereafter, 
Monument), transforming the structure into the image of a lighthouse. The Hon. Patrick 
Hurley, Secretary of War, said the monument was going to look impressive when viewed 
from the sky.51 The comment seemed to undergird the importance of a site that 
commemorated both the origin of flight and the ability of humans to access an aerial 
perspective.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 “Work on Wright Pylon To Start, Now Sand Has Been Anchored,” New York Times (Feb. 18, 1930), p. 6. 
 
51 New York Times (Dec. 28, 1930). 
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Figure 8: Artist’s rendering of the Wright Brothers National Monument, 1930 (Library of Congress) 
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The dignitaries and celebrities who gathered on Kill Devil Hill to commemorate 
the 25th Anniversary of the Wrights’ first flights laid the cornerstone for the Monument. 
Orville Wright, Hiram Bingham, Lindsey Warren, and Amelia Earhart were among the 
1,000 participants in attendance. Two hundred aviation leaders traveled together from 
Washington, DC, on a chartered steamboat for the two-week celebration. On the 
anniversary day (December 17, 1928), Earhart—herself a newly celebrated aviation 
passenger, as Chapter Three will describe—dedicated the 1928 Boulder.52 The 1928 
Boulder symbolized the future Monument to honor of the Wright brothers’ first four 
flights.  
The Monument sits atop the ninety-foot Big Kill Devil Hill, which as has been 
established is one of only two artifacts at the WBNM. It was on Big Kill Devil Hill where 
the Wrights had laid the sixty-foot long rail that guided the first aircraft into powered 
flight, and, since they flew their gliders from the dune, this hump of sand was hallowed, 
at least in the eyes of those who imagined this place to be a pilgrimage of sorts. The dune 
is visible in the photographs of the Wright brothers, and, thus, was essential to the origin 
story of flight. In fact, it was on this dune that the Wright brothers discussed their 
methods of control over their aircraft, which differentiated their efforts from their 
competitors, who built vehicles with limited maneuverability.53 
In preparing for the placement of the 60-foot-tall trapezoidal white and gray 
Monument, the ninety-foot tall and 26-acre wide Big Kill Devil Hill first had to be 
fortified and protected from future erosion. Described as a “high mound of shifting sand,” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See “The Wright Brothers and the Invention of the Aerial Age,” Smithsonian National Air and Space 
Museum (Web): accessed Feb. 11, 2015, http://airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/wright-brothers/  
 
53 “Glider Experiments 1902,” Wright Brothers National Memorial, (Web): accessed Feb. 11, 2015, 
http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/hh/34/hh34j.htm 
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Big Kill Devil Hill had, due to strong prevailing winds, reportedly moved 450 feet south 
in the twenty-five years since the Wright brothers used it for more than 1,000 glider 
experiments.54 If left unfortified with shrubs and grass, the hill would continue to migrate 
further from its location at the time of their experiments and thus further from the 
location of the first powered flight. L. H. Bash, Brigadier General of the War 
Department, who was overseeing the fortification project, directed the planting of native 
and exotic grasses, wood mold, and shrubs. Monument construction began in December 
1931 with 1,200 tons of white and grey granite that had been transported by railroad from 
Mount Airy, NC, over to the eastern part of the state in Elizabeth City, then by truck and 
barge to Kill Devil Hills.  
The Monument, described by the New York Times after the 1932 dedication as an 
“aspiring shaft, a rugged triangular pylon,”55 contained symbolism that would have 
responded to the contemporary enthusiasm for air shows. At the time of the Monument’s 
design and construction, pylons were being used in air shows to direct and provide 
boundaries for the pilots who competed in races. Pylons were tools that had hardly been 
necessary for the first four flights, but given their significance at the time of the 
Monument’s design and construction, choosing that shape for the Monument was a nod 
to the new era in flight, as was the selection of the Art Deco motif. The Monument was 
intended to capture the attention of a younger generation, just as the Wrights were 
supposed to be the geniuses teaching and inspiring their pupils (such as Lindbergh and 
Earhart).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 “Aviation Leaders Off to Kitty Hawk” [Washington, D.C] (Dec. 16, 1928). 
 
55 New York Times (Nov. 20, 1932). 
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 The Monument’s southern façade features the Wright brothers’ names in 
uppercase bold lettering at the top. Just below their names is a stainless steel door that 
once opened to a visitor center. Inside the Monument is a metal spiral staircase that once 
transported visitors up to the observation platform.56 Around the Memorial’s base runs 
the inscription, “In commemoration of the conquest of the air by the brothers Wilbur and 
Orville Wright, conceived through genius and achieved through dauntless resolution and 
un-quenching faith.”57 The Monument sits on top of a five-pointed star base that was 
modeled after the one under the Statue of Liberty, thus making a symbolic union between 
the Wright brothers’ story and one of the greatest symbols of U.S. citizenship. The design 
of the Monument evokes the Art Deco movement. Hans Wirz and Richard Stringer 
describe the great diversity found in the Art Deco style as one that gestures to the modern 
in its “symbolism, feeling of velocity, and machine aesthetics.”58 The Monument’s sides 
look like sculpted pin-backed wings in bas-relief, with sunrays and thunderbolt patterns, 
and with a marine beacon resting on top. Because Art Deco was a popular style of the era 
in which the Monument was constructed, it seems to signal a generational salute from a 
younger generation of aviators to the Wright brothers.  
Despite the effort that went into the planning of the monument and its dedication 
day, a Nor’easter forced organizers to scale back plans. They cancelled a fly-over from 
the Second Bombardment Wing of the Army Air Corps from Langley Field; Orville 
Wright predictably gave no formal statement; Pres. Herbert Hoover, who was supposed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 The inside of the Monument is no longer open to the public. The Visitor Center was moved to a new 
building in 1960. 
 
57 Originally, the inscription was supposed to be one from Leonardo da Vinci saying more simply, “there 
shall be wings.”  
 
58 Hans Wirz and Richard Stringer, Washington Deco: Art Deco Design In The Nation’s Capital 
(Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution P, 1984), pp. 35-36. 
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to speak and unveil the Monument, did not attend; neither Lindbergh nor Earhart made it. 
Instead, Ruth Nichols, an aviatrix and Earhart’s understudy of sorts, stood in a semi-
circle of male dignitaries, including Orville Wright and Brigadier General L. H. Bash, 
unveiled the Monument, and, according to the New York Times report, offered “reverent 
appreciation of the amazing progress and far-reaching values of present-day aviation.”59 
At the dedication, Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley paid tribute to the “wizardry of the 
two Ohio bicycle mechanics”:  
As a direct result of their successful flight right here at Kill Devil Hill, the 
 conquest of the air is to be achieved. I use the future tense advisedly. Great 
 as has been the progress since these intrepid men achieved the first  successful 
 flight in a power-driven plane, air transportation is yet in its infancy.60   
The Wrights, Hurley suggested, were unlikely heroes, not because the skills of mechanics 
were not suited to invention—they certainly were—but, rather, because the brothers 
possessed the exact range of skills, creativity, determination, and daring necessary to 
achieve their goals but not the funding of more “likely” competitors, such as Langley.  
 
Monument’s Door Panels and the Origin Story’s Ancestors 
At this point, I will devote extra attention to a study of the relief door panels that 
adorn the tall granite Monument at the WBNM. These eight reliefs—made of stainless 
steel over nickel—depict different moments in the history of flight that occurred before 
the Wrights’ first flights. The selection of the subjects for these panels reflects a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 “Shaft to Wrights Dedicated in Storm,” New York Times (Nov. 20, 1932), p. 2. 
 
60 Ludington [Michigan] Daily News, “Memorial Dedicated to Wright Brothers” (Nov. 20, 1932), p.1. 
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rhetorical construction of mostly lighter-than-air flight that is, I believe, emblematic of 
similar rhetorical decisions employed elsewhere at the WBNM. The door reliefs, along 
with the other components of the WBNM, are meant to create a guiding narrative and to 
give visitors impressions of the primacy of the Wright brothers’ feat in the history of 
human flight and to keep the origin story of flight in active circulation. The eight relief 
panels on the door of the Monument catalogue humanity’s long interest in flight—the 
“steps of human flight”—and this creative and evocative inventory makes the Wrights’ 
accomplishment that much more interesting. The relief panels depict stories of lighter-
than-air flight that either cannot match the achievement of human powered flight or 
demonstrate previous failures in flight. The first panel illustrates the story of Daedalus 
and Icarus, who died attempting to fly. Another panel pays homage to Otto Lilienthal, 
who also died in flight. Other panels show propellers, kites, planes, and paddles—all 
tools of mythical or real flight. The relief panels catalogue humanity’s long interest in 
flight, and underscore the enormity of the Wrights’ accomplishment, contrasting the 
unsuccessful risk-taking of earlier aviators to the demonstrated safety of the two brothers. 
With the exception of a single relief panel depicting propeller design, the door 
panels illustrate key moments in the history of lighter-than-air flight. Birds fly in two 
panels while on another Icarus plummets toward the sea as a kite draws nearer to the sun. 
Thousands of years of dreaming, failed mythological and actual attempts at flight, 
followed by the two boys from Dayton. When visiting the Monument, the eye travels 
from the door back up to the bold wrapping letters that celebrate the brothers’ “conquest 
of the air.” Considered alongside the panels inventorying previous attempts at flight, the 
brothers’ accomplishment is that much more powerful.  
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Figure 9: Detail of the door panels, Wright Brothers National Monument, 1969 (National Park Service, 
Outer Banks History Center, Manteo, NC) 
81
  
 
To anyone familiar with the history of flight, it is immediately apparent that 
certain notable events are not depicted on the panels. Notably missing are Leonardo da 
Vinci’s drawings of human flight and images of the Montgolfier brothers or other early 
balloonists. There is only an image of Jacob Besnier, the French locksmith who attached 
four wings on the ends of two wooden poles, placed them over his shoulders, and 
attempted flight from window sills and rooftops. Additionally, none of the panels depict 
air or helium balloons or dirigible airships: all feats that predated 1903. Arguably, those 
planners and artisans who were crafting the rhetorical message of these panels wanted to 
steer clear of stories that might overshadow or destabilize the Wrights’ accomplishment.  
The selection of the panels reinforces the Wrights’ success by counterpointing it 
with stories of failures. What set the Wright brothers apart from many of the images on 
the Monument door was not only their successful introduction of an engine to flight but 
also the fact that they did not die inventing flight. The dialectic between risk and safety is 
at work in these panels, which symbolically represents a timeline leading up to the first 
four flights. The panels represent past efforts, some successful and others not, that 
culminate to prove the Wright brothers’ piloting skills were superior to the other aviators. 
These panels reaffirm the origin story while at the same time affirming the risks inherent 
in flight itself. The paneled door salutes the Wright brothers as the first who were able to 
successfully traverse that dialectic and thereby enshrine their origin story in the location 
of its invention.  
The 1932 granite Monument updated and represented the origin story within a 
1930s frame, and one that reflected the spectacle of flight much more than its requisite 
protocol for safety. In its spectacle, it recognized and accommodated the exigencies of 
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the era so as to keep the origin story fresh, and of equal grandeur to the milestone flights 
of the 1920s, within an evolving public memory. The 1932 addition seems to reinforce 
the importance of the origin story in anticipation of future advances in aviation, including 
the expansion of commercial flight. 
 
The Origin Story Across the Generations 
The 21 years that passed between the construction of the granite pylon and the 
development of the next commemorative buildings at the WBNM was a turbulent period 
in U.S. history. This tumultuous period spanned the Great Depression, World War II 
(which used airplanes to unleash the nuclear era), and the beginnings of the Civil Rights 
Movement. And this period witnessed the record-setting flights of Charles Lindbergh and 
Amelia Earhart and her disappearance, as well as the first African-American Army Air 
Force. This chapter will now look at how these events helped to shape future 
commemoration of the origin story of flight at the WBNM. 
The economic and social upheavals of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s required the 
WBNM to adapt in order to keep the origin story of flight relevant to a new generation. 
The public no longer craved stories about record-setting flights. So many records had 
been set by that point that there was a kind of records fatigue, and after Earhart’s 
disappearance, the public began to question whether or not heroic feats in the skies were 
worth the risk they entailed. 61 The air and sea search for Earhart, which yielded no plane 
and no body, had been costly. Furthermore, technological advances, such as more 
powerful and reliable engines, the introduction of lighter and sturdier materials, and the 
invention of navigational radar made it safer and cheaper to move people commercially. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 William Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York: Harper, 2009), p. 340. 
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Consequently, with more airline passengers, greater assurances of safety were necessary, 
and commercial ventures and public adventure were being privileged over risk taking. 
This shift is evident when viewed through the lens of the commemorative practices at the 
WBNM.  
Responding to these changes, the WBNM shifted focus—in the 1950s and 
1960s—to commemorate the tremendous growth in commercial flying by encouraging 
visitors to participate in the experience of flight as passengers and as private pilots. 
During this twenty-year period, a number of new commemorative features were added to 
the Memorial site. Now, instead of the spectacle of a vertical monument on top of a 
fortified sand dune, the WBNM became a horizontal mall that was 2,852 feet long by 750 
feet wide.62 
For the fiftieth anniversary in 1953, the WBNM reconstructed the living quarters 
that housed the Wrights during their experiments at Kitty Hawk. The spartan living 
quarters recreated there telegraph the ruggedness of the Wright brothers, whose 
commitment to technological progress clearly trumped their desire for physical comfort.63 
These structures were meant to help visitors imagine how the brothers lived while 
making history on the Outer Banks. Accompanying pictures of the original hangars used 
by the Wright brothers depict how they “lived simple, methodical lives, dividing the 
camp duties between each other . . . [and how] neither shirked or passed the buck. . . . 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Hitchcock, Wright Brothers National Memorial: Cultural Landscape Report, p. 75; the mall runs north to 
south between the Monument and the fourth landing site marker on the First Flight Field (1953). 
 
63 The reconstructed hangar and living quarters had to be rebuilt four times due to man-made and 
environmental destruction (1953, 1964-65, 1976-77, and 1993). 
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Cleanliness was next to if not ahead of godliness with these brothers.”64 The reproduction 
living quarters include the Wrights’ beds, kitchen area, shelves for food, and chairs. To 
honor the fiftieth anniversary in 1953, the National Canners Association (NCA) prepared 
a press release about the critical role canned food played during the Kitty Hawk 
experiments. In photographs of the Wright brothers’ living quarters, the NCA was able to 
relay proof that canned foods were critical to “major explorations and expeditions of the 
past 150 years.”65 The NCA reported that they had found labels to replicate all of the 
Wright brothers’ provisions from the turn of the twentieth century, except for a can of 
asparagus tips. 
 While a visitor can peer into the living quarters of the brothers, the First Flight 
Field (1953), built during the same year, was an interactive commemorative structure.66  
This new field built on to the 1928 Boulder (which marked the Flyer’s point of lift off), 
featured a path of four granite flight markers that marked the order, distance, and time of 
each of the four powered flights.  In Getting Back Into Place, Edward Casey writes, “An 
event is at once spatial and temporal.”67 The origin story of flight encapsulated in those 
first four flights becomes more believable within a temporal and spatial scenario meant to 
draw a visitor in. Because the Wrights’ first flights had few eyewitnesses, the claims of 
the origin story of flight must be substantiated, beyond the assurances of the brothers’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 “Wrights Were Good Cooks and Dish Washers: No Task Too Menial, No Problem Too Intricate For the 
Flier to Tackle, Says One Who Knew Them,” The Independent (Nov. 13, 1932). 
 
65 “Canned Foods Helped Wright Brothers during Kitty Hawk Experiments” (Washington, DC: National 
Canners Association, 1953). 
 
66 Each marker lists the length and distance of each flight. Marker 1= 12 seconds, 150 feet; Marker 2=12 
seconds and 175 feet; Marker 3= 200 feet and 15 seconds; and Marker 4=852 feet and 59 seconds. Along 
the beginning of the marker is a sixty-foot monorail, from which the flyer took off. 
 
67 Edward S. Casey, Getting Back Into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place World, 2nd 
ed. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana U P, 2009), p. 339. 
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notebooks. Each flight becomes substantiated along a field that demonstrates the exact 
time of lift off and landing.  
Encouraging visitors to perform certain aspects of a historical narrative and its 
related public memory is not unique to the WBNM. In the essay Michael Bowman 
contributed to the book Places of Public Memory: The Rhetoric of Museums and 
Memorials, he describes the importance of performativity at historical sites. In “Tracing 
Mary Queen of Scots,” Bowman illustrates how the Mary Queen of Scots House and 
Visitor Centre site in Scotland dramatized Mary’s one-month visit there, before her reign 
unraveled.68 A walk through her home affords the opportunity to share dramatic stories 
from her time there, including a fateful fall from a horse. As visitors take the tour, they 
also are encouraged to imagine the fears and the risks that befell Mary.  
  Like Mary Queen of Scot’s Visitor Centre, the WBNM invites visitors to interact 
with a chapter from history. The First Flight Field invites such interactivity as visitors 
begin at the 1928 Boulder and pace the 852 feet, along a grated plastic walkway, to the 
site of Wilbur Wright’s fourth safe landing. At the WBNM, visitors are invited to 
meditatively step, walk, or run all the way to the fourth marker, following the flight line 
of the very first flights. The performativity of the First Flight Field has a dual effect of 
being both an interactive, educational experience for the visitor and entertainment for 
people in the Visitor Center who watch from inside. With a little imagination, the Wright 
brothers would be perpetually switching back and forth in the First Flight Field preparing 
to take off on the next first, second, third, or fourth flight.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Comparably, after many interviews with tourists at the Mary Queen of Scots Visitor Center in Scotland, 
Michael Bowman discovered that most visitors came with varied knowledge of Mary’s life prior to their 
visit. These a priori stories helped to shape the way they addressed the commemorative space. See 
Bowman, “Tracing Mary Queen of Scots,” Places of Public Memory, pp. 191-215.  
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The First Flight Field encourages visitors to perform the origin story of flight in 
the presumed location of its occurrence. At the Field, visitors are encouraged to walk the 
very path the Wright Brothers flew. Being able to take the plastic mesh walkway from the 
first to the fourth flight marker reinforces a visitors’ confidence in the story’s authenticity. 
When visitors pace, walk, skip, run (often with arms extended like wings), they reach the 
first three markers quickly. The fourth marker, just like the dramatic fourth flight of 
Wilbur Wright, is a much greater commitment that not all visitors choose to make. The 
First Flight Field demonstrates the principles of Massey’s trajectory in a space that 
affords the retelling of the same story on a journey encouraged of each visitor, as they 
walk along the flight path to Marker 4. Like a pilgrimage to a shrine, this journey is one 
that can only be taken in the designated location of its commemoration, for all who travel 
to the WBNM. The need for the plane, the actual artifact of the first flight, diminishes 
when the visitor travels its flight path instead. The First Flight Field, then, affords a stage 
for this iconic story, made more believable each time a visitor reenacts the journey. 
Growth in tourism at the Outer Banks has changed the setting of the WBNM. The 
location of the first four flights has transitioned from being situated in the town of Kitty 
Hawk to the town of Kill Devil Hills. The tourism industry has transformed this once 
remote location into a popular vacation destination, replete with a grocery store, a car 
dealership, a Brew Thru, Duck Donuts, and Captain George’s Sea Food Restaurant. 
Travel literature reminds us that it may not even be the Monument or Poor’s design that 
motivates people to hike to the top of Big Kill Devil Hill. For many, visiting the 
Monument is an opportunity to experience an expansive view of the ocean. One 
guidebook describes the Monument as “imposing” and recommends the most important 
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action to take when visiting the site is to “stand on the grassy dune and feel the breezes 
rise off the water.”69 Visiting the WBNM has come to mean, for some, the opportunity to 
get a good view of the ocean. Such comments found in travel literature are a useful 
cautionary in the interpretation of the WBNM as always meaningful to tourists in its 
historical significance. Instead, what appears evident is that some of the trajectories 
followed at the WBNM have little to do with the origin story of flight but more to do with 
its location, a historic site situated within a beach landscape, a destination that provides 
an opportunity to view the natural beauty of the sea. It is unlikely that a visitor to a site 
designated as historic who seeks a pleasant view or ocean breeze would completely fail to 
recognize the site’s affirmation of flight’s origin story. However, by emphasizing good 
views over historic significance, some tourist literature threatens to diminish the origin 
story of flight. 
 
The Visitor Center: Reflecting the 1960s 
The WBNM includes a Mission 66 Visitor Center (built in 1960) near the park’s 
entrance. When federal funding was made available to build visitor centers at national 
park sites all around the U.S., the WBNM became one of the sites to receive funding. The 
design of the Visitor Center reflected the increase in commercial flight and the new way 
of flying.70 It resembles an airport terminal: a one-story, reinforced concrete, steel, and 
glass structure modern building that includes a domed flight room for presentations, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Holly Hughes, Frommer’s 500 Places to Take Your Kids Before They Grow Up (New York: Frommer’s, 
2009), p. 295. 
 
70 The Visitor Center was constructed between 1957 and 1960 as a part of “Mission 66,” a federal initiative 
to improve national parks, in large part through the development of approximately one hundred Visitors 
Centers. 
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lobby, and a museum area.71 The windows inside the Visitor Center look out onto the 
First Flight Field. Indeed, visitors to the Center appear to be passengers waiting for a 
flight in an airport terminal (or for a flight with Wilbur and Orville). The airport terminal 
setting emphasizes the connection between the experience of flight today and the origin 
story. The first exhibit panel features a magnified version of a handwritten letter from 
Wilbur Wright to Octave Chanute. The other exhibit panels highlight the singular 
imagination of the Wright brothers and the steps that led them to the first four flights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By the 1960s, the commercial flight industry had fully entered the jet age. 
Pressurized cabins and increased speed meant more efficient and comfortable travel. 
Celebrating the role of commercial flight passengers in the commemoration of the origin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The Visitor Center was designed by the architectural firm Mitchell/Giurgola of Philadelphia. 
 
Figure 10: Visitor Center at the Wright Brothers National Memorial Historic Site, the night of 
the first man on the moon landing, 1969 (Outer Banks History Center, Manteo, NC) 
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story of flight provided an opportunity to herald these changes and to encourage more 
people to become air passengers. 
The airport terminal-like Visitor Center showcases many technological advances 
that allowed commercial flight to overcome many of the risks characteristic of the era of 
early aviation. By 1960, commercial flight had radar in order to prevent collisions, and 
transponders to relay a plane’s call signal to air traffic control, reliable instruments made 
flight possible, regardless of weather conditions.  
Like a nested doll, the Visitor Center reverts back to historical representations of 
1903 on the inside. Cordoned off by a rope in the Visitor Center, a reproduction of the 
1903 Flyer serves as the focal object for NPS rangers’ interpretation of the site and the 
origin story. NPS rangers demonstrate various controls through protective white cotton 
archival gloves as though they were preparing it for Orville or Wilbur’s return. Rangers 
describe and demonstrate how the Wright brothers controlled the 1903 Flyer by lying on 
the wing beside the engine and shifting their hips side-to-side to warp the wings. If 
visitors did not know that this plane is the reason for the WBNM site, then they would 
know it by the time the interpreter had completed her or his presentation. These Flight 
Room talks take place with tourists standing around the Flyer and with the ranger 
positioned inside of the rope. The NPS rangers’ presentation reviews the Wright brothers’ 
life in Ohio and the details of the first four flights. These presentations by the rangers 
recount the origin story of flight and demonstrate Massey’s sense that history is made up 
of a narrative that evolves in public memory. The Flyer serves as the focal point to both 
include and exclude aspects of the origin story of flight while also serving as the 
inspiration for stories about the Wright brothers. There are other artifacts and 
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reproductions incorporated into NPS ranger talks, such as the piece of wood and cloth 
from the 1903 Flyer that Neil Armstrong carried with him on the Apollo 11 mission, now 
framed in the Visitor Center Lobby. By incorporating the framed piece of wood and cloth 
into stories about the origin story of flight, the rangers reify a trajectory that begins with 
the Wright brothers in 1903 and extends to the 1969 landing on the moon.72 
In a memo to the WBNM staff in 1969, Paul Garber, Historian Emeritus of the 
National Air and Space Museum (NASM), provided commentary and critique for the 
park rangers after attending a tour.73 Concerned that visitors thought the 1903 Flyer on 
exhibit at the WBNM was the original, Garber suggested they put on display a 
photograph of the original 1903 flyer at the NASM in order that the flyer on display at 
the WBNM could be identified as a reproduction. To ensure that his request would be 
honored, Garber wrote, “I may be able to have [the photograph] prepared on a pedestal so 
that it could be exhibited without further preparation.” To further reinforce the flyer’s 
status as a reproduction, Garber recommended they put on display another photograph of 
the volunteers who built the 1903 Flyer.74 In his letter, Garber concluded by reminding 
the WBNM staff about the difference between a replica—constructed by the original 
craftsmen—and a reproduction—made by unrelated others. Garber was sensitive about 
precise classifications possibly because of the battle that had ensued years earlier in the 
retrieval of the Wright Flyer from London. After several overtures made to Orville 
Wright by the Smithsonian Institution, the successful proposal was one that enlisted the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Such a trajectory is also affirmed by Bilstein in Flight in America. 
  
73 Paul Garber, “Thoughts While Enjoying a Visit to the Wright Brothers Museum at Kill Devil Hills,” Dec. 
8, 1969. Outer Banks History Center, Manteo, NC.  
 
74 At the bottom of the memo, Garber wrote that his memo was not “intended as adverse criticism but 
…personal impressions during a most enjoyable visit.” 
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help of Charles Lindbergh as an emissary who would fly to London and retrieve the 
Flyer. As reported in the New York Herald Tribune, “Asked how he would view the 
negotiations between himself and the Smithsonian through Colonel Lindbergh . . . Wright 
said he had the greatest confidence in the Colonel.”75 In January 1948, Orville Wright 
died, and Lindbergh returned the Flyer to the Smithsonian. According to Wright’s terms, 
the Flyer would always be displayed in the most prominent location at the Smithsonian, 
in front of Lindbergh’s aircraft, the Spirit of Saint Louis.  In celebration of its return on 
December 17, 1948, the 35th anniversary of the origin story of flight, blimps and 
helicopters formed a “circular wreath” around the WBNM.76 That the 1903 Flyer housed 
at the WBNM is a reproduction and not the original is important because it threatens the 
authenticity of the origin story in its geographic location and indicates the continuing 
preeminence of the Smithsonian over the WBNM in commemorating the origin story of 
flight.77 
In 1963, at the sixtieth anniversary celebration, the First Flight Airport (KFFA) 
was dedicated, allowing pilots of small aircraft to participate in the origin story by taking 
off and landing on a runway parallel to the First Flight Field. Advocates of the KFFA 
Airport recognized that the proximity of the landing strip to the Visitor Center would 
promote the origin story for non-pilots, too, by adding a sense of authenticity as now 
visitors regularly see the offspring of the 1903 Flyer in action. Plans for the airport were 
in the original designs by Alfred E. Poor in his Monument submission in 1930, but they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 New York Herald Tribune (Dec 18, 1945), n.p. 
 
76 “Kitty Hawk Marks First Brief Flight,” New York Times (Dec. 18, 1948), p. 3. 
 
77 Poor did not attend the dedication ceremony in Nov. 1932. His letters reflected disgruntlement over a 
lack of recognition for his Monument design. 
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were delayed by budget cuts during WWII. The airport is located on the western side of 
the park with a runway only suitable for small aircraft. While fully operational, it has 
always been intended as more than a symbolic link to the origin story of flight. The 
airport affords a pilgrimage site for private aviation where pilots can move beyond 
performativity to the actual embodiment of flight. Because the runway was built for 
planes with less power and heft than most modern aircraft, most takeoffs and landings 
require great skill from pilots who must land on a much shorter runway than that to which 
they are accustomed. The experience of takeoff, in particular, encourages interaction with 
the origin story of flight. Intended or not, the airstrip was constructed so that airplanes 
could only travel down the runway just shy of the fourth flight marker on the First Flight 
Field (Wilbur Wright’s second flight) before they must make a quick U-turn back in the 
other direction to taxi for takeoff, as if to symbolize that no plane will travel further, or at 
least not in the same direction as the longest of the four flights of the Wright brothers. 
This act, while symbolic, continues to reify the location of first flight as a pilgrimage site, 
where all pilots who visit will, by design, travel down the runway just short of Wilbur 
Wright’s last flight as represented in the origin story of flight. Similar to representations 
of intrepid Europeans who settled Roanoke Island across the Pamlico Sound from 
WBNM and established an early narrative of freedom and citizenship, modern day pilots 
at KFFA extend the origin story, even for non-pilots. The origin story of flight circulates 
in everyday modern enactments by current pilots who have no choice but to fall just shy 
of the Wright brothers’ achievement in each takeoff and landing at KFFA. 
Trajectories, according to Massey, represent stories whose symbolic 
understandings remain in constant flux. By the late 1960s, the Visitor Center had become 
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the primary attraction at the WBNM, as opposed to the Monument.78 Forty years later, 
most guidebooks described the experience of the Visitor Center over the Monument. In 
their Guide to the National Parks Area, Eastern States (2004), David and Kay Scott open 
with the origin story of flight but quickly shift to a description of the Visitors Center with 
its reproduction of the 1903 Flyer and the portraits of historical figures in aviation in the 
Paul E. Garber First Flight Shrine.79 The people who are honored represent “significant 
firsts,” beginning with a portrait of the Wright brothers. Five years later, they added a 
portrait of Thomas Selfridge. By commissioning a portrait of Selfridge in 1971, among 
other record-setting aviators such as Chuck Yeager and Lindbergh, the First Flight 
Society honored a man for being both the first military officer to pilot a plane and the 
first fatality in powered aviation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Sarah Allaback, Mission 66 Visitors Centers: The History of Building Type (Washington, DC: National 
Park Service. 2000). 
 
79 David and Kay Scott, Guide to the National Park Areas, Eastern States (Guilford, CT: Globe Pequot P, 
2004). Regarding the First Flight Shrine, it was built in 1966 by the First Flight Society as something to 
surround the 1903 Flyer in the Visitor Center. 
Figure 11: First Flight Shrine, Visitor Center, Wright Brothers National Memorial Historic 
Site, 1969 (Outer Banks History Center, Manteo, NC) 
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One Hundred Years of Telling a Story 
Because public memory is always in process, the centennial celebration is 
important as it sheds light on how the origin story of flight has continued to respond to 
the exigencies of flight safety and has served as a vessel for patriotism more broadly. 
During the six-day centennial event (December 12-17, 2003), 120,000 people were in 
attendance at the Outer Banks, including Pres. George W. Bush, Gov. Mike Easley (NC), 
senators, congressmen, astronauts, and celebrities, such as John Travolta, who served as 
master of ceremonies.80 Travolta, a private pilot as well as an actor, welcomed the rain-
logged crowd and, after citing some of the achievements of the Wright brothers, 
compared Neil Armstrong’s walk on the moon to the Wright brothers’ first four flights. 
Pres. Bush spoke next, comparing the Wright brothers to patriotic dreamers who always 
took chances and never gave up.81 Both Travolta and Bush invoked patriotism in their 
shaping of the narrative.  
After the official programs, organizers attempted to reenact the Wrights’ first 
flight, using a reproduction of the 1903 flyer. The first unsuccessful attempt occurred at 
10:35 a.m., the time recorded by the Wright brothers for their first flight. Two other 
attempts, made at 12:30 p.m. and at 3:30 p.m., also failed because of inadequate wind and 
weather conditions. One of the organizers said of the attempted reenactment, “One 
hundred years ago, the Wrights had the opportunity to wait for the optimal weather to fly. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 The First Flight Centennial Commission included Governor Mike Easley (North Carolina) and Governor 
Bob Taft (Ohio), NC Sens. Jesse Helms and John Edwards, Hooters Air, Wright Family Members, and the 
descendants of witnesses. 
 
81 “First Flight Ceremony: White House Event,” C-Span Video Library (Dec. 17, 2003) (Web): 
http://www.c-span.org/video/?179551-1/first-flight-centennial-ceremony 
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. . . We gave it our best effort.”82 While there was no doubting their effort, the 
interpretation of the origin story—even at its centennial celebration—had been adapted in 
order to soften the defeat of the twenty-first-century aeronauts. As you might recall from 
earlier in the chapter, the weather was not optimal on December 17, 1903. Yet, because 
they had committed to return to Dayton by Christmas, the Wrights did not have the 
luxury of waiting for good weather. The justifications of 2003 were based on the same 
factors as the Wrights, and, yet, the outcomes were different. 
Despite the botched attempts at reenactment, the centennial of the first four flights 
in 2003 provided an opportunity to further solidify the narrative ties between the Wright 
brothers’ legacy and the state of North Carolina and the rest of the U.S. Massey argues 
that our understanding of particular spaces is always in process. Such has been the case 
with the WBNM, which has been a tourist destination since 1932, and for North Carolina 
residents, who have had “First in Flight” on their license plates since 1982. Hosting the 
Centennial celebrations, however, afforded the opportunity for celebrities, politicians, 
and the public to gather in the location of first flight. Notwithstanding the influence of 
pride, the centennial celebration with its large attendance, an attempted flight 
reenactment, and speeches that linked the location of the first flights to Neil Armstrong’s 
moon landing all reinforced North Carolina’s claim to the origin story.  
For the centennial, the state of North Carolina commissioned a sculpture—
inspired by the First Flight photograph taken by John T. Daniels—that would further 
establish the site and, by extension, the state, within the origin story. Smith’s bronze and 
stainless steel sculpture, which he created from 10,000 pounds of stainless steel, was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 “Mother Nature Just Doesn’t Cooperate in Effort,” Countdown to Kitty Hawk (Dec. 17, 2003) (Web): 
http://mail.countdowntokittyhawk.org/news/12-17release.pdf 
 
96
  
 
unveiled at the Centennial celebration and now resides on the south side base of Big Kill 
Devil Hill and the Monument. The source photograph documents only Orville in flight 
and Wilbur running just behind. For his sculpture, Stephen H. Smith, however, decided to 
include Daniels, who was behind the camera, as well as the other witnesses from the Kill 
Devil Hills Life-saving Station, thus adding a new emphasis on the North Carolina 
residents. 
The sculpture was one of the planned highlights of the Centennial of Flight 
commemoration. After the dedication ceremony on December 16, 2003, Gov. Mike 
Easley (NC) and then-Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton went to have their 
photograph taken at the December 17, 1903 sculpture. However, instead of standing in 
front of or beside the sculpture, as Ruth Nichols, Orville Wright, and other officials had 
done in 1932 at the base of the Monument, the two government officials laid down next 
to the bronze cast of Orville, between the two wings of the aircraft. With thumbs high up 
in the air, the former Governor and Cabinet Member attempted a twelve-second ride that 
never left the ground. In addition to cultivating state pride and claiming North Carolina’s 
full share in the origin story, this statue reinforces the claim that the first human powered 
flight represents twelve seconds that changed the world.  
While the geographic location of the sculpture, which sits at the base of Big Kill 
Devil Hill and the Monument, is perfectly situated for visitors, who arrive by foot or car, 
the scupture’s optical illusions (or confusions) become evident when interpreting the 
WBNM through Massey’s trajectories. The December 17, 1903 sculpture seeks to build 
state pride in North Carolina’s role in the story of First Flight, and also national pride. 
But in so doing, it takes liberties in the representation of North Carolinians who were not 
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featured in the one photograph of the origin story of flight. By adding them to the 
sculpture, it makes it seem as if an omniscient narrator was there too, to capture the 
moment.  
Figure 12: Photograph of December 17, 1903 sculpture by Steven Smith, 2003 (Julia Scatliff O’Grady) 
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As the photo reflects, how this sculpture relates to the original monument is also 
problematic. Is the Lifesaving station cheering for the aircraft, or for the monument atop 
Big Kill Devil Hill? If the First Flight Field represents the trajectory of the first four 
flights, one that is nearby but headed in another direction, then what is this stainless steel 
plane doing on the other side of the dune? Here on this Mall that commemorates the 
origin story of flight, trajectories are flying through the air like arrows.  
As argued earlier in this chapter, the origin story of flight continues to circulate 
and is deemed the inspiration for other record-setting flights and aviators. At the 25th 
anniversary of the origin story of flight, Amelia Earhart was in attendance as a symbolic 
link between the origin story of flight and her recent achievement as the first woman 
passenger on a transatlantic flight. When Earhart did not return for the dedication of the 
1932 Monument, this absence also sent a signal of discontinuity. After reflecting upon 
the origin story of flight, its threats, contests, and relationship to citizenship, it is possible 
now to imagine the 1903 story as a template for Golden Age of Aviation aviators.  
 Over time, the WBNM has come to be understood as a place of ritual, with 
religious associations; it has been called an “aviation shrine.”83 The concept of 
pilgrimage is a fundamental organizing principle at the WBNM, as visitors return each 
December 17 to honor the anniversary of first flight by climbing up to the top of Big Kill 
Devil Hill to the Monument. People reenact the first flight in reproductions of the 1903 
Flyer, including singer John Denver, who came to the site dressed like the Wrights, and 
laid down on his plane to attempt flight.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 The WBNM as shrine is evidenced in stories that include a tradition of “reenactors,” and people who 
drop ashes of relatives over the Monument. See W.O. Saunders, “Two Historic Shrines,” The [Elizabeth 
City, NC] Independent (1937). 
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Figure 13: Marching band headed to the Wright Brothers National Memorial Monument for 
the First Flight Celebration, 1969 (Outer Banks History Center, Manteo, NC) 
Figure 14: John Denver and Ken Kellet on the Wright Brothers’ Flyer (reproduction), 
1969 (Outer Banks History Center, Manteo, NC) 
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The Visitor Center encourages a performativity in kite flying contests and the 
spinning of toy helicopters, such as the one the Wright brothers’ father gave to them as 
boys. The performances are meant to encourage the visitor to engage in activities similar 
to those of the Wright brothers in order to experience first hand some of the influences 
that led to the possibility of flight.  
 
Conclusion 
 
During the era of ballooning and dirigibles, the public came to associate flying 
with expectations for spectacle. Aviators fed this appetite by marking progress in their 
flying with events to demonstrate their next success (or failure) in the presence of a 
crowd. While safety measures were, no doubt, considered and attempted, the events were 
focused more on representations of greater altitude and sport than on the potential for the 
practical applications for flight. In 1903, the Wright brothers defied the expectation for 
spectacle, as they planned their first four flights in a remote location, and without a 
crowd. In their flight experiments, they privileged a rhetorical discourse of safe flying 
over spectacle, later applied in commemorative acts at the WBNM to encourage 
commercial flying among the public. Since then, successful flight has become 
represented as an abiding dialectic between risk and safety. This origin story of flight, 
and how it has been represented to subsequent generations of pilots and passengers, both 
in the press and at the national park site, continues to demonstrate the relevance of 
representations of risk balanced by assurances of safety. 
Spectacle has never fully retreated from human flight. While the Wright brothers 
were the first aviators to both demonstrate a careful understanding of flight and to 
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successfully fly their own gliders, they too found themselves flying for crowds once the 
word got out, especially Orville’s flights at Fort Myer and Wilbur’s in France in 1908. 
Both Wright brothers were unnerved by crowds, especially the 1908 flights of Orville at 
Fort Myer and Wilbur in France. In the next chapter, we will see how an aviator such as 
Amelia Earhart struggled to attend to measures of safety as she gave the public what they 
wanted: spectacle. While the tension between spectacle and safety becomes challenged in 
the brief aviation careers of the Wright brothers, the stakes grow even higher with the 
introduction of planes during the 1920s and 1930s that could traverse not just a few 
miles, but a wide ocean.  
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Chapter Three 
 
  EARHART: REASSURING A SKITTISH PUBLIC OF FLIGHT’S SAFETY 
 
“Trouble in the air is very rare.” 
—Amelia Earhart1 
 
 
  To interpret the Wright brothers’ contributions to safe human flight demands the 
long view, one that considers not only the first five years of successful flying—1903-1908—
but also the construction of public memory of those earliest flights instantiated in the Wright 
Brothers National Memorial. With the passage of time, public indebtedness to the Wright 
brothers’ legacy of safe flying has only increased. By contrast, although Amelia Earhart 
figured prominently in newspaper and media accounts of feats in early aviation during her 
lifetime—she was, for instance, widely known as “Lady Lindy,” after Charles Lindbergh—
the public memory of her has focused more on her disappearance.  Throughout her aviation 
career, that nine-year period from 1928 to 1937, Earhart was not only a record-setting pilot 
and national icon, but also a celebrity spokesperson for commercial aviation in the U.S. 
when the industry was in its infancy. Accordingly, I argue that news accounts about 
Earhart’s aviation career and her own reflections on flying highlight the rhetorical role she 
played in reassuring the public that it was safe to fly and that these messages were as 
essential to the continued development of the aviation industry as were technological 
innovations. 
 Since 1937—when Earhart’s plane in her round-the-globe trip disappeared—her 
prolific and public role as spokesperson and author has been largely overlooked or parsed 
                                                
1 Amelia Earhart, The Fun of It: Random Records of My Own Flying and of Women in Aviation (New York: 
Harcourt Brace, 1932), p. 42. 
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out in only brief mentions. In the recovery and critical analysis of her memoirs, public 
lectures, magazines stories, and newspaper interviews, what emerges is the critical role she 
played in the rhetorical construction of aviation safety, a persistent effort on the part of 
Earhart that has seemingly disappeared along with her plane. When historical or public 
accounts of Earhart’s appeals to air safety do appear, they often minimize the critical nature 
of her role in encouraging a skittish public to fly. It is important to note from the start that 
there are reasons for the absence or downplaying of Earhart’s effective appeals to flight’s 
safety. First of all, how could it be possible for a pilot who disappeared to remain a public 
symbol for safe flying? The irony or the dissonance of characterizing Earhart as a purveyor 
of flight’s safety has come to distance Earhart’s public memory from the impact of her 
advocacy. This drift has been accentuated by the fact that much of her public memory has 
focused on the pursuit of finding her plane or in solving what has been described as one of 
aviation’s greatest mysteries.2 
 Setting aside the mystery and the public memory of Earhart, this chapter will focus 
on those rhetorical discourses spoken or penned by Earhart, or reflected in texts that 
circulated during her lifetime, which, I argue, were her strategic tactics of reassurance that 
encouraged a skeptical public that it was safe to buy a ticket and fly. Inspired by recent 
scholarship that proves that “logics of circulation” are “fundamental to the study of public 
address,”3 this chapter interprets the discourse of safety that circulated in the social 
imaginary of flight during Earhart’s career. To do so, I investigate the discourses and texts 
that circulated during the 1920s and 1930s that were intended to persuade non-flyers to fly. 
Like the circulating texts regarding the Wright brothers’ first four flights, this chapter draws 
                                                
2 Emma Lacey Bordeaux, “Group: Piece of Metal May Solve Mystery of Amelia Earhart’s Disappearance,” 
CNN U.S. Edition, Oct. 30, 2014. 
 
3 Mary E. Stuckey, “On Rhetorical Circulation,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 15 (2012): 609-12. 
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inspiration and guidance from Warner’s accounts of public formation and Taylor’s 
construction of a social imaginary.4 Biographer Susan Ware sums up this social imaginary 
by addressing how Earhart’s discourses of reassurance were designed to assuage fears: 
“Many of Amelia Earhart’s public activities between 1928 and 1937 were directed at 
overcoming popular fears about commercial aviation.”5 This ability to build her rhetorical 
persona, not only as a daredevil, but also as an advocate for flight’s safety, became Earhart’s 
trademark during an era that was not only “boiling with new enterprises”6 but also 
contending with skeptical consumers. While Ware and other biographers have identified the 
way Earhart quelled public fears, they rarely support such claims. What has been missing in 
Earhart scholarship is a comprehensive, critical analysis of the thousands of newspaper and 
magazine articles that circulated and represented Earhart’s aviation career. Such is the work 
of this chapter. The “discourse of reassurance,” that Earhart embodies, can be characterized 
as persistent coaxing or reflected optimism meant to distract the public from any real 
presence of risk in the air.  In this discourse, Earhart consistently reassured the public that 
any of their concerns—bad weather or accidents—could be overcome by the mitigation of 
their own fears. This discourse of reassurance helped a skittish public begin to embrace the 
idea of commercial flight in greater numbers.  
Record-setting male pilots were not expected to reassure the public of flight’s safety in 
this way. Throughout his career, and in his book Flight and Life (1948), Lindbergh 
privileged the risks of flying over the precautionary measures he took as a pilot, exemplified 
in a comment made about a particular flight as returning “from the border of death.”7 
                                                
4 Warner, Publics and Counterpublics; Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries, p. 23. 
 
5 Ware, Still Missing: Amelia Earhart and the Search for Modern Feminism (New York: Norton, 1993), p. 68. 
 
6 Ware, Still Missing, p. 105. 
 
7 Charles Lindbergh, Of Flight and Life (New York: Scribner’s, 1948). 
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Lindbergh did not make public reassurances about the safety of flight, rather, he emphasized 
the risk of flight in recollections of his barnstorming days. While Earhart engaged in risk-
taking comparable to the male record-setting pilots, her discourse was positioned as one 
meant to reassure the public of the safety in air over its proven risk. One of my jobs is to 
parse out why this was so. 
Throughout Earhart’s career and into the present, the aviation industry has been 
mostly a man’s pursuit and profession. In order for Earhart to be accepted as a pilot and to 
gain advertising endorsements and lecture gigs, she had to demonstrate that she both 
understood the limits of being a woman in aviation and continue to set and break the flying 
records of male pilots, all while projecting a humility that made it seem as if she was just 
darn lucky. The “feminine style” that Karlyn Kohrs Campbell’s speaks to describes the 
gendered practices of women public figures.8 In “Gender and Genre: Loci of Invention and 
Contradiction In the Earliest Speeches by U.S. Women,” Campbell argues that women have 
been cast as “ill-suited to the role of rhetor historically.”9 Women engaged in public address 
find themselves in a “double bind”: “Every occasion when a woman speaks, there was an 
awareness of taboos being violated and an expectation that the woman would act rhetorically 
to reaffirm traditional notions of womanhood.”10 This “feminine style” was meant to 
reassure the audience of the speaker’s femininity, through inductive arguments, a woman 
speaker was expected to give the audience the impression that the conclusions they were 
drawing were their own. Furthermore, a woman speaker was only supposed to discuss 
experiences appropriate to women and demonstrate their reliance on male expertise to 
support their claims. Such was the case for Earhart. She came to master a gendered 
                                                
8 Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, “What Really Distinguishes and/or Ought to Distinguish Feminist Scholarship in 
Communication Studies,” Women’s Studies in Communication 11.1 (1988): 4-5. 
 
9 Campbell, p. 479. 
 
10 Campbell, pp. 479-80. 
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discourse of flight’s safety in the appeals she made to reassure the public in order to support 
a fledgling commercial industry. 
In this chapter, I draw a circumference around the circulating texts of Earhart’s aviation 
career. 11 Because Earhart’s rhetorical persona has been overshadowed by her disappearance, 
this chapter reclaims a discourse that supported a growing enthusiasm for flight during the 
Golden Age of Aviation. The civic identity that Earhart maintained before she disappeared 
can be found in the thousands of articles that Earhart and Putnam collected in a series of 
scrapbooks that are archived at Purdue University. These collected articles include accounts 
of Earhart’s lecture circuit, which took her all over the U.S., articles that record the public 
reception of her record-setting flights, Earhart’s own perspectives on flying, and articles that 
demonstrate her advocacy for women’s equality, considered together, these demonstrate 
Earhart’s ongoing rhetorical constructions of flight’s safety. 
Earhart was a critical part of a broader discourse of reassurance employed by the 
nascent airline industry that both encouraged enthusiasm for flight and constructed a new 
civic identity of the airline passenger. I will focus on three instantiations in Earhart’s 
rhetorical practices of reassurance: First, the public persona she promoted for herself, using 
gender performativity to play up or play down the feminine and masculine aspects of herself 
when one appeared to be more advantageous than another. Second, her association with men, 
both in her personal life and in her aviation adventures, who could lend her work additional 
credibility. Third, her advocacy work to get women to embrace flight as a new mode of 
transit, a “discourse of domesticity” that appealed to both women passengers and women 
who might sway other family members to fly, by comparing flight to household 
responsibilities.  
                                                
11 See Jensen, Erin F. Doss, Claudia I. Janssen, and Sherrema A. Bower, “Theorizing the Transcendent 
Persona: Amelia Earhart’s Vision in The Fun of It,” Communication Theory 20 (2010): 1-20.  
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All three of these rhetorical strategies of reassurance depended upon a dialectical 
relationship between safety and risk. Kenneth Burke’s perspective on dialectics in his 
Grammar of Motives (1945) provides a means through which to interpret such discourses 
and their public significance in Earhart’s aviation career.12 During Earhart’s aviation career, 
appeals to safety were always embedded within the logics of adventure and risk. Before 
Earhart, record-setting flights had been interpreted solely as enactments of risk. Consider, 
for instance, Charles Lindbergh’s 1927 transatlantic flight: this feat proved to the American 
public that such a flight was technically possible and that Lindbergh was a brave and skilled 
pilot, but it was not intended to help everyday members of the public to imagine themselves 
in his shoes. Earhart, however, in her lectures, memoirs, magazine stories, and interviews, 
articulated a relationship between safety and risk that made flying seem more appealing to 
potential new airline passengers, as if the risk of taking a seat on a commercial flight was 
somehow on par with Earhart’s decision to fly across the Atlantic Ocean. Within dialectics, 
Burke described the possibility for a  “transposition of terms,” an ambiguity making it 
possible for two words to take on new or enhanced meaning as a result of their “interplay” 
with each other.13 Taming flight within public discourse meant representing just enough of 
risk to make the experience seem appealing to airline passengers, but always in concert with 
reassurance of safety. The risk inherent in tropes of transportation could be contained by the 
safety discourses fundamental to Earhart’s rhetorical constructions of flight.  
When delineating Earhart’s role in aviation history, it is helpful, too, to consider how 
her identity as a female aviator affected her experience. Feminist standpoint theory offers a 
language for understanding Earhart’s situation. In a male-dominated sky, Earhart was given 
a subordinate role, but she acknowledged the gendered strictures and strategized a way to 
                                                
12 Burke, A Grammar of Motives. 
 
13 Burke, A Grammar of Motives, pp. 402-03. 
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work within them in order to achieve her goals. Feminist standpoint theory—a subset of 
other standpoint theories that focus on other identities, such as race, ethnicity, and sexual 
orientation—provides a theoretical structure through which distinctions between men and 
women can be seen as reflective of greater forces related to patriarchy, ones that have 
rendered women as subordinate to men. While social location determines and shapes one’s 
life, it does not determine one’s particular standpoint, which is the result of “critical 
reflection on power relations.” Earhart, to use this theoretical language, developed an 
“oppositional stance” formed out of struggle.14 Like Warner’s counterpublic, feminist 
standpoint reflects the experience of life looking from the “outsider-within.”15 The rest of 
this chapter will demonstrate Earhart’s strategies for successfully navigating a male-
dominated realm.  
 
Charles Lindbergh 
  
 Because of his transatlantic flight in 1927, Charles Lindbergh became the first and 
most enduring archetype of a record-setting pilot, sparking a public enthusiasm for flight 
both in the U.S. and abroad. After Lindbergh crossed the Atlantic Ocean solo in the Spirit of 
Saint Louis, throngs of cheering spectators greeted him in Le Bourget, France. That public 
fervor was matched in communities across the U.S. in the national tour he made after his 
return. Not everyone cheered him on, though; Lindbergh had to defend himself against 
accusations that circulated in the press that he acted too much like a daredevil in his piloting. 
A letter from business tycoon and philanthropist John Hays Hammond to Harry 
                                                
14 Julia T. Wood, “Feminist Standpoint Theory and Muted Group Theory: Commonalities and Divergences,” 
Women and Language 28.2 (2005): 61-64. 
 
15 Ibid, p. 62. See also Patricia Hill Collins, “Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance 
of Black Feminist Thought,” The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies, 
ed. Sandra G. Harding (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 103-26. 
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Guggenheim, the sponsor of the national tour, raised the concern that Lindbergh was too 
daring—that he was performing air stunts on his national tour—and that it would be a 
“national calamity if anything happened to him.” Hammond asked Guggenheim if he would 
be willing to “drop a word of caution” to his friend Lindbergh.16 Seeking to reassure 
Guggenheim, Lindbergh wrote to report that he was “not taking as many chances flying on 
this tour as I would be flying the mail,” and that reports of his stunts during the national tour 
were unfounded.17 Despite his protests, news reports about the tour also cited Lindbergh’s 
foolish risk-taking. The Minneapolis Star called Lindbergh’s stop there one of many 
“sensational hops over the country,” and that the Colonel was “actuated by only one 
purpose—the promotion of interest in aviation.”18 Guggenheim understandably would be 
alarmed by the reports of his friend Hammond and by those appearing in newspaper 
accounts. He wanted Lindbergh’s victory lap to showcase the safety of flying and to inspire 
future new passengers—not future daredevils. The commercial air industry depended upon 
Lindbergh to serve as the poster boy for an industry that sought to popularize air travel.  
    
Changes in Aviation History during Earhart’s Career  
So far, I have considered peripheral matters in the state of early aviation when Earhart 
was becoming a public figure. Before turning to Earhart herself, I will briefly preview the 
state of aviation technology and the advances that were being made in technology and 
regulation during the course of her nine-year career. In 1930, Congress passed the Air Mail 
Act, which gave almost dictatorial powers over the air transportation system to the 
                                                
16 From John Hays Hammond to Harry Guggenheim, Box 27, F-14, July 27, 1927, Lookout Hills, Gloucester, 
MA, Missouri Historical Museum. 
 
17 Charles A. Lindbergh to Harry Guggenheim, 1927-28, from the Brown Hotel, Louisville, KY, Aug. 7, 1927, 
Box 2, Harry Frank Guggenheim Papers 1900-1972, Library of Congress. 
 
18 “Lindbergh’s Unhappy Lot,” Minneapolis Star (Sept. 1, 1927). 
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Postmaster General. The main provision of the Act, which concerned how airmail carriers’ 
rates were computed, made it financially advantageous for the contract carriers to fly larger 
planes, thus creating room for passengers. The Postmaster, Walter Folger Brown, then 
wielded his power and consolidated airline routes to only three companies. Those companies 
would eventually become United Airlines, which flew the northern routes; a merger of 
Transcontinental Air Transport (TAT) and Western Air Express, which became 
Transcontinental and Western (TWA) and covered the middle of the U.S.; and American 
Airways, whose routes included the southern and western routes.19 The demands of carrying 
letters and packages necessitated improvements to aviation safety that would eventually 
radically transform commercial air service after a political fallout between President 
Roosevelt and Postmaster Brown in 1934. Still, the airlines had begun to grow in wealth and 
power. The commercial airline industry had taken off.20 
 Advances in safety measures are a critical component in this narrative. During the 
1920s, the country had begun installing lines of beacons from coast to coast in order to light 
the airways. Navigational aids and instruments for night flying were still rudimentary or 
nonexistent, and rotating lamps and mirrors standing atop 50 ft.-tall steel towers set about 10 
miles apart meant that pilots flying in clear weather were always within visible range of a 
beacon. However, with the development of airmail routes, floodlights were added, such that 
by 1933—not long after Earhart had made history as the first woman to fly solo across the 
Atlantic—the United States boasted 18,000 miles of lighted airways.21 Therefore, passengers 
                                                
19 “Airmail and the Growth of the Airlines,” U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission. (Web). Accessed Nov. 16 
2014: http://www.centennialofflight.net.  
 
20 For more on commercial aviation history, see Henry Ladd Smith, Airways: The History of Commercial 
Aviation in the United States (New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1965); and for more on the history of air  
mail, see James H. Bruns, Mail on the Move (Polo, Ill: Transportation Trails, 1992). 
 
21 See Grant, Flight, p. 117. 
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could fly coast to coast without needing overnight train service, thus making flying 
competitive with rail travel.  
 Despite making travel safer at night, the beacons were invisible during bad weather. 
Therefore, in the late 1920s, American scientists and engineers began experimenting with a 
radio-based navigation solution using a network of directional radio beams. By the early 
1930s, planes were equipped with AM radio receivers that picked up the low frequency 
radio waves transmitted from the ground, which allowed pilots to navigate the skies even 
when weather conditions were blinding.22 The industry established radio navigation stations 
transmitting radio beams at 200-mile intervals along U.S. airways.23 By the mid-1930s, in 
fact, most passenger aircraft in the U.S. were equipped with two-way radios that allowed 
communication with ground controllers.24 Therefore, Earhart’s career coincided with this 
milestone development of a navigational system, however rudimentary, that allowed pilots 
to “fly blind” through storms. 
As traffic at some airports increased in volume, the need for air-traffic control emerged. 
The first air-traffic control tower was built in 1930 at the Cleveland Municipal Airport, and 
by 1935, 20 airports in the U.S. had similar systems in place.25 Under this system, 
approaching pilots would radio in information about their position, and controllers would 
alert them if there was any concern and also give permission to land. However, since there 
was no control of aircraft until they approached the airport, controllers sometimes had to 
coordinate the landings of numerous planes arriving at zero visibility at the same altitude, 
and at some underfunded airports, controllers doubled as switchboard operators and baggage 
                                                
22 Charles Wood, “On the Beam,” Flight Simulator Navigation (Web): accessed 16 Nov. 2014: 
http://www.navfltsm.addr.com/ndb-nav-history.htm.  
 
23 See R. G. Grant, Flight: 100 Years of Aviation (New York: DK Publishing, Inc., 2002), p. 139. 
 
24 See Grant, Flight, p. 142. 
 
25 Grant, Flight, p. 142. 
112
   
 
handlers. A series of highly publicized crashes in the mid-1930s—particularly that of New 
Mexico Senator Bronson Cutting in 1935—underscored the critical need to develop a 
national air traffic control system.  
 It is hard to overestimate the impact of media accounts of crashes such as that 
involving Sen. Cutting and how such reports stoked fears in the American public that figures 
like Earhart would have to work hard to diminish. The May 7, 1935 New York Times report 
about the flight that killed Sen. Cutting gives a flavor of the kind of bad publicity with 
which the airlines contended, and, for that reason, I will quote the entire news report:  
ATLANTA, Mo., May 6 — Out of fuel and desperately groping through a dense fog 
for a landing place, a twin-motored Transcontinental & Western Air liner 
crashed early today at the edge of a pasture here and killed United States Senator 
Bronson M. Cutting, the two pilots and a woman passenger. All the other nine 
passengers, including a baby, were injured. The crash was within fifteen miles of the 
Kirksville emergency field, which company officials had hoped the craft would 
reach when it was warned not to land at Kansas City because of the “soupy” 
condition of the air. 
Senator Cutting’s death was instantaneous. 
His crushed body was identified from the contents of his pockets, which held a 
card with his name, a check for a telephone bill bearing the name of his mother, Mrs. 
W. Bayard Cutting of New York City, and almost $600 in cash. He also carried a 
photograph of his mother. He was hurrying to Washington to vote on the veterans’ 
bonus. His body is being sent to New York from Macon, Mo. Burial will be near his 
birthplace, Oakdale, L. I.   
The other dead were: BOLTON, HARVEY, the pilot, Kansas City. 
113
   
 
GREESON, KENNETH, co-pilot, Kansas City. 
HILLIAS, Miss JEANNE ANNE, 20, Kansas City. 
The injured are: METZGER, Mrs. DORA L., Los Angeles. Her 3-months-old 
daughter.  
WALLACE, RICHARD, motion-picture director. 
WING, PAUL, motion-picture official. 
KAPLAN, WILLIAM, motion-picture executive, KAPLAN, Mrs. WILLIAM. 
DREW, C. G. (PAT), motion-picture electrician. 
SHARPE, HARRY, motion-picture camera man. 
MESKER, Mrs. D. L., Kansas City, wife of a TWA pilot. 
All except Kaplan were dangerously hurt.26 
As a result of the crash, the congressional Subcommittee of the Senate’s Committee on 
Commerce held hearings to investigate certain airplane accidents and interstate air 
commerce.  In 1936, closing in on the year of Earhart’s last flight in 1937, the federal 
government granted control of the national airways to the Commerce Department.27 From 
1936 to 1937, Congress held its “Safety in Air” hearings.28 By this point, the industry had 
grown up and no longer flew under the proverbial radar. Earhart’s work to encourage a 
reticent public to fly—to which this chapter will soon turn—must be read alongside this 
history. 
 
                                                
26 “Senator Cutting is Killed in Air Crash Fatal to 4,” New York Times (May 7, 1935). 
 
27 “Airline Expansion and Innovation, 1927-1941: The Beginning of Air Traffic Control,” Smithsonian 
National Air and Space Museum Online Exhibition: America by Air (2007) (Web): accessed Nov. 16 2014: 
https://airandspace.si.edu/exhibitions/america-by-air/online/innovation/innovation12.cfm.  
 
28 For the full report, see Safety in Air: Hearings before a Subcomittee of the Committee on Commerce, United 
States Senate, Seventy-fourth Congress, second session, pursuant to S. Res. 146; digitized via Hathi Trust 
Digital Library (Web): accessed Nov. 16 2014: http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001039585 
114
   
 
The Role of Women in Aviation in the 1920s 
 Before turning to Earhart, I will also sketch out the role of women in aviation just 
before she became a national figure. From 1903 to 1927, women aviators appeared mostly 
within the social imaginary at risk-taking events as barnstormers, wing walkers, and pilots.29 
There had been many women aviators who died in these events. However, two accidents and 
the reported details of those accidents were so gruesome that the memory of their crashes 
likely added to the public’s skittishness about flying. In 1912, Harriet Quimby flew over the 
Boston Harbor in a purple flowing gown with a hood and laced boots in a trial flight for an 
upcoming air show. In the presence of 5,000 spectators, she lost control of her monoplane 
and fell into the water, along with her male passenger, the organizer of the air show.30 A 
group of men, including her flight instructor, ran into the water to rescue her, only to 
discover her dead in the harbor. One of the men threw her corpse over his shoulder and 
walked toward an empty stretcher. The New York Times reported that the “two bodies shot 
downward, striking the water 200 feet from the shore.”31 The article continued with an 
account of the male passenger’s young son, who “was frantic and would have tried to swim 
out in the bay had he not been restrained.” Both observations reflected a propensity toward 
the sensational and gruesome in accounts of aviation disasters.  
 In 1926, African-American pilot Bessie Coleman had herself gained notoriety for her 
daring flights. In preparation for a 1926 air show in Jacksonville, Florida, Coleman fell out 
                                                
29 See Janaan Sherman, Walking on Air: The Aerial Adventures of Phoebe Omlie (Jackson, MS: U of 
Mississippi P, 2011), pp. 3-23. The career of Omlie and her husband, Vernon, afford a window into early 
aviation, as entertainment, business, and peril.  
 
30 Quimby was the first woman to receive a pilot’s license in 1911 and the first woman to cross the English 
Channel. She was also a screenwriter for the film Birth of a Nation. 
 
31 “Miss Quimby Dies in Airship Fall: Noted Woman Aviator and WAP. Willard, Passenger, are Thrown 1,000 
Feet,” New York Times (July 2, 1912), p. 1.  
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of her plane at 500 feet, and, along with William T. Wills, a white pilot, died.32 Their deaths 
were reported on the front page of the New York Amsterdam Times, an African-American 
newspaper, which began the article with the sentence, “death rode in an airplane.”33 Like the 
articles that circulated after Quimby’s death, reports about Coleman’s accident explicitly 
described both pilots’ charred remains. Two years after Coleman’s death, Earhart made her 
first headlines. 
 It is also important to contextualize Earhart’s aviation career in a second occupation 
developed for women in planes: as flight attendants. In 1930, women assumed a new role in 
aviation. Boeing Air Transport became the first airline to hire women for the aircrew. The 
first flight attendants were trained nurses, dressed in light gray nurse uniforms with 
matching nurse’s caps. 34 Passengers almost certainly welcomed seeing medically trained 
staff on flights that were rough and dangerous, and the presence of these female flight 
attendants offered comfort and reassurance. The Boeing 80s were the latest in trimotor 
design, had passenger cabins outfitted to resemble luxury Pullman railroad cars—with wood 
paneling, upholstered seats, lights with shades—and served in-flight meals on elegant china 
dishware. However, as R. G. Grant reminds us, “despite this surface slickness, much of the 
experience of flight remained stubbornly discomforting”: deafening noise, chairs without 
shock absorbers, an inefficient heating system, crude toilets, and, since planes could not yet 
fly above the weather, airsickness-inducing turbulence. In fact, Grant continues, “one of the 
stewardess’s prime tasks was to care for people emptying their stomachs into the coyly 
named ‘burp cups’ . . . . Sitting among vomiting passengers and disintegrating crockery, a 
                                                
32 Coleman got her pilot’s license in France. 
 
33 “Aviatrix Killed by Fall: Bessie Coleman and White Pilot in 2000 ft. Crash,” New Amsterdam News (May 5, 
1926), p. 1. 
 
34 For information about the role of stewardesses in advertising, see Peter Lyth, “‘Think of her as your mother’: 
Airline advertising and the stewardess in America, 1930-1980,” Journal of Transport History 30.1 
(Manchester, UK: Manchester U P): 1-21. 
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‘bad flight’ was as hellish an experience as the worst sea crossing.”35  Furthermore, in the 
early 1930s it was still common for planes to make emergency landings in remote 
emergency airfields—or in cow pastures.  
By the end of the 1930s, Grant says, “U.S. airlines were carrying three million 
passengers a year,” and those passengers enjoyed heated sound-proofed cabins, sat in 
padded seats, ate hot in-flight meals, played card games, and sometimes wrote cards or 
letters in flight that would be carried via airplane.36 During the period of Earhart’s career, 
the commercial air industry grew from an estimated 95 million revenue passenger miles in 
1932 to 270 million in 1935.37 Three years after Earhart’s career ended, Boeing introduced 
the four-engine B-307 Stratoliner, the first commercial airplane able to fly in the 
stratosphere, above the weather. Therefore, the kind of smooth airplane travel that we know 
now was not yet available during Earhart’s aviation career, when she was trying to sell 
customers on the flying experience.38 Earhart’s aviation career—1928-1937—coincided 
historically with the growth of the commercial airline industry and its awareness of the need 
to downplay the risks—which were being addressed—in flying. 
 
Earhart and the Airline Industry    
 By the end of her career, Earhart would be able to claim fourteen record-setting 
flights, including the first transatlantic flight as a woman passenger in 1928 and the first 
transatlantic flight as a solo woman in 1932. In addition to her two transatlantic flights, she 
was the first to fly round-trip across the U.S. in an Autogiro in 1931, the first to fly from 
                                                
35 Grant, Flight, p. 145. 
 
36 Grant, Flight, pp. 147-49. 
 
37 Bilstein, Flight in America, p. 104. 
 
38 Grant, Flight, p. 149. 
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Hawaii to California, and the first to fly over the Gulf of Mexico to New York City, all in 
1935.  
 It all began, though, when Earhart responded to a call in 1928 to become the first-
ever woman passenger on a transatlantic flight. The flight had been organized and sponsored 
by Amy Phipps Guest, an American heiress to the Pittsburgh Steel fortune who was married 
to a British man and living in London. She owned a plane she called Friendship, which she 
hoped would demonstrate the friendly ties between the United States and Britain. However, 
when family members of the American heiress decided that the flight would be too perilous 
for Guest, she contacted book publisher and publicist George P. Putnam about finding 
another woman to fly in the plane across the Atlantic.39 Guest wanted to find a woman with 
the right image and personality in order to promote the flight of the Friendship and future 
possibilities for commercial transatlantic service. Putnam, who had published Lindbergh’s 
memoir We (1927) after his transatlantic flight, stepped in to reorganize Guest’s trip and to 
select another woman passenger. At the time, Earhart had been working as a social worker 
in Boston. In her interview with Putnam and three committee members, Earhart made an 
impression, in part because of her physical and temperamental resemblance to Lindbergh. 
Her poise, modesty, clean looks, and cheerfulness—as well as her experience as a pilot and 
her comfort flying—made her a natural replacement for Guest. The committee selected 
Earhart to serve as “captain” of the flight. In fact, the role was merely ceremonial, and 
Wilmer Stultz, a test pilot for one of Admiral Byrd’s planes, was compensated $20,000 for 
flying the plane. Earhart would receive no financial reward—even the fees she would earn 
from her newspaper articles after the flight had to be returned to help cover the costs of the 
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flight.40 After the Friendship’s successful passage across the Atlantic, Earhart became an 
international hero who was celebrated with tickertape parades, lecture invitations, and other 
adventurous gambles such as a deep sea diving expedition in the waters off of Manhattan.41  
Soon thereafter, with Putnam’s grooming, she released her first memoir, 20 Hrs., 40 Min.: 
Our Flight in the Friendship. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discourse of Safety 
 
 Amelia Earhart’s career began just a few years before commercial flying took off in 
earnest in the U.S. During this era of growth, Earhart became the face and figure of safe 
flying. Having a woman to promote flying as a passenger, as Earhart had been so 
prominently in 1928, was critical to making a shift in public perception. If it was safe for a 
woman to fly as a passenger, then it could be argued that it must be safe for all citizens. 
Over time, this discourse targeted at women, focused on encouraging American wives to 
                                                
40 Rich, Amelia Earhart: A Biography, p. 49. 
 
41 “A Famous Aviatrix Explores the Bottom of the Ocean,” Mid-Week Pictorial (Aug. 10, 1929), p. 1. 
 
Figure 1: Amelia Earhart dressing for 
deep-sea diving, 1929 (New York Times 
Mid-Week Pictorial) 
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reassure their husbands and families that flying would be a safe mode for business travel, 
Earhart—as both passenger and solo pilot—continued to play an important role in this 
endeavor throughout the length of her career.  
 As the nation’s most celebrated female air passenger—a designation that troubled 
Earhart-the-pilot for the rest of her career—she conveyed the image of someone with the 
necessary competence, agency, and willingness to take calculated risk. Earhart embodied 
safety and clean living, and the public persona that developed represented her both as a 
record-setting pilot and as an everyday woman, who, for instance, favored buttermilk and 
eschewed drinking and smoking. Nothing in this collection of attributes was as critical, 
however, as the public seeing that she put her trust in the Friendship’s pilot Wilmer Stultz, 
even though she was a pilot too. As a pilot who agreed to be a passenger, she could model 
the trust necessary for others to consider flight themselves. 
 
Earhart’s Memoirs 
 Earhart’s perspectives on flight and safety circulated through interviews with her and 
stories about her in newspapers and the three memoirs she wrote (the last of which was 
taken from her final flight log and published posthumously). In these memoirs—20 Hrs., 40 
Min.: Our Flight In the Friendship (1928); The Fun of It (1932); and Last Flight (1937)—
Earhart shared her own perspectives about the opportunity afforded by flight.42 Earhart’s 
ability to develop an effective discourse around flight’s safety is evident in her capacity to 
tell stories, ones that enhanced the public’s ability to imagine their own entrance into the 
skies as pilot or passenger.  
                                                
42 Amelia Earhart, 20 Hrs., 40 Min.: Our Flight in the Friendship: the American Girl, First Across the Atlantic 
by Air, Tells her Story (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1928); Last Flight: Amelia Earhart’s Flying Adventures 
(New York: GP Putnam, 1937); and The Fun of It: Random Records of My Own Flying and of Women in 
Aviation (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1932). 
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 Recent biographers, such as Doris Rich and Susan Ware, have dismissed Earhart’s 
memoirs with statements such as: “In spite of brisk sales and generally flattering reviews, 
the book [20 Hrs 40 Mins] was not very interesting. Other than entries from Amelia’s diary, 
it was a dull summary of the problems of commercial aviation and a plea for more support 
from the government and the public.”43 As this critique suggests, the memoirs seem rather 
vapid. However, it is clear that Earhart was privileging a discourse of reassurance over any 
literary imperative.  Earhart’s biographers may dismiss Earhart’s folksy anecdotes as 
offering little more than passing amusement, but I argue that knowing that Earhart was also 
responding to the imperatives of safety lends a more nuanced reading to her words.   
 In her memoirs, Earhart relates advice and enumerates simple steps toward 
participating in air travel. In her first memoir, 20 Hrs., 40 Min.: Our Flight In the Friendship, 
Earhart constructs a rhetorical persona of herself as a cheerful helper: she seems clearly 
motivated to become a well-regarded pilot. Her self-deprecating tone, one evocative of 
Campbell’s “feminist style,” helps to create a rhetorical persona that reflects both personal 
humility and a desire to achieve. It was a strategy perhaps designed to relate to a public that 
was threatened by the abilities of a woman pilot. Earhart shares both accounts of her 
transatlantic flight and perspectives about flying for the domestic traveler. In 20 Hrs., 40 
Min., she acknowledges that there is risk in flight, but her dominant message is that flight 
has become much safer. Her words offer courage to those individuals still undecided about 
flying. 
 The precedent set in this first financial arrangement—of financing Earhart’s record-
setting flights through her own creative labor—became the manner in which Putnam and 
Earhart collaborated throughout her aviation career. Earhart developed a rhetorical persona, 
                                                
43 Anne Hermann, “On Amelia Earhart: The Aviatrix as American Dandy,” Michigan Quarterly Review 39.1 
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in part, through her writing and speaking about the wonder of flight and her ability to 
overcome its risk. Putnam promoted these messages to a public both intrigued by Earhart 
and the possibility that they too could join her in the skies as passengers.  
Because of the public influence of Putnam’s celebrity circle of friends, including 
Hollywood directors and actors, Earhart’s fame has often been attributed to Putnam’s 
network.44 After Earhart and Putnam’s marriage in 1931, their relationship provided a 
platform on which they were able to bolster the public’s confidence in flight’s safety. This 
relationship—one represented in accounts of them prior to and after her milestone flights, on 
the lecture circuit, and in product endorsements— telegraphed to readers that, as a wife, 
Earhart had the impetus to return from her flight, in tact, to the expectant arms of a loving 
husband.45 
 Because so few people had flown in a plane in 1928 very few people had seen the 
sky up close. Therefore, Earhart’s descriptions of the sky suggested the purpose of inviting 
calm in order to recruit future passengers. In her first memoir, she wrote, “There is a light 
haze and the ocean is smooth, with little color….From a height it looks quiet, almost like ice 
with flecks in it.”46 Earhart promised the air passenger entry to “another world” when flying 
above the clouds and “playing hide and seek” through the clouds.47 The sky, she suggests, is 
a peaceful habitat. This perspective promised views of the Earth just by looking out a cabin 
window. Through images that conjured up the exoticism of the sky, Earhart encouraged the 
public to covet the experience of flight. The book devotes a couple of chapters to recounting 
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the flight from Nova Scotia to Wales, and then flashes back to Earhart’s life prior to being 
selected as a passenger and speculates about the future of aviation, especially for women. It 
becomes clear in the book’s text that Earhart’s mission is not only to represent her own 
heroic journey but also to present a case for the safety of flying for all citizens.  
After the release of 20 Hrs., 40 Min., Earhart embodied the new civic identity of the 
airline passenger. In the chapter “Aviation Invites,” Earhart makes specific 
recommendations for how to move from the “airmindedness” of a non-flyer to becoming an 
air passenger. While she encouraged spectatorship at airshows and stunt flights, she also 
recognized that becoming an air passenger meant engaging in practices of civic agency. The 
first of these acts was, simply, sending letters by airmail.48 From the act of mailing a letter, 
the “airminded” citizen might consider taking the next step of becoming an airline passenger. 
Earhart corrected some popular misconceptions about flight, namely that it was comparable 
to a roller-coaster ride or to peering over a tall building: “Flying is so matter-of-fact that 
probably the passenger taking off for the first time will not know when he has left the 
ground.”49 Citing testimony of former “non-flyers,” Earhart emphasized the normalcy of 
flight: “I heard a man say as he left a plane after his first trip, ‘Well, the most remarkable 
thing about flying is that it isn’t remarkable’.”50 While the memoir conceded the fact that 
poor weather could affect a flight, she downplayed the risk: “There are bumps. Bumpiness 
… or a good time for strong stomachs.”51 The greatest threat to passenger safety, she 
claimed was flying with an unlicensed pilot. She included a chart, “Accidents and their 
Causes,” which drew a distinction between licensed and unlicensed planes and pilots and 
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links the majority of accidents with the unlicensed pilots.52 The chart implied that flight had 
become safer with the increased number of licensed and trained pilots operating licensed 
aircraft.  
 
                Figure 2: Chart: “Accidents and their Causes,” published in 20 Hrs., 40 Min., p. 147 
 
 Repeatedly in this memoir, Earhart told non-flyers that the best way they could 
support the advancement of aviation was to become air passengers. Citing conditions such 
as air timidity, Earhart suggested that commercial aviation’s future development depended 
equally upon a public reckoning with its fears and embracing technological advance. As the 
confidence of each new airline passenger grew, so, too, would grow the airline industry.  
 Earhart’s second memoir, The Fun of It, came out four years later. While it was 
promoted as the memoir of her solo transatlantic flight, only the last ten pages focus on that 
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feat, due to the fact that it was released almost immediately after the flight. Earhart’s 
discourse of reassurance, with regard to flight’s safety, is evident in the manner in which 
The Fun of It was promoted. One promotional advertisement featured a full-length 
photograph of Earhart wearing aviator goggles on top of her head, and a leather jacket and 
boots. The ad promised a phonograph recording of Earhart’s broadcast in London 72 hours 
after her take off.53 Arguably, this commercial gimmick was intended not just to sell copies 
of the book, but also to offer additional reassurance to an anxious public that Earhart would, 
indeed, reach her destination and that they would get audio proof.  
 The memoir itself, released with record speed the day after Earhart returned from the 
very flight that the promotional material about it touted, sought to assuage non-flyers of the 
relative safety of air travel. In it, Earhart cited what she had heard so many people say— that 
they “would gladly fly if [they] could stay very close to the ground”— and tried to dispel the 
myth that flying close to the ground was safer than flying with substantial altitude: “Trouble 
in the air is very rare. It is hitting the ground that causes it. Obviously, the higher one 
happens to be, the more time there is to select a safe landing place in case of difficulty.”54 
The added credibility she had gained through her solo transatlantic flight had given her a 
platform and an audience, and she used her newfound position to offer instruction to the 
public, as an expert pilot. With her first memoir, she did not have this kind of platform, since 
her fame at that time stemmed from her role as a passenger, not pilot. 
Even in her role as pilot, Earhart in her second memoir continues to draw a 
comparison between ground and sky from the perspective of being an air passenger. For 
example, Earhart cited instances in which the “non-flyer” had to choose between flight and 
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ground transportation. On certain airline routes, the travel time by railroad was comparable 
to that of an airplane. In order to make flight seem like a viable option for commercial 
transportation, the safety of the journey was not the only variable to consider. During the 
early 1930s, traveling cross-country via plane required 10 stops and took 24 (down from 36) 
hours. If airplane technology was only recently out of its infancy, so was automobile 
technology, which itself could be blamed for its share of fatalities.55 As Earhart advised her 
readers, “If you want to go more than forty-five, better take it to the air. It isn’t safe on the 
ground.”56  
Offering reassurance also came in the form of correcting public assumptions about 
women pilots. This tendency to scapegoat women for their own deaths was not lost on 
Earhart. In The Fun of It, she wrote:  
 Speaking of plane accidents in general, I might add that women are often penalized 
 by publicity for their every mishap. Any disproportionate “breaks” they get when 
 they accomplish something are nullified in crash headline.57  
For Earhart, the necessity for reassurance was not only a measure targeted at the non-flyer 
hesitant to take on the risk of flight. It was also necessary for a public that was skeptical of 
those women who chose to pilot aircraft.   
 Since the time of the Wrights’ first four flights, the weather was a constant concern. 
In both of her first two memoirs, Earhart reframed and dismissed or downplayed such 
matters as threatening weather conditions as “bugaboos.” This strategy acknowledged the 
possibility of various risks in flying, yet minimized them. She also drew her readers’ 
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attention to advancements in air safety, such as instruments for blind flying and radio 
equipment.58 Thus, in her memoirs, Earhart celebrated the wonder of the sky and touted 
those technological advancements meant to strengthen the safety record in aviation.  
 
Earhart’s Public Lectures  
Earhart’s public career as an advocate of flight and flight’s safety served as an 
essential companion discourse to the growth of commercial air travel.  As an advocate for 
flight’s safety, Earhart encouraged the “stay-at-homes” or “non-flyers”—period language 
for those who were fearful of air travel—to take the risk of becoming commercial air 
passengers. While there were many technological advances that contributed to the safety of 
flying, the rhetorical work of reassurance remained a necessity for future growth in 
commercial flight. 
 After her 1928 transatlantic flight, Earhart was constantly on the lecture circuit, 
giving lectures that took place in performance halls, college campuses, and churches across 
the country. While frequent mention of her lecture itinerary circulated in the news, there are 
far fewer examples of the content in Earhart’s lectures. On June 7, 1935, Earhart addressed 
3,500 people in her hometown of Atchison, Kansas.59 In her lecture, she employed her 
discourse of reassurance to encourage women to fly, to coax women to encourage their 
husbands to fly (or at least not be a barrier), and to choose flight over ground transit. She 
began by dispelling the many myths circulating in the media about the reasons she flew. She 
cited one question she had been asked in particular: if she had flown over the Pacific Ocean 
because she was bored with her husband. After relating a few other stories about the public’s 
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suspected reasons for her flights, Earhart went on to emphasize that she flew for her own 
“personal satisfaction,” not for any higher purpose such as the collection of scientific data, 
as so many had queried of her while in the audience of her prior lectures. 
 In the rest of the speech, Earhart focused on recruiting new air passengers by 
dispelling what she considered to be the popular myths or misperceptions of flight. The first 
myth was that worry could be in any manner productive to flying. Calling worry a “potent 
poison,” she said it “retarded reactions” in pilots and kept people from becoming air 
passengers. She emphasized her point by speculating that Hamlet would not have been a 
skilled aviator. She concluded her lecture with an appeal to flight’s safety, saying, “You 
would have to travel by air 12 million miles for an accident, which is practically safe!” Since 
Earhart attracted sometimes large crowds for her lectures, which were many, she was able to 
convey her confidence about flight in person to diverse audiences across the country. 
 
Safety in Air Congressional Hearing 
Earhart’s role of reassuring the public about flight’s safety reached its apex in 1936-
37 in her testimony before a congressional hearing on safety in air.  The Senate Committee 
on Commerce blamed the crash of the plane carrying Senator Cutting to his death on a faulty 
navigational aid and poor leadership within the Bureau of Air Commerce.  Prior to the 
accident and under the leadership of Eugene Vidal, the Bureau of Air Commerce had 
installed navigational aids for pilots, such as air-to-ground communication and beacon lights. 
When these aids failed, as was the case with the crash in Missouri, the public blamed the 
negligence of aviation bureaucrats in Washington, D.C. While the hearings were prompted 
by the death of Sen. Cutting, as documented in the introduction to this chapter, accounts of 
the accident responded to the need to support and promote the burgeoning civic identity of 
commercial air passengers by publicly investigating the safety of flight. At the hearings, 
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there were many articulations of safety over risk, meant to stabilize the perception of 
commercial flight as a viable and growing commercial industry.   
 Toward the end of the three-month-long hearing, Earhart gave her testimony. The 
modus operandi of her testimony was the necessity of reassuring the public of safe flying 
practices of commercial air personnel and also translating the experience of flight from the 
air back to the ground. As she had done so often on the lecture circuit, she made frequent 
comparisons between flying and driving as a way to discuss the challenges of nascent 
navigational aids:   
In the early days, curve signs were not necessary along the highways for the slow-
 moving automobile. As the speed increased those signs became more important, in 
 order to push performance to a higher level. . . . Theoretically, should not [aviation] 
 aids be considered in the same light as the highway signs?60  
Because the U.S. public in 1936 was largely reticent to fly, Earhart translated for them the 
experience of the sky by talking about it in terms of the automobile, hoping that reassurance 
would bring the perspective that flying was just like driving, but only safer.   
Toward the end of her testimony, Earhart warned committee members about those 
initiatives to address safety in flight that she believed would not increase the number of 
passengers in the air. She shared her disdain for the “musty laboratories” of academics that 
projected opinions about the “scope of the safety problem” without addressing the adventure 
of flight. It was, she argued, the skill of the pilot that would make aviation safe.61 Earhart’s 
congressional testimony signaled a turning point in the public’s relationship with flying. 
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Before this point, public discourses about flying privileged adventure, heroism, and record-
setting flights.  
Earhart’s many rhetorical strategies of reassurance in flight’s safety at the hearing 
registered her dissent. A New York Herald Tribune headline summarized Earhart’s 
testimony accordingly: “Overemphasis on Safety Called Bad for Aviation: Too Much Talk 
about Aids Frightens Public, Miss Earhart Tells Senators. Defends Beacon System; 
Facilities Better Here Than Abroad, Girl Flyer Says.”62 Nowhere in Earhart’s testimony did 
she insinuate that safety was overemphasized. What she did articulate was a need not to rely 
on the recent addition of navigational aids. This distinction, however, was too subtle for the 
New York Herald Tribune.63 Because so much emphasis had been placed on a faulty 
navigational aid in the Cutting accident, Earhart emphasized their “relative importance” for 
cautious pilots. With this congressional hearing, the adventure of flight had to be tempered 
with assurances that aviation safety would increase with the advancement of navigational 
aids. Flight had to appear safe in order for the commercial air industry to flourish. 
 
Earhart as Employee of the Commercial Air Industry 
As a woman, and as a competent pilot, Earhart could lend her celebrity status to sell 
commercial products. In the course of her career, she endorsed a clothing and luggage line to 
support the mobility of the air passenger, spark plugs, an airplane engine, an automobile, 
gasoline, oil, and Kodak cameras.64 She was the “it-girl” of aviation, and a wide range of 
commercial producers sought her endorsement. With the ubiquity of her name and image in 
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the American media in the years 1932-37, Earhart’s star status was strong and her words 
carried weight. And because the products she endorsed were meant for everyday use, their 
utilitarian nature transferred over to the perception of flight, by association, as a quotidian 
pursuit. 
 As a vice-president for three commercial aviation ventures, Transcontinental Air 
Transport (TAT), Ludington Airline, and the Boston and Maine Airways, Earhart’s job was 
not only to add credibility through her own fame but to reassure the public of flight’s 
safety.65 Biographer Susan Ware described Earhart’s roles with each of these commercial 
ventures as “more ceremonial than substantive.” She joked that she was a “chronic vice-
president” in each venture.66 Despite the self-deprecation she herself frequently and 
rhetorically employed, Earhart helped the commercial aviation industry to grow and, in turn, 
these professional responsibilities secured her financial stability. By the end of its first year 
in 1931, with Earhart as a Vice-President, Ludington Line had shuttled about 66,000 
passengers on about 28 flights a day without accident or injury.  
 Earhart’s first business association was with Transcontinental Air Transport (TAT), 
also known as the Lindbergh Line, established in 1929.67 TAT sold coast-to-coast package 
flights with the duration of 48 hours, flying during the day and having passengers take the 
train at night. In 1930, Earhart joined up with a second venture, led by Gene Vidal and Paul 
“Dog” Collins, who had convinced brothers Charles and Nicholas Ludington to invest in an 
hourly service airline, the Ludington Line, that would provide ten round trips a day between 
                                                
65 In The Fun of It, Earhart shared stories about animals as air passengers. For example, she wrote about flying 
with a frightened canary. Earhart seemed to challenge readers that the American public could be braver than a 
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dogs in their coats.  
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New York and Washington, the first frequent service airline in the world. From 1930-1931, 
Earhart served as one of three Vice-Presidents. When it failed to get a mail contract, 
Ludington Line was sold to Eastern Transport in 1933. Earhart’s third commercial aviation 
venture operated flights between Boston and several cities in Maine.  
 
A Woman Speaking to Women 
 The traveling public had to be “sold” on flight, and women became the most 
dependable messengers.68 Earhart’s role with those airlines was to sell flight to women. 
Airline executives identified women not only as potential commercial flight passengers, but 
also as the ones who could allow and persuade the men in their lives to be air passengers. 
Earhart had acknowledged this fact in The Fun of It, quoting a girl who had told Earhart that 
her “father won’t fly, if Mother says he can’t.”69 In her speech given to a hometown 
audience in Atchison, Kansas, Earhart said:  
 Women have been labelled [sic] the greatest sales resistance in flying. They won’t go 
 up and they won’t let their men go up. If mother says father will stay down, father 
 stays down. The last few years this situation has improved somewhat. It may be true 
 that father used mother’s attitude as a general excuse.  
In this prodding, Earhart sought to empower women to be in solidarity with her public 
campaign to accept the opportunity of flight. 
 As part of her role as the national representative about flight to other women, Earhart 
also appeared frequently in women’s magazines, often with her husband. Acknowledging 
that their unconventional marriage could provoke public discomfort, Earhart and Putnam 
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worked hard to craft an image of a more traditional marriage. Being safe meant that she had 
to project herself as a woman with traditional values, despite having a career, being married 
to a divorced man, and not having children of her own. Being married afforded Earhart 
access to the traditional role of wife and stepmother to Putnam’s two sons, despite the 
autonomy of her aviation career.70  
 
Figure 3: Amelia Earhart with husband and a stepson, 1933 
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In order to navigate any public discomfort in a marriage with more autonomy and mobility 
than most couples of the 1920s and 1930s, Earhart and Putnam wrote articles about their 
relationship for women’s magazines in which they discussed how they approached the 
subject of being apart, and their two surnames. Even though these topics had nothing 
materially to do with the safety of flight, these essays reflect Earhart’s overall safety 
discourse. Women’s magazines afforded an audience that was captivated by Earhart and 
wanted to know more about the details of her life in order that they too could share their 
“airmindedness” among family and friends. 
 In order for Earhart to advocate for the safety in flight and to be considered a safe 
pilot, the public had to see her as someone who also inhabited and embraced more 
traditional, domestic, roles such as being a wife. Because Earhart was both a wife and a pilot, 
women’s magazines tried to make sense of her unusual marriage arrangement. Through their 
public dialogue, Earhart and Putnam seeded such considerations in the minds of a broader 
audience. George Putnam published columns about being the husband of Amelia Earhart 
and what happened to relations between sexes when both had public careers. In companion 
columns in Redbook Magazine entitled “My Wife” and “My Husband,” Putnam confided 
some of the negotiations he and Earhart made within their marriage as a means perhaps to 
encourage other women to fly, or to let their husbands fly for business, despite the 
possibility of marital tension or discord. Putnam explained why he encouraged Earhart to fly 
solo across the Atlantic Ocean and why a wife did not need her husband’s permission to do 
something she really wanted to do, whether pursuing aviation or something else. He wrote, 
“Why did I let her do it? In the first place, I didn’t ‘let’ her. Yes doubtless I could have 
prevented the flight. But when the person who happens to be my wife wants very much to 
do something, she doesn’t have to get my permission—her husband’s royal sanction—any 
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more than I have to get hers if I want to fly down to Washington or take a lady to lunch.”71 
In his columns, Putnam both affirmed and found humor in the dual identity of Earhart as 
both a record-setting pilot and his wife in such comments as “she’s gone domestic—for a 
couple of minutes, anyway.”72 In her companion column, “My Husband,” Earhart shared her 
perspectives on how a wife, after doing what she really wanted to do, might acknowledge 
the support and encouragement of her husband. Earhart conceded that she had placed a great 
strain on her husband and acknowledged her husband’s support in helping her to be a safe 
pilot. In the two columns, we see both Earhart’s and Putnam’s efforts to represent their 
relationship as one traditional enough to reflect the mores of the era, yet strong enough to 
withstand the pressures of their high profile partnership. 
Earhart’s retention of her maiden name remained of active public concern. She was 
Amelia Earhart was Miss Earhart in public and Mrs. Putnam in private.73 To represent a 
public united front concerning their different surnames, Putnam introduced his wife as 
Amelia Earhart. In response, Earhart said her husband had given her permission to use Miss 
Earhart. The Bay City Daily Times quoted Earhart as saying, “I’d rather be Miss Earhart. 
Why drag Mr. Putnam into aviation?”74 Earhart justified the keeping of her maiden name as 
a way to accept responsibility in her own aviation career and to minimize any risk by 
association to her husband. 
As a couple, they were deliberate about a departure protocol that suggested Putnam’s 
full support of the next flight. Before all of Earhart’s record-setting flights, Putnam staged a 
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public goodbye to Earhart, presenting his public identity as the worried, loving husband. 
Putnam stood by her plane or on the wing, ready with a handshake, a few words, and a smile 
to reassure the public that her safety in the air depended upon this public expression of 
marital concordance. In Illustrated Love Magazine, Earhart is able to narrate her experience 
of their separations saying, “Of course, I hate to be separated from G. P. on my trips. But he 
understands what aviation means to me and is willing to be generous about my career—that 
is, if I don’t plan trips that are too long.”75 Putnam shared his own concerns, saying he 
identified himself as someone who kept vigil on the ground and always waited for her return.  
In certain essays, Putnam leads with his own reaction to the risk of his wife’s 
milestone flights as a way to acknowledge to the public that while he, along with Earhart, 
promoted the safety in flight, he also understood and was willing to reflect the dangers. In an 
article entitled “A Flyer’s Husband,” Putnam discussed his reaction to his wife’s record-
setting 1935 flight from Hawaii to California, saying: 
 Take my wife’s most recent flight, across the Pacific. It stirred up an unconscionable 
 lot of trouble for me. . . . When my better half—by name Amelia Earhart—shot her 
 plane off the muddy field in Honolulu and headed for California, someone asked me 
 how I felt. I’d rather have a baby was my reply . . . . From my prejudiced masculine 
 viewpoint, I cherished the notion that giving birth to an infant would be easier (for 
 me) than waving a wife off on a transoceanic hop.76  
Projecting himself as a concerned, supportive husband, Putnam’s public persona added to 
Earhart’s dual persona as a risk taking record-setter and an advocate for safety as he watches 
her plane depart.  
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Gender Performativity  
As Earhart transformed the depiction of woman aviators within the social imaginary 
of flight from barnstormers to advocates of flight’s safety, women pilots not only had to 
learn how to represent flight’s safety in partnership with men, but they had to learn how to 
deploy gendered performances of both masculinity and femininity strategically, in part, upon 
which gender performance might best convey flight’s safety or be more persuasive to the 
“non-flyer.”  Earhart discussed such performances as necessary in this transition from 
women being risk-takers in air to being advocates of flight’s safety.  
In response to being a pilot, in a profession scarcely populated by other women, 
Earhart’s persona reflected a fluidity of gender identity as a strategy, I would argue, to 
appear safe or typical.77  
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Figure 4: Amelia Earhart with George Putnam, 1933 
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When selected as a passenger in 1928, it was certainly because of her poise, strength, beauty, 
and femininity. Over time, as her fame as a pilot—not just passenger—grew, she could 
represent a more masculine identity with her short hair, ties, leather jacket, and pants.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    
                          Figure 5: Caricature of Amelia Earhart, 1932 
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This ability to shift back and forth between gender identities further amplified the mystery 
of her public persona. Within the social imaginary of flight, women aviators engaged in 
practices of gender performativity as a rhetorical strategy to represent flight’s safety, evident 
in caricatures of Earhart with masculinized physical features. Privileging the traits of a 
masculine pilot was one way for women aviators not to be “penalized by publicity for their 
every mishap.”78 As frequently as Earhart was represented wearing a tie under a mechanic 
suit, she was also captured in photographs in ball gowns, pearls, and fur. After her first 
transatlantic flight in 1928 landed in Wales, Earhart appeared in the crowd wearing a dress, 
feminine hat, and fur stole, having changed before leaving the plane from her flight suit—
her goggles, helmet, and leather jacket—that she, like the male crewmembers, wore during 
the flight. Newspapers reinforced representations of Earhart’s masculine identity in articles 
that document Earhart’s habit of getting her hair cut at a barbershop, instead of a beauty 
parlor.79  
While Earhart may have complained about the practice, another gendered 
performance deployed in relation to journalist queries was to exaggerate her femininity. 
After the 1928 transatlantic flight, photographs circulated of Earhart in fashion magazines 
such as Vogue, dressed in ball gowns. Many images combined aviation gear with glamorous 
outfits, as if to suggest that the experience of flight afforded not only an elevation in altitude 
but also in social status or desirability. It was not only Earhart who wrote about the burden 
of representing femininity. Anne Morrow Lindbergh was a bestselling author, the first 
woman to earn a glider pilot license in 1930, and the wife of Charles Lindbergh. In her 
North of the Orient, she documented the experience of serving as navigator for her husband 
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on a flight from Long Island to Russia, Japan, and China. She reflected on the fact that she 
was often defined more by her fashion choices than by her navigational skills.80 Instead of 
refusing to respond to questions from the public, however, she seemed to accept the public’s 
expectation that she show her feminine normativity through discussions of fashion. Women 
aviators, like Earhart and Lindbergh, knew that they had to talk about topics that might 
interest women readers in order to bolster their appearance as safe pilots.   
As “Lady Lindy,” Earhart assumed a masculinized public persona created by her 
physical similarity to Charles Lindbergh. This identity—while founded in similar looks—
was intentionally amplified by its mention in newspaper articles. The Chicago Daily Tribune, 
for example, made frequent comparisons between Earhart’s and Lindbergh’s physical 
features and dispositions: “She looks enough like that famous bird man Charles Lindbergh 
to be his sister. Both faces have an expression of quiet, somewhat aloof, . . . both have 
similar features, straight, level brows, small mouths with well-formed lips, . . . long, supple 
bodies and are what the Scotch would call ‘bonnie’.”81 When asked by reporters if she knew 
Lindbergh, Earhart responded that she had never met the Colonel, that she did not look like 
him, and that she would “apologize to him for innocently inflicting the idiotic comparison. 
The idiotic part is all mine, of course.”82 Despite Earhart’s protests, the two aviators did 
favor one another in their tall leggy physiques, angular and boyish good looks, coloring, and 
determined stare. 
Symbolic comparisons continued to be made between Earhart and Lindbergh 
throughout her aviation career. Her physical resemblance to Lindbergh seemed to telegraph 
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to the public that Earhart was a safe pilot. By scheduling her solo transatlantic flight around 
the anniversary of his transatlantic flight, which occurred May 20-21, 1927, she seemed to 
invite this comparison. The Rochester NY Democrat and Chronicle opined, “It is appropriate 
that this [flight] should be done in the tenth anniversary year of the Lindbergh flight,” 
calling Earhart “America’s favorite flying daughter.”83 Newspaper articles affirmed a 
synchrony between the two aviators, as if Earhart’s flights would somehow be safer when 
proximate to the anniversary of Lindbergh’s flight.  
Women, as aviators and passengers, were also interpolated into a discourse of safety, 
not only in their safe flying but also in demonstrations of femininity up in the air. Dressing 
up made flying appear to be refined enough for a woman’s presence in the cockpit and 
cabin. Because flying represented a new domain for women, more conservative dress made 
the innovation seem appropriate and safe. After her first transatlantic flight in 1928, Earhart 
was photographed in highly stylized images wearing her aviator helmet and goggles while 
also wearing a fur stole and a pearl necklace. She was frequently, photographed in ball 
gowns and hats. After a White House dinner on April 20, 1933, Earhart and Eleanor 
Roosevelt flew together on a round trip flight from Washington, DC to Baltimore.84 The 
Washington Post quoted Eleanor Roosevelt, who said of Earhart, “It’s amusing to think of a 
girl in white evening dress and high-heeled shoes flying a plane.”85 In contrast to Anne 
Morrow Lindbergh, who found fashion queries of women aviators a distraction, the First 
Lady seemed to use the topic of fashion and flight as a way to point out the predicament of 
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women aviators who, despite their many accomplishments, remained suspect, once they 
became citizens of the air.  
 
Flying with Men On Board 
 By incorporating the help of men, both on the ground and up in the air, Earhart was 
able to appear more competent. From her first flight as a passenger across the Atlantic 
Ocean in 1928, Earhart worked closely with male aviators and colleagues to be represented 
as a safe and prudent flyer. Demonstrating how she built and sustained partnerships with 
men was essential to her rhetorical constructions of flight’s safety. In her partnerships with 
men, she demonstrated that she understood the perceived and real risks of flight, and by 
asking male aviators to serve as her navigator or co-pilots, she signaled the public that she 
saw men as an essential aspect of her own safety in air.  On the ground, she enlisted the 
counsel of men, in both symbolic and behind-the scenes work. As mentioned earlier with 
regard to the ritual prior to most flight departures, Earhart rarely left the ground without a 
handshake from Putnam.86 This handshake seemed to signify both that he approved of his 
wife’s decision to take such risks and that he had confidence in her safety and would await 
her return.   
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Figure 6: “Mr. Amelia Earhart,” 1937 
 Putnam’s ritual of shaking Earhart’s hand, from his subordinate position on the 
ground, telegraphed his implicit belief in his wife and by extension, the potential 
competency of women pilots more broadly.  In 20 Hrs., 40 Min., Earhart writes that she 
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would never ask men to fly with her because out of “gallantry” they would accept her 
invitation even if “they [did] not trust” her. “So,” she concluded, “my male passengers have 
always had to do the asking.”87 Earhart’s statement points to a dilemma she faced in 
representations with other male aviators and aviation enthusiasts. While there were more and 
more women aviators, there remained skepticism regarding their ability to be safe pilots. 
 Another way to demonstrate flight’s safety was to stage flights between Earhart and 
other air-minded public figures, most notably Eleanor Roosevelt.88  
 
Figure 7: Amelia Earhart and Eleanor Roosevelt, 1933 (National Portrait Gallery) 
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 The flight with Earhart and Eleanor Roosevelt came to be characterized as one between the 
first lady of the nation and the first lady of the air. Earhart may have had the platform for 
advocating the safety of flight to a skittish public, but that did not mean that she was fully 
trusted as a pilot. A Washington Post reporter asked Roosevelt if she felt “just as safe out 
here knowing a girl may be flying this ship?”89 With her affirmative response, the First 
Lady—“one of the most ‘airminded’ women passengers we have ever seen”—both vouched 
for the safety of flight and for the competency of women pilots.90 A week later, however, the 
“Talk of the Town” column in the New Yorker cast doubt on the significance of Roosevelt’s 
flight with Earhart.  The column mused over whether or not the flight did indeed signal a 
change in the perception of aviators: 
When a girl in evening dress and slippers can pilot a plane at night? We agree that it 
does mark an epoch. But to every new epoch some of the quaint old customs of the 
former epoch still cling. We noticed that the take off and landing of the big new 
Curtiss Condor plane were in charge of regular pilots of the Eastern Air Transport 
Company. We men don’t give up without a fight.91 
This column encapsulated the tension the media felt between, on the one hand, wanting to 
acknowledge the possibility of women’s equality in the air and, on the other hand, not being 
able to trust that Earhart would be able to return the First Lady back safely to the White 
House. The New Yorker interpreted this tension as an inability among men to relinquish 
control. As the column suggested, regardless of each new epoch, men still positioned 
themselves to keep women out of the cockpit. 
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The Discourse of Domesticity 
 Speculations about Earhart’s romantic relationship with and subsequent marriage to 
George P. Putnam have distracted many Earhart biographers and analysts, from 
investigating the important role she played as spokesperson for the commercial aviation 
industry. Several Earhart biographers have focused much of their analysis on the 
relationship between Earhart and Putnam. Mary S. Lovell credited George Putnam and his 
marketing abilities with Earhart’s durable legacy.92 Susan Butler characterized the marriage 
as utilitarian.93 Lori Van Pelt cited Putnam’s “keen promotional efforts” and also 
underscored Earhart’s determination to bolster her own career during an era “when it was 
considered unfashionable for women to seek careers, she demonstrated through her own 
example that opportunities thought to have been reserved for men were available to women 
as well.”94 The nature of their private relationship is outside the purview of my study on 
Earhart’s (public) rhetorical roles, but the public perception of that relationship, which they 
helped to craft through their incessant engagement with the press, does come to bear on my 
study. I will look at how reflections upon their interpersonal relationship provided content 
for Earhart’s reassurances to the public regarding flight’s safety.  
News reports and magazine stories about Earhart that were published at the height of 
her career reflect a discourse of domesticity that pitched Putnam and Earhart as not only 
promoter and aviator, but also as husband and wife. The published stories reflected a 
stylized public conversation between Putnam and Earhart, evidenced in Earhart’s frequent 
appeals to a dual identity as both pilot and housewife, one a thrill-seeking, powerful position, 
the other a counterbalancing submissive role. Earhart emphasized her responsibilities as a 
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housewife, often citing concerns over the remodeling of her home in Toluca Lake, near Los 
Angeles as a possible reason why she was not able to set a date for her upcoming world 
flight. She said, “Next year? Well, one never knows.”95 Reassurances of flight’s safety came 
to be reflective of representations of Earhart as someone who now made home-making her 
priority, as a gardener, resting in her study, and cooking in the kitchen.96 If Earhart appeared 
as a tomboy at the hangar in photographs one day, another set of photographs would follow 
of her cooking and cleaning back home. In some representations of Earhart, a domestic 
impulse took precedence over the desire to fly, as in the Herald Tribune, which claimed, “A 
kitchen apron superseded the mechanic’s overalls in AE’s life, and the charts she’s studying 
now are blueprints of a new home instead of weather maps.”97 The safety in domesticity was 
constantly represented as a counterweight to the risk of flight. 
With the platform of her fame, Earhart encouraged a reluctant public to see flight as 
a family affair. She often referred to her mother and her stepfamily in the media. One 
magazine advertisement featured Earhart’s mother, who said that her daughter’s favorite 
meal was chicken and biscuits. Earhart invited her mother, Amy Earhart, to fly with her and 
reported that her mother thought flying was so calm that she “needed to bring entertainment 
along.”98 Earhart urged mothers to encourage their children to fly, telling them not to raise a 
boy to be a “ground aviator.” She also urged wives not to hinder their husbands from flying. 
Even preparations for Earhart’s record-setting flights featured a discourse of domesticity that 
compared the responsibilities of a record-setting pilot to the chores of a housewife. In all of 
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these comments, Earhart projected her belief that people would feel safer about flying when 
reassured by friends and family. 
Earhart’s mothering role on the ground offered reassurances regarding the safety of 
flying. Earhart was never a biological mother, but upon her marriage to George Putnam, she 
gained stepchildren. In the media, Earhart would invoke her experiences as a former social 
worker and role as a stepmother to represent herself as a caring woman and mother, who, 
naturally, was invested in the health and safety of those under her charge. In order to reflect 
these maternal attributes, Earhart was photographed repeatedly with children she knew from 
the settlement house where she had previously worked in Boston. On occasion, Earhart’s 
mentoring of other younger women pilots was compared to mothering. Instead of 
characterizing Earhart’s risk-taking flight as the endeavor of a lone pilot standing in front of 
an airplane, Earhart demonstrated a proclivity toward domesticity in photographs with her 
two stepsons as a soon to be step-grandmother.  
 
Earhart’s Disappearance and the End of her Discourse of Reassurance 
When Earhart decided to fly around the equator, there were no ready investors to 
bear the cost of a new plane and the expenses of the flight. Record-setting women aviators 
such as Earhart did not have the same easy access to capital that male aviators had when 
fundraising for their aircrafts, crews, and supplies for such expeditions. When Charles 
Lindbergh decided to fly across the Atlantic Ocean, investors from Saint Louis, Missouri, 
paid for the Spirit of Saint Louis without any expectation of repayment. Earhart, however, 
depended upon revenues from the lecture circuit, her memoirs, and other partnerships. This 
difference between Earhart and the leading male record-setting aviators meant that Earhart 
had to invest more time and travel in the acquisition of funds, spending less time and 
attention on developing the skills necessary to be successful at girdling the globe as a pilot. 
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Perhaps for this reason she was not as versant in the navigational aids that could keep her 
safe in the air. The irony here is quite obvious but important to name. So much of Earhart’s 
rhetorical identity was focused on the safety and reassurance of passengers as she continued 
to put herself at risk in flight. 
Purdue University sponsored Earhart with the stipulation that she give the university 
a two-year commitment as a consultant focused on women in careers. The Purdue Research 
Foundation put up $40,000 toward the purchase of Earhart’s “Flying Laboratory,” the all-
metal, 10-passenger, bi-motor Lockheed Electra transport plane, with a normal cruising 
speed of about 190 m.p.h. and a top in excess of 210 m.p.h. Compared to the Vega that 
Earhart had flown across the Atlantic Ocean and on other record-setting flights, the Electra 
was much more technologically sophisticated with better design and handling. However, to 
finance the plane required personal commitments to the Purdue community and beyond that 
could serve as a distraction to the planning of the world flight. The implicit expectation in 
the “flying laboratory” proved to be hollow in a flight that did not include scientific pursuit, 
a goal Earhart had committed to but could only muster the plan of observing her own food 
intake throughout the flight.  
What the Purdue residency afforded, however, were representations of Earhart as a 
safe and lauded pilot, captured in photographs that represented her as more like a big sister 
than an aviator, sitting on residential hall floors and around her plane with Purdue students. 
In addition to teaching classes on aviation, Earhart was hired as a career counselor for 
women. While the Purdue community lent great enthusiasm and support for her aviation 
career, the time she spent teaching Purdue students, speaking in the chapel, and eating meals 
with students while fulfilling the terms of the residency was time she was not able to use in 
preparation for her flights, such as learning Morse code or navigation. 
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Before Earhart’s first attempted world flight in March 1937, she and Gene Vidal 
were pictured in newspapers flying a kite that Vidal had designed in the event of an 
emergency landing over the Atlantic or Pacific oceans. The staged event exemplified a 
continuing belief among Earhart, Putnam, and Vidal that record-setting flights—as long as 
they were meticulously planned—were still viable demonstrations of flight’s safety. In 
comparison to a growing sophistication in navigational aids, however, the kite intervention 
seemed wildly insufficient, particularly amid mounting public criticism that Earhart was 
being reckless in her planned world flight. 
Given the lack of preparation, it is not surprising that Earhart’s March 17, 1937 
attempt to fly around the world ended in an accident in Hawaii after a successful hop from 
Oakland, CA, to Honolulu. Putnam attempted to mitigate public concerns with regard to the 
next attempted world flight and the competence of the pilot. Putnam sent a telegram to 
Earhart, “So long as you and the boys are o.k. the rest does not matter. . . . Whether you 
want to call it a day or keep going later is equally jake [alright] with me.”99 In his choice of 
words, Putnam distanced himself from Earhart as if he was more a devoted fan than a 
husband, calling her a “swell gal.”100 After the first attempted world flight failed in an 
accident upon take off from Honolulu, it seemed that not only Earhart’s planned flight but 
also her rhetorical constructions of safety could no longer have the same credibility.  
On June 1, 1937, Amelia Earhart departed on a second attempted world flight from 
Miami, Florida, on a route to circumnavigate the equator.101  
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Figure 8: Amelia Earhart, in front of a map before her attempted world flight, 1937 (George Palmer Putnam 
Collection of Amelia Earhart Papers, Purdue University) 
 
Figure 9: Cover photograph from Last Flight, 1937 
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Earhart and navigator Fred Noonan’s path took them down to South America, across 
the Atlantic Ocean to Khartoum, Karachi, Bangkok, and Singapore. On July 2, Earhart and 
Noonan took off from Lae, New Guinea, with plans to refuel at Howland Island, one of the 
Marshall Islands in the Pacific Ocean. Howland Island, as a destination in the Pacific, one of 
thousands of Marshall Islands in the Pacific, was described as a “spec of land” 1,800 miles 
southwest from Hawaii.102 Not only was it difficult to situate on a map, its location was 
close enough to the international dateline that Earhart’s flight on July 2, 1937 came to be 
known as a “flight into yesterday.” Flying in the direction of Howland Island, Earhart 
radioed that they were flying at 1,000 feet and running low on gas.  Her last official radio 
transmission was recorded at close proximity to Howland Island, after having flown 22,000 
miles of a 27,000-mile attempted world flight.  
Soon thereafter, the U.S. Navy commenced a four million dollar search for the 
Electra, the most expensive oceanic search ever organized up to that time. After her 
attempted world flight and last radio transmission over the Pacific in 1937, the subsequent 
cost to the U.S. Government in the Navy’s search and recovery efforts on and around 
Howland Island were not seen by many in the public as a prudent expense. Instead, many of 
the discourses and texts that circulated with regard to Earhart and her flight concluded that 
her efforts had been excessive and self-centered.  
During the early days of Earhart’s second attempted world flight, she weathered 
critique as a pilot, wife, and public figure. Such criticism stood in stark contrast to the public 
adulation she had received after her earlier record-setting flights. This sudden shift in 
perspective seemed to reflect a societal shift that reflected a concern over unnecessary 
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spectacle, be it in flight or on the ground. And yet, even after the public critique and 
disappearance, her reflections from the series of flights around the globe were published 
(perhaps posthumously) in the memoir Last Flight. Thus, even though she was physically 
absent, her voice was present and she was criticized. In an effort to perpetuate her role in 
offering reassurance (despite great risk), Amelia Earhart never wrote about flying over 
jungles and swamps without returning to appeals to flight’s safety during her attempted 
“globe-girdling” flight. In Java, Earhart wrote she was  “filled with housewifely 
determination” to make a dish she was served at a feast in Indonesia, just days before her 
disappearance.103 And yet, the public response to her appeals to domesticity was different 
from earlier flights. Journalists that once embraced Earhart’s renderings of familial ties and 
domesticity now criticized her for her absence in her personal relationships. While praise 
poetry was customary in response to earlier record-setting flights, as evidenced in 
Lindbergh’s receipt of thousands of poems after his transatlantic flight in 1927, editorial 
pages in newspapers throughout the United States published poetry critiquing Earhart as she 
attempted her world flights.104 A reader of the Greenwich Press satirized Earhart’s 
attempted world flight in a poem that taunted her for thinking it was possible for her to leave 
her husband at home while she flew with three “attractive men.”105 Each line of the poem 
took aim at Earhart, an aviator who, once celebrated as an advocate of flight’s safety, had 
become an affront to former fans. In her disappearance, a poem like the one above 
transformed prior admiration into articulations of jealousy. A modern marriage between 
George Putnam and Earhart was no longer a model but a threat.  
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Both world flights drew criticism of her as an aviator. Earhart’s reflexive practices of 
optimism were often deemed suspect. That she flew for the “fun of it,” a repeated reason she 
gave for flying, was criticized by the Raleigh News as “careless bravado” after her 
disappearance, and in light of the effort and money then being expended to search for her.106 
The Worcester Post shared the sentiment of a former Navy man who said Earhart treated her 
attempted world flight as if it were a vacation cruise.107 Because Earhart had acknowledged 
the security she found in her own family during her aviation career, the most pointed 
critique after her disappearance regarded her own lack of concern for family. Such criticism 
revolved around Earhart’s decision to leave her husband behind in order to attempt the flight. 
The Winston-Salem Sentinel questioned Earhart’s unconventional priorities: “Women safe at 
home with husband and children will wonder why she should have left the security that is 
hers to blaze new trails and make new records in flying.”108 The shift in public sentiment 
was dramatic in accounts that exaggerated Earhart’s abilities to remain stalwart in the “face 
of danger.”109 Public reaction to her disappearance surfaced a public anxiety and punitive 
edge toward the original intent of Earhart’s attempted world flight. The attempted world 
flights were now framed as selfish endeavors, instead of a journey taken by a cautious and 
skilled pilot. 
 
Conclusion 
Because Earhart disappeared on her attempted world flight, it is ironic that she had 
been celebrated in her lifetime as an advocate for air travel who widely shared her 
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conviction of the relative safety of human motorized of flight. In response, this chapter has 
begun the critical work of recovering, recuperating, and analyzing Earhart’s archival record 
in order to assess her role as an advocate of flight’s safety during her career.  
The public memory of Earhart has been obsessed with her disappearance. Many have 
speculated about her whereabouts and what might have become of her. She would have been 
118 years old this year, and since she never aged above 40 years old in her photographs, fans 
have enjoyed imagining a life for her post-crash. Indeed, searches for her physical remains 
and the Electra she was flying have overshadowed critical analysis of her nine-year aviation 
career. Texts from her years as a record-setting pilot, popular lecturer, author, and media 
respondent all give us a different perspective on Earhart’s formal and informal role as 
national spokeswoman, an internationally known hero who was also essential to the 
commercial airline industry’s campaign to encourage more Americans to try flight.  
Biographers have largely ignored or downplayed this aspect of her career and before 
now, no one has offered a thorough critical study of the media that circulated within her 
lifetime to assess her role in this campaign. What this study of Earhart reveals uniquely is 
that women aviators and airminded enthusiasts such as Eleanor Roosevelt were expected not 
only to fly safely, but also to reassure the public that they too would be safe as passengers. 
Technological advancements depended upon such rhetorical messages to encourage a 
mostly skittish public to fly.  
Within the social imaginary of flight, Earhart, as a woman and an aviator, was part of 
a counterpublic, one that was both aware of societal expectations of femininity but also able 
to strategically maneuver around such barrirs in order to join, and, in moments, even surpass 
the achievements of other male aviators.110 Through the lens of Feminist Standpoint Theory, 
it is possible to see how Earhart understood perceptions of her social location as subordinate 
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to male aviators but was still able to deploy strategies that made it possible for her both to 
experience the freedom necessary to achieve milestone flights and to serve as a reliable 
public advocate for flight’s safety. In order to do so, she became adept in depicting a more 
fluid gender identity alternately as androgynous (or masculinized) or as an overly feminine, 
in fur stoles and ball gowns. Earhart had the burden of balancing representations of courage 
and determination up in the air with the gendered responsibilities of the domestic sphere. 
Stories about her in women’s magazines showcased her domestic side in order to make her a 
palatable hero for other women. In order to reflect upon this gendered burden, contrast 
Lindbergh’s stance with the public, one that was aloof and free of any need to demonstrate 
domestic prowess.  
The fur stoles, crushing crowds, and tickertape parades all signal the way that 
Amelia Earhart and her aviation career served as national spectacle. While she is 
remembered as this heroic woman aviator, the behind-the scenes work hidden by the glitz 
and glamour presents a more complicated picture of someone who, unlike her male peers 
who enjoyed ample financial sponsorship, had to earn her own keep through advertising and 
the lecture circuit. Despite the complexity found in her public record, her public memory has 
become awash in her disappearance and that is what she is remembered for.  
In the next chapter, I will investigate the shift that occurred in discourses of aviation 
during wartime. As the chapter will detail, African Americans had served in the trenches of 
WWI and were hopeful to participate in the air combat of WWII. Racial prejudice, both 
within the armed forces and out, made this desire difficult to attain. Once an airbase for the 
training of black pilots was established and even when those pilots went to war, the 
oppression continued. While serving as escort pilots to white bombers, the black aviators, 
crew, and ground crew, gained recognition for their protection of the white pilots and crew, 
but also faced the imbalanced scrutiny of the U.S. War Department and the American public.  
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Chapter Four 
 THE TUSKEGEE AIRMEN AND THE COLOR LINE IN THE SKIES 
“He can not control himself in the face of danger to the extent the white man can.”1 
—The Army War College Report, 1925.  
 
The Wrights effectively opened the sky to human aviators. Charles Lindbergh 
demonstrated what was possible, and Amelia Earhart reassured the broader public that it 
was safe to take the risk to fly. The androgynous, well-financed Earhart was an exception 
to the widespread belief in her era that women were unfit to pilot aircrafts; only white 
women with resources figured out a way to fly. In this chapter, I explore the fact that 
African Americans were likewise considered a safety risk. In this pre-Civil Rights era, 
there was a pervasive societal belief that blacks were inferior to whites and lacked the 
cognitive flexibility to safely respond to the unforeseen dangers that pilots encountered.2 
When the Roosevelt Administration established the Civilian Pilot Training Program 
(CPTP) in 1938, however, many white women and African Americans hoped that this 
program would provide greater access to flight training and careers in the aviation 
industry for all Americans.3 Soon thereafter, when the exigencies of war prompted the 
Army Air Forces (AAF) to propose the creation of a segregated base to train “airminded” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Major General H. E. Ely, “The U. S Army War College Report: The Use of Negro Manpower in War, 
1925,” U. S. Army Heritage and Education Center Digital Collections.  
 
2 The Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASP) created opportunities for more than 1800 white women to 
fly in U.S. non-combat missions. The WASP excluded all African-American women pilots. 
 
3 Dominick Pisano, To Fill the Skies with Pilots (Urbana, IL: U of Illinois P, 1993), p. 3. 
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African-American men to participate in military aviation, military leaders settled on 
Tuskegee, Alabama.  
The rural, remote Tuskegee had, since 1881, been home to the Tuskegee Institute 
and seemed a fit place to train African-American pilots and mechanics to see if they 
could disprove a post-WWI study that had concluded that all WWI black soldiers were 
inferior in battle.4 This military initiative was called the “Tuskegee Experiment,” and 
more than 15,000 black men trained there—most as ground personnel, but almost 1,000 
as pilots, too.5 On their first mission in the European Theatre, in 1943, five Tuskegee-
trained black escort pilots were disciplined for abandoning their assigned bomber planes, 
which were flown by white pilots, in order to attack German planes. This event, which 
blew up in the press, began a shift in the rhetorical evaluation of the Tuskegee 
Experiment. The black pilots realized that their ability to fly in combat missions 
depended on their maintaining the subservient role of keeping the white pilots and crew 
safe during air combat. For this reason, they became known in public memory as the 
“Tuskegee Airmen,” the WWII veterans who, it has often been said, “never lost a 
bomber” to enemy fire.6  
The heroic narrative of the Tuskegee Airmen has sought and found a place within 
war memory. However, the military and historical record of the Tuskegee Experiment, 
which is rarely attached to the public memory of the Tuskegee Airmen, problematizes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 House Memorandum: 99th Pursuit Squadron Combat Efficiency, 1943,” ABC CLIO: History and the 
Headlines,” (Web); accessed Dec. 4, 2014: http://www.historyandtheheadlines.abc-
clio.com/ContentPages/ContentPage.aspx?entryId=1687628&currentSection=1687640 
 
5 Joseph Caver, Jerome Ennels, and Daniel Haulman, The Tuskegee Airmen: an Illustrated History, 1939-
1949 (Montgomery, AL: NewSouth Books, 2011). 
 
6 Prior to being named “Tuskegee Airmen,” there were other collective identities such as the Schwartze 
Vogelmenschen (“Black Birdmen”), the “Black Eagles,” and the “Red Tails.” These names—military or 
civilian—have mostly collapsed or become synonymous with the collective identity of Tuskegee Airmen. 
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both the critique and praise the Tuskegee Airmen have attracted. The inflated claim that 
the Airmen “never lost a bomber” originally referred to the first one hundred missions of 
the 332nd Fighter Group. Over time, though, that number grew and entered the popular 
consciousness, such that by the late twentieth century, the superlative claim was made of 
all 989 missions of the Tuskegee-trained 99th Pursuit Squadron and the 332nd Fighter 
Group. Eventually, the disclaimer was added that the escort pilots never lost a bomber in 
enemy action—a clarification that effectively focused public accolades and attention on 
the black pilots’ combat action and, perhaps, deflected attention from any domestic and 
training accidents that occurred stateside. 
What, then, has been the rhetorical effect of this popular, oft-repeated claim that 
the Tuskegee Airmen “never lost a bomber”? In the early years, the claim insinuated that 
the white American bomber pilots of World War II were safer navigating enemy fire 
when escorted by black pilots. The black pilots themselves were discouraged from 
seeking glory in war by attacking enemy aircraft themselves, but when they stayed close 
to and protected the white bomber pilots, they became heroes. Many of the Tuskegee 
Airmen who told their accounts in an oral history project funded by the National Park 
Service reported having earned livings as chauffeurs and butlers prior to becoming part of 
the Tuskegee Experiment, and, despite the allure of new careers in aviation, it soon 
became clear that, for black pilots, the coveted skyscape was reflecting and mirroring the 
racial segregation and subordination on the ground.7  
 In order to analyze this dynamic, I depend on Kirt Wilson’s theoretical analysis of 
race relations in the U.S. and his definition of a “rhetoric of equality,” or a “rhetoric of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The Tuskegee Airmen Oral History Project and Oral History in the National Park Service (2001); 
accessed on site in April 2012.  
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place.”8 By “place,” Wilson does not mean a geographical location, but, rather, a societal 
location. African Americans, Wilson argues, were expected to “remain in their proper 
place”—an expectation among whites certainly at work during WWII and arguably 
present today. In coining the phrase “rhetoric of place,” Wilson draws inspiration from 
the observations of abolitionist Frederick Douglass, who first identified this “cultural 
conflict” when writing about being thrown off the railroad for failing to comply with 
segregation policies.9 According to Douglass, “people in general . . . will say they like 
colored men as well as any other, but in their proper place. . . . They assign us that place; 
they don’t let us do it for ourselves.”10 While Wilson outlined this rhetoric of place to 
evaluate the desegregation debates during post-Civil War Reconstruction, the phrase 
perfectly describes how the white military brass viewed the African-American pilots 
under their supervision in WWII. African Americans had a place, and that place was to 
support and protect the white bombers.  
In this chapter, I first investigate the state of black aviation in the 1920s and 
1930s, and then interpret the origins of the Tuskegee Experiment, which has effectively 
been minimized—if not elided—from the public memory of the Tuskegee Airmen.11 In 
order to bring this era to life and to reanimate the rhetorical conversation that circulated, I 	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Place, 1870-1875 (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State U P, 2002), pp. 7-8. 
 
9 In a review of Wilson’s Reconstruction Desegregation Debate, Angela Ray writes that the book “departs 
from standard rhetorical approaches to frame the debates as a cultural conflict.” See her “Public Argument 
in the Nineteenth-Century United States,” Argumentation and Advocacy 39 (2003): 274-82.  
 
10 Wilson, Reconstruction Desegregation Debate, pp. 7-8; emphasis is original. 
 
11 See Kendall R. Phillips, ed., Framing Public Memory (Tuscaloosa, AL: U of Alabama P, 2004), p. 2; and 
Greg Dickinson, Carole Blair, and Brian L. Ott, eds., Places of Public Memory: The Rhetoric of Museums 
and Memorials (Tuscaloosa, AL: U of Alabama P, 2010), p. 6. 
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evaluate two aviator memoirs, and the military reports from WWI and WWII that 
addressed the performance of black soldiers and airmen. In order to investigate the 
rhetorical conversation about the Tuskegee Experiment, which circulated from 1938 to 
1945, this chapter also evaluates the news articles that ran in both white and black presses 
during this era. A critical race analysis of these texts shows how print media depicted 
Tuskegee-trained pilots as courageous pilots accountable for the safety of the white 
bomber pilots they escorted. By the 1980s, the essential claim that the Tuskegee Airmen 
“never lost a bomber” began to be invoked in prominent exhibits, documentaries, and 
motion pictures, while the Tuskegee Experiment, and its rootedness in the assumed 
inferiority of black men, was downplayed in these media. In the end, it was the safety of 
the white bombers that became most critical to claims of their heroism within public 
memory. 
 
The Color Line in the Skies 
 
 During the 1920s and 1930s, even if an African American aspired to become a 
pilot, there were social barriers that made such hopes nearly impossible. At the time, 
there were two key gatekeepers to the skies: first, the prohibitive cost, which most 
African Americans could not afford; and, second, the military, which in WWI had 
rebuffed blacks from serving in the Army Air Corps. The African Americans who sought 
pilot training faced societal barriers that stemmed from the irrational fears and cultural 
norms of segregation. Jim Crow laws, enacted after Reconstruction, mandated 
segregation in the schools, on public transportation, and in restaurants throughout the 
South.  In 1903—the same year the Wrights first flew in Kitty Hawk—W. E. B. Dubois 
published The Souls of Black Folks, the treatise on race in the U.S. in which he identified 
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the “problem of the color line.” The “color line”—that socially constructed division 
between blacks and whites that influenced every aspect of life, from interpersonal to 
economic relationships—was experienced by African Americans as a veil or as a “double 
consciousness” that influenced all inter-racial interactions. Robert Terrill explains double 
consciousness as a phenomenon distinct to African Americans, who were “always forced 
to see oneself through the eyes of others,” which Dubois saw as a potentially alienating 
act.12 Blacks in the 1920s and 1930s who looked up to the sky would have seen only 
white pilots and mostly likely could not have imagined themselves as passengers, much 
less in the cockpit.  
 Dreams of flight among African Americans, who sought to make air combat a 
possibility for young black men, were deeply influenced by the ongoing debates between 
Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. Dubois over how best to support African Americans 
in their quest to escape racism and economic oppression. Both espoused the trope of the 
“New Negro,” a term that gained parlance at the turn of the twentieth century to represent 
the fight to gain greater social equity for African Americans.13 According to B. T. 
Washington, the New Negro must accommodate the white population while adhering to 
the principles of self-help. In Hearing the Hurt, Eric K. Watts characterizes B. T. 
Washington’s New Negro, however, as an “aesthetic artifact…steeped in the affects of 
the past—throwback sentiments of paternalism and domestication.”14 By contrast, 
Dubois’s New Negro would be a person of letters, someone who was prepared to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Robert E. Terrill, “Unity and Duality in Barack Obama’s ‘A More Perfect Union’,” Quarterly Journal of 
Speech 95.4 (Nov. 2009), 363-86. 
 
13 The New Negro Movement of the 1920s and 1930s only later came became known as the Harlem 
Renaissance after subsequent scholarly publications. See, for example, Nathan Irvin Huggins, Harlem 
Renaissance (New York: Oxford U P, 1971). 
 
14 Eric K. Watts, Hearing the Hurt (Tuscaloosa, AL: U of Alabama P, 2012), p. 11. 
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“transform America.”15 Most certainly, any African American who could learn how to fly 
successfully would, according to both Dubois’s and B.T. Washington’s definition be 
identified as a New Negro.  
 
The Legacy of World War I on Black Aviation 
 To understand why blacks in the 1920s and 1930s found it difficult to imagine 
flying, it is important to evaluate the effect of policies in WWI on black Americans—
particularly on those who hoped to serve their country. As the U.S. prepared to enter 
WWI, a great debate played out in Congress and spilled into the white—and especially 
the black—press about what role blacks should play in the war effort. As the leading 
black spokesman against white oppression, DuBois, in addition to other black leaders, 
wanted the Army to employ black combat troops, black officers, and end segregation;  
the recent death of B. T. Washington, who had espoused accommodationist policies 
urging blacks to work with white people, sparked a renewed determination among blacks 
to achieve equality. There were only four black regiments that existed since the Civil 
War, and once those spots were filled, the only avenue for blacks to serve was in the 
National Guard. When the War Department announced the organization of fourteen 
officers’ training centers that would not train black officers, morale in the African-
American community flagged as they felt that their country did not welcome their 
contributions. Acknowledging that the only possible way to get black officers trained was 
to advocate for a segregated training camp for black officers, DuBois did so, and the 
Army agreed to open one such camp at Fort Des Moines. Only begrudgingly did the 
black press get behind the effort to encourage blacks to embrace segregated training. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 This chapter traces Booker T. Washington’s conceptualization of the New Negro. Ibid, p. 12. 
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Black leaders justified the effort by arguing that certainly the U.S. would reward blacks 
for contributing enthusiastically to the war effort by giving them full citizenship rights 
after the war. Because of their efforts, Congress passed the Universal Service Bill, which 
would make provisions for the drafting of blacks on a segregated basis in WWI.  
 The debate over the proper role that blacks should play in the war animated 
Southern congressmen, in particular, and would have ramifications for the role given to 
black aviators in WWII. The Crisis, the official publication of the NAACP and founded 
by W.E.B. Dubois in 1910, quoted Congressman Nicholls of South Carolina, who warned 
in the debate over the Conscription Bill, “if you put a boy from Mississippi in a Negro 
regiment from Massachusetts, you won’t have to go to Germany to have a war. You will 
have it right here.”16 That same article quoted Senator James K. Vardaman, who also 
cautioned his fellow Southerners that the draft “means the millions of Negroes who come 
under this measure will be armed. I know of no greater menace to the South than this.”17 
Whether or not it would prudent to train and arm blacks, who, some feared, would be 
equipped to turn on their white oppressors in the U.S., was a pervasive worry in WWI, 
and one that would reappear in the lead-up to WWII. However, in the 1940s, the fear was 
not just that armed black soldiers would be trained, but that armed black pilots would be 
given the knowledge and the tools to attack from the sky.18 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Qtd. in The Crisis 14 (May 1917): 37, which is qtd. in Lee Finkle, Forum for Protest: The Black Press 
during World War II (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson U P, 1975), pp. 43-44.  
 
17 Ibid. 
 
18 While there is no one document that definitively proves this assertion, the circulating newspaper articles 
from this era reflect the wariness and fear that some whites—particularly in the South—felt about the 
prospect of training black fighter pilots. 
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First-hand Accounts of the Color Line for Aviators 
 The “color-line” that Dubois identified extended up from the ground and into the 
skies during the years of early aviation, as attested by the first-hand accounts of white and 
black aviators. After his transatlantic flight in 1927, Charles Lindbergh became iconic as 
the world’s most celebrated pilot. With his tousled hair, boyish good looks, and white 
skin, Lindbergh came to embody the image of the ideal pilot, and with his memoir We, he 
ascended to international fame. This memoir is pertinent to my study for its casual 
racism, which, arguably, serves as a bell-weather for what was popularly acceptable in 
the U.S. in the 1920s. One anecdote from Lindbergh’s memoir, in particular, suggests 
how hard it would have been for an aspiring African-American pilot to be taken seriously 
in the 1920s. Lindbergh related a story from his early days of barnstorming in the 
countryside prior to his transatlantic flight. On that occasion, a group of white spectators 
in Mississippi bribed him to fly with a black spectator who had come to watch the air 
show. The group of whites, Lindbergh wrote, “chipped in fifty cents a piece to give one 
of the Negroes a hop [ride], provided, as they put it, I would do a few ‘flip flops’ with 
him.”19  Whether or not the African-American man wanted to play this role Lindbergh 
does not report, but the man was instructed to wave a red handkerchief throughout the 
flight to demonstrate that he was not afraid. After the plane took off, Lindbergh recalls, 
the black passenger had his head down on the floor of the cockpit but still waved the red 
handkerchief as directed. As the story makes clear, the group of white spectators felt 
empowered to objectify and demean their fellow black spectator, as much in flight as 
would have been customary on the ground. Lindbergh narrated this story without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Charles Lindbergh, We (New York: G. P. Putnam’s, 1927), p. 56. 
 
165
	   	   	  
 
editorial—not saying, for instance, that it was odd to receive such a request to fly with a 
black passenger or to make him wave a handkerchief—and by choosing to include it in 
his memoir, Lindbergh flaunted the white privilege he enjoyed in the Jim Crow South. 
 This anecdote reflects certain truths about the plight of blacks in the 1920s, a time 
in which they struggled within a culture that could not imagine them in this new context 
of aviation as anything more than barnstorming props, useful only for the thrill of white 
spectators who were too afraid to venture up into the air on their own. Blacks, like 
women, found access to the skies made more difficult by the widespread cultural belief 
that only white men could be safe pilots.  
 A contemporaneous memoir by a pioneering black aviator and civil rights activist 
tells a different story about African Americans in early aviation. As one of only a handful 
of licensed black pilots in the early 1930s, William J. Powell not only proved the 
dependable flightworthiness of his race, but he also encouraged other black Americans to 
participate in the exciting new venture of aviation—as pilots, designers, engineers, and 
mechanics. In his memoir, Black Wings, which he called a fictionalized version of his 
life, Powell wove stories about flying with appeals to his fellow African Americans to 
join the small but growing movement of blacks in aviation.20 In the appendix, he cites the 
statistic that, in 1932, for instance, only 20 aviation licenses were issued to African 
Americans, but by 1936, 47 were issued. Here is a scan of that page in the book: 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 William J. Powell, Black Wings (Los Angeles: Ivan Deach, Jr., 1934). In the appendix, he cites the 
statistic that, in 1932, for instance, only 20 aviation licenses were issued to African Americans, but by 
1936, 47 were issued; see p. 65. 
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Figure 1: Appendix from William Powell’s memoir, Black Wings, p. 216: List of Negroes holding pilots’ licenses 
in the U.S. in 1932 
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 From Powell’s perspective, only racism and financial insecurity kept blacks out of the 
cockpit. 
 Powell opened Black Wings with an allusion to Lindbergh’s transatlantic flight, 
noting how Powell arrived at Le Bourget Field three months after Lindbergh’s landing. It 
was his first airplane ride, and, for Powell, his personal triumph was made all the more 
meaningful for having taken off from the very field where Lindbergh had landed at the 
end of his world-famous flight. It is as if Powell needed to link his story to Lindbergh’s to 
substantiate the strength of his own story.21 As Powell’s memoir suggests, the 
“airmindedness” of African Americans would open the gates to the skies, but only when 
they showed proper deference to the prior accomplishments of white aviators.  
 The contrasting aviation experiences recounted by Lindbergh and Powell, 
respectively, reflect the cultural norms and limitations of the 1920s and 1930s. If 
Lindbergh even knew of Powell we can never know since he did not mention the black 
aviator in any of his three memoirs; Powell, however, not only invoked Lindbergh in the 
opening scenes of Black Wings but he suggested that he was inspired by Lindbergh to 
likewise accomplish uncharted milestone flights and the national and international 
acclaim that would follow. Powell relates an anecdote from 1932, when several fellow 
African-American aviators had decided to compete in a transcontinental flight that began 
in Los Angeles. Powell and co-pilot, Irvin Wells, flew only as far as New Mexico. After a 
night of camping, the two pilots awoke to a Texas ranger, who, Powell recalls, told them, 
“I never heard of a Nigger flyer anyway, and furthermore I believe youse are the fellers 
that killed the milkman in El Paso night before last, and that you are trying to disguise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 By contrast, Lindbergh makes no mention of black aviators, even though Bessie Coleman had died 
preparing for an airshow one year before his transatlantic flight.  
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yourselves in flying suits.”22 As the ranger’s reaction registered, black aviators—any 
aviators, really—were uncommon, unlikely, and unexpected. After Powell and Wells 
showed the ranger their pilot licenses (with their photos), they were set free, but they still 
had a disabled aircraft and no money. Meanwhile, another black flying team that called 
themselves the “Flying Hobos” begged for money and food across the country and 
finished first in the race. The money and fame that followed the likes of talented and 
daring white aviators, like Lindbergh and Earhart, were entirely absent in the experiences 
of talented and daring black aviators. Powell’s first-person account makes pointed how 
disparate were the worlds of black and white aviators.  
  There are so few first-person accounts by black aviators from this era that 
Powell’s insightful memoir is key in exposing the racist and discriminatory practices in 
pilot licensure. In it, he related a story he heard from James Herman Banning, one of the 
two “Flying Hobos,” who did eventually pass his transport pilot’s examination, but only 
after repeatedly failing for reasons he knew were discriminatory. Before one such pilot 
license exam, Banning sat outside the room with an underprepared white examinee, who 
asked him to define a “rhumb line.” Banning recognized this as an opportunity to throw 
off his colleague in order to test his hypothesis about the arbitrariness of passing a pilot 
licensure exam. He told the white examinee that a rhumb line “is a line three miles out in 
the ocean, this side of which it is illegal to possess or sell rum.” (The term meant, a “line 
on a sphere which makes equal oblique angles with all meridians.”23) The experiment 
proved Banning’s hypothesis: the white pilot passed, and Banning failed. Powell repeated 
this story in his memoir to illustrate how much much more difficult it was for blacks to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Powell, Black Wings, p. 166. 
 
23 Powell, Black Wings, p. 169. 
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get licenses. As Powell wanted his readership to conclude, the lack of black pilots was 
not the result of a lack in intelligence, but, rather, due to the racially oppressive 
institutional practices within the Bureau of Air Commerce.  
Powell’s memoir instructed readers not only about the many barriers to flight 
faced by aspiring African Americans, but also about how the double-consciousness 
required of the black aviator to reach goals that seemed out of reach. When he was not 
flying, Powell spent a lot of time with the president of the flying school, in his office, 
gaining perspectives on what whites thought about black people. The president told him, 
“the great trouble with many of your race is that they step out into things without being 
fully prepared.”24 Later, Powell’s instructor told him, “you are the dumbest flyer I ever 
met. You’ll never learn to fly.”25 Powell pointed to that insult as the impetus to complete 
his training and to attain his license. His memoir offers a rare glimpse into the barriers 
faced by African-American aviators in the early years of aviation. His memoir considered 
alongside Lindbergh’s, makes those barriers especially clear. Lindbergh conveyed the 
story of his jolly hop through the Jim Crow South, while Powell used serious anecdotes 
to guide fellow blacks in how to overcome the barriers to flight.  
 
The Exigencies of WWII 
 
When Powell got his pilot’s license, he really was a pioneer, but at the end of the 
1930s, as WWII broke out in Europe, and as the U.S. considered the possibility of being 
drawn into the conflict, Congress created a program meant to widely recruit and train 
U.S. citizens to fly. The Congressionally funded Civilian Pilot Training Program (CPTP) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Powell, Black Wings, p. 53. 
 
25 Powell, Black Wings, p. 77. 
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was formed in 1938 and was open to all citizens, regardless of sex or race.26 It trained 
435,165 pilots from 1938 to 1944 at 1,132 colleges and universities and 1,460 flight 
schools nationwide, including four women’s colleges and six historically black colleges 
and universities (Howard University, Delaware State University, Hampton University, 
North Carolina A&T, West Virginia State College, and Tuskegee Institute).27 The CPTP 
also funded the Coffey School in Chicago, one of the few black-owned flight schools. 
Through the CPTP, the number of black pilots grew to approximately 2,000, and the 
number of women pilots grew from 675 in 1939 to approximately 3,000 in July 1941.28 
The CPTP sought to identify and train a generation of pilots, crew, and mechanics to 
match the growing threat from German youth air power. As CPTP director Robert 
Hinckley wrote to Congressman Clarence Lea (D-CA), “There are 100,000 youths 
between 13-17 who are members of the ‘Hitler Youth,’ all destined for aviation 
service.”29 With the entry of the U.S. in WWII in 1941, the CPTP focused its training 
only on those who were qualified to serve in air combat. From 1942 to 1944, the CPTP 
was renamed the War Training Service and tasked with screening potential pilot 
candidates. White women were able to enlist as Women AirForce Service Pilots (WASP) 
in 1943 and African-American men could become airmen, but the few African-American 
women who had trained to be pilots in the CPTP no longer had access to military or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 CPTP was the brainchild of New Deal Administrator Robert H. Hinckley, a member of the Civil 
Aeronautics Authority (CAA). See Pisano, To Fill the Skies with Pilots (Urbana, IL: U of Illinois P, 1993), 
p. 3. 
 
27 Four women’s colleges were in the CPTP: Lake Erie, Adelphi, Mills, and Florida State University at 
Tallahassee. See “Civilian Pilot Training Program,” National Museum of the Air Force, Feb. 8, 2011: 
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=8475 
 
28 Pisano, To Fill the Skies with Pilots, pp. 76-77. 
 
29 Robert Hinckley to Congressman Clarence Lea, Mar. 27, 1939, Box 62, Folder 1, Robert H. Hinckley 
Papers, Special Collections, J. Willard Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City.  
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civilian flight training.30 Eleanor Roosevelt fought on their behalf, telling the CPTP 
director that “there are one or two colored women pilots in this country. They had better 
be prepared to accept them.” Hinckley’s response—that any military flying would be too 
difficult for black women pilots—no doubt reflected the majority opinion of the era.31 
The integrated CPTP, where all citizens could participate if they developed the skills to 
fly, was put on hold. 
 
 
The Tuskegee Experiment 
 
By 1940, the year of Roosevelt’s second bid for reelection, the Department of 
Commerce registered 231 black aviators listed with the Civil Aeronautics Administration 
(CAA).32 Because Roosevelt both needed the black vote and was a proponent of aviation, 
Executive Order 8802 ended racial discrimination in defense industry hiring, and the War 
Department allowed African Americans into the Army Air Forces training.  
As the Roosevelt Administration began to adapt governmental infrastructure to 
accommodate the participation of African Americans in the event of war, the Army 
Armed Forces also began considering enlisting African Americans, thus sparking a 
debate about how and where to train black military pilots in an era of segregation. The 
decision to establish a segregated military unit of the Army Air Corps became known 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 The WASP included 1,074 women pilots who ferried military aircraft within the U.S—thus freeing up 
more white airmen and cadets to fly in air combat in WWII.  
 
31 Robert Hinckley and Eleanor Roosevelt, Dec. 5, 1941, Box 38, Robert H. Hinckley Papers, Special 
Collections, J. Willard Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City.  
 
32 Powell, Black Wings, p. 65. 
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within military leadership as “The Tuskegee Experiment.”33 The War Department 
announced the formation of the 99th Pursuit Squadron with a military base in Tuskegee, 
Alabama, in January 1941.  
The rhetoric of place, as it related to military policy, was substantiated in an 
earlier document—the 1925 Army War College Report on the “Use of Negro Man Power 
in War”—which had asserted that, while African Americans were full citizens of the 
U.S., they lacked the ability to take on leadership or technical roles in war due to their 
inferiority to white soldiers.34 The memorandum cited anatomical evidence to argue the 
inferiority of black men, drawing on the pseudo-scientific field of ethnology, which 
legitimized the practice of racial hierarchies based on anatomical differences. Such 
rhetoric had circulated at least since 1839, when Samuel Morton argued in Crania 
Americana that factors such as craniotomy, facial angles, and skull capacities 
demonstrated the inferiority of Africans.35 The 1925 Army War College Report also cited 
what they considered to be worrisome behaviors among the black soldiers’ in WWI: that 
they were too cowardly for battle and seemed to experience a sense of inferiority around 
white men. Based on this pre-existing memorandum, the military leadership in 1941 
decided to sanction segregating the pilots.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 See Double V’s historical narrative about the AAF’s segregation policies and their implementation 
through the regulations of the Tuskegee Experiment in a chapter on “The Experiment: The Smoke Screen” 
(pp. 147-84); Lawrence P. Scott and William M. Womack, Sr., Double V: The Civil Rights Struggle of the 
Tuskegee Airmen (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State U P, 1994). The Army Air Corps’s Tuskegee 
Experiment is unrelated to the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiments, conducted in Tuskegee between 1932-1972. 
See Martha Solomon, “The Rhetoric of Dehumanization: An Analysis of Medical Reports of the Tuskegee 
Syphilis Project,” Western Journal of Speech Communication 49.4 (1985): 233-47. 
 
34  Major General H. E. Ely, “The U.S. Army War College Report: The Use of Negro Manpower in War,” 
1925. 
 
35 Wilson, The Reconstruction Desegregation Debate, p. 80. 
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The “Tuskegee Experiment,” therefore, became a rhetorical framing that 
ostensibly invited African Americans to serve in the AAF while also perpetuating the 
premise of their inferiority. In order to gain the confidence of the oppositional military 
leaders, the Tuskegee Air Force base was rhetorically framed as an “experiment.” At its 
core, the Tuskegee Experiment sought to find out if black pilots could be safe, obedient, 
and effective pilots. 
Because the enforcement of inferiority necessitated containment and control, the 
location for the air base would not necessarily fall along the lines of greatest access to 
aviation resources. The AAF narrowed its search for an air base location to two sites: a 
Chicago airfield, and the Tuskegee Institute in Tuskegee, Alabama. At face value, 
Chicago was the better location for the first African-American AAF. Since the post-WWI 
Great Migration of blacks out of the South and into the North, metropolitan Chicago had 
developed a tradition in black aviation. Bessie Coleman, the first African-American 
woman to receive a pilot’s license, was from Chicago and was the symbolic founder of 
black aviation. Likewise, throughout the 1930s, black and white aviators trained at the 
Coffey School of Aeronautics in Chicago, a school that was awarded contracts to train 
pilots through the CPTP. Chicago had the leadership and the infrastructure to militarize 
their civilian efforts in preparation for WWII. Furthermore, Chicago’s Harlem Airport 
had many runways ready to be used, whereas Tuskegee had none. However, because the 
Army Air Corps sought a segregated military unit, Tuskegee’s rural location, temperate 
climate, and, most especially, its location in the Jim Crow South made it the best 
laboratory for the Tuskegee Experiment. There, the expectations of inferiority could be 
observed and disciplined, as it had been during WWI.  
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Because the War Department had no experience with training black pilots, it 
would be easier to enforce segregation policies in Alabama, where there were de jure Jim 
Crow Laws. After all, there would be black airmen coming from the North and the West 
to Tuskegee, who, prior to military service, would have experienced greater mobility and 
freedom without the same discrimination based on race. What men on base discovered 
were laws to separate the races in almost every aspect of public and private lives. There 
were, for instance, white and black trainers and an all-black training squad. “Colored” 
and “white” signs labeled all water fountains, restaurants, train cars, and busses. Jim 
Crow laws even prohibited blacks and whites from playing cards or dice together and 
prohibited white barbers from cutting the hair of black men.36 In Tuskegee, there would 
be consistent measures to enforce segregation, both on the airbase and in the surrounding 
community. 
 
Selling of Tuskegee (1939-1941) 
 
The decision to militarize Tuskegee, as opposed to Chicago, resulted in a debate, 
both within and outside the African-American community. Once plans for a pursuit 
squadron—an aviation military unit that includes 12-24 aircraft—became public 
knowledge, several African-American civil rights advocates spoke out against any plan 
for a segregated air base—much like the debate in WWI in the black community over the 
prudence of accepting segregated officer training. Willa Brown, founder and secretary of 
the Chicago-based National Airmen’s Association (NAA), which had never barred 
membership to white people, issued a resolution condemning the War Department’s plans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 “Separate is Not Equal,” Smithsonian National Museum of American History: accessed Jan. 12, 2015: 
http://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/index.html 
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for segregated units; she argued instead for the integration of flight training.37 Leaders 
such as William Hastie, Walter White, Executive Secretary of the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), representatives of the National Urban 
League, and African-American higher education administrators debated the pros and cons 
of a segregated military unit, concluding that the only acceptable outcome was the 
formation of an integrated fighter squadron, instead of what some derisively called the 
“Jim Crow Air Squadron.”38  
 The decision over whether or not to segregate remained contested well into the 
early months of training in 1941, and, by some measures, into 1943 and beyond. While 
many African-American leaders were divided over the War Department’s decision to 
establish a segregated air base and pursuit squadron for black men, top administration at 
Tuskegee advocated consistently for a segregated air base, which they saw as a prudent 
step of “expedience.”39 Tuskegee officials, however, found themselves frustrated over 
national leaders within the African-American community who spoke out in opposition to 
segregation. In his unpublished autobiography, G. L. Washington, Tuskegee’s first 
Civilian Flight Manager, characterized FDR’s Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War as 
the “militant William Hastie” for his opposition to segregation, a slight that indicated just 
how divided national leaders within the African-American community had become.40 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 WW II provided more extensive flight training opportunities not only for African-American men, but 
also for white women. The Women Airforce Service Pilots (WASP) archival record is almost exclusively 
maintained at Texas Woman’s University (TWU) in Denton, Texas.  
 
38  “Ten Flying Cadets Join U.S. Army Jim Crow Air Squadron on July 19,” Chicago Defender (July 19, 
1941), p. 5. 
 
39 G. L. Washington, Memoir, Tuskegee Airmen Collection, Box Number 339.001, Tuskegee Institute, p. 
131. He was no relation to Booker T. Washington. 
 
40 G. L. Washington, Memoir, p. 119.  
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 As the debate continued, G. L. Washington realized that he could not just be 
against the integration of troops, but he had to be for segregation—even if merely on the 
principle of expedience—in order to maintain Tuskegee’s frontrunner position. Dubois 
had found himself in a similar position in WWI. In the lead up to and during World War 
I, DuBois—who succeeded B. T. Washington as the leading black voice in America—
crafted a rhetoric about black involvement in the war that would shape the military’s 
strategy. He lobbied the black press to advocate for a segregated training facility for 
black officers, recognizing the expediency of it, warning that, otherwise, the War 
Department would not train black officers. Once the majority of black leaders adopted 
this point of view, they had to battle the fears in The South that training blacks to shoot at 
(European) whites would be disastrous. Robert R. Moton, who had succeeded B. T. 
Washington at Tuskegee, assured President Wilson of the loyalty of the majority of 
blacks.41    
 G. L. Washington promoted Tuskegee as a community where blacks both honored 
whites and accepted the rhetoric of place. If the air base were to be established in 
Tuskegee, he argued, the white military leadership would feel safe and appreciated. G. L. 
Washington had to continue to make a case for why Tuskegee was the best location to 
fulfill the operational philosophy embedded in the AAF “experiment,” recognizing that 
such an approach would test Tuskegee’s alliance with other African-American national 
organizations. The Roosevelt Administration recognized that even though the Tuskegee 
Institute was the only CPTP site with no runway or hangar, at first, the idea of locating 
the air base there was appealing rhetorically as a location where blacks were learning 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See Finkle, Forum for Protest, pp. 40-43. 
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how to become productive members of society and where, as a remote location in the 
South, segregation policies could be enforced.42  
 An association with the Tuskegee Institute and the accommodationist 
philosophies of Booker T. Washington would enhance the public perception of the 
AAC’s “Experiment.” During his lifetime, B. T. Washington was considered to be the 
most influential black man in the U.S. He had advised presidents William Taft and 
Theodore Roosevelt and had garnered funding for the Institute from Andrew Carnegie 
and other prominent philanthropists. He had first arrived in Tuskegee in 1881, invited by 
a group of white people to start a school for blacks. He sought to train teachers, who 
would in turn fan out into their local communities, teaching African Americans industrial 
skills, such as sewing, cooking, bricklaying, and farming.43 The original school became 
the Tuskegee Institute and it nurtured B. T. Washington’s legacy of training blacks for 
positive contributions to society and his political stance of racial assimilation. To a 
military leadership keenly aware of the racial tension in the country and the disapproval 
of some activists that the Army Air Force would be segregated, the accommodationist 
stance embedded in the philosophy of the Tuskegee Institute assuaged them that the 
blacks trained to be military pilots there would be kept in their place, so to speak, and not, 
as some whites almost certainly silently feared, trained, and then empowered to turn 
against their own country. This accommodationist stance was critical assurance to a 
military leadership concerned that once African Americans learned how to fly they would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Tuskegee was geographically remote, and yet, known to FDR. Warm Springs, the Little White House, 
was less than two hours away by car. 
 
43 Booker T. Washington, The Tuskegee Institute, dir. Richard Wormser, PBS.org: “Jim Crow Stories” 
(2002); accessed Jan. 16 2015: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/jimcrow/stories_events_tuskegee.html 
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take up arms from the skies. The African Americans being trained as pilots would not be 
allowed to pilot bomber aircraft. It was this prohibition that sent Eugene Bullard from 
Columbus, Georgia, to fly for the French Lafayette Flying Corps in WWI, becoming the 
first black combat pilot.  
The accommodationist stance that made Tuskegee so attractive was rooted in B. 
T. Washington’s philosophy of social change, which he had described in his 1895 Atlanta 
Exposition Address, which Du Bois later mocked as the “Atlanta Compromise.”44 In this 
address, B. T. Washington told the story of a ship lost at sea, whose passengers shouted 
to a “friendly vessel” that they were dying of thirst and that they needed water. The reply 
to the dying people was that they must “cast down their bucket where they were,” as their 
ship, unbeknownst to them, had moored into the freshwater of the Amazon River. B. T. 
Washington then appealed to the crowd:  
To those of my race who depend on bettering their condition in a foreign land or 
who underestimate the importance of cultivating friendly relations with the 
Southern white man, who is their next-door neighbor, I would say: “Cast down 
your bucket where you are. . . . Cast it down in making friends in every manly 
way of the people of all races by whom we are surrounded.”45  
After addressing a pressing need for the Negro (to use period terminology) to become 
trained in such pursuits, B. T. Washington asserted his belief that the “wisest among my 
race understand that the agitation of questions of social equality is the extremist folly,” 
that progress must be the result of “severe and constant struggle rather than of artificial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 For more on DuBois’s battle against B. T. Washington’s rhetoric and how the controversy played out in 
the black press, see Lee Finkle, Forum for Protest, pp. 34-39.  
 
45 Booker T. Washington, Up From Slavery (Boston: Bedford, 2003), p. 106. 
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forcing.”46 That logic—that agitation among the races over social equality was folly—
would guide the leadership at Tuskegee in their relationship with the War Department as 
they planned to accept the terms of segregation at the air base.  
 Central to his legacy was B. T. Washington’s belief in amity among black and 
white people, stemming in part from a conviction that social equality would come to 
African Americans as a result of greater efficiency and work ethic. In From Slavery to 
Freedom, John Hope Franklin writes, “As [B. T.] Washington saw the salutary effects 
that his program was having on the white South as well as on his black students, he 
became more and more convinced that this was the pattern for strengthening the position 
of African Americans throughout the area.”47 This educational philosophy was 
compatible with the AAF’s desire to train black pilots and crew but to do so within the 
terms of segregation.  
 Kirt Wilson argues that the rhetoric of place triumphs over the rhetoric of 
equality, not only because whites upheld this cultural belief but also because of the 
advocacy of key figures in the African-American community.  Specifically, Wilson 
focuses on B. T. Washington’s role during the post-Reconstruction era in order to 
demonstrate how he participated in the rhetoric of place as a result of his 
accommodationist stance. While B.T. Washington’s notoriety and beliefs cultivated 
resources for the Tuskegee Institute, he himself became a symbol to both Southern 
conservatives and Northern politicians that African Americans were willing to accept a 
subservient place in society, in relation to whites. Wilson points out that presidents 	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47 John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss Jr., From Slavery to Freedom, Seventh Edition (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1994), p. 270. 
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Cleveland, McKinley, and Roosevelt built strong working relationships with B. T. 
Washington, and ignored those leaders in the black community who advocated for equal 
rights.48 In his relations with U.S. presidents and with industrialists such as Andrew 
Carnegie, B. T. Washington, Wilson reminds us, “failed to recognize that his vision for 
the black community was being co-opted by those who used the rhetoric of place to 
affirm black inferiority as well as separation.”49  
 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who understood the long and productive political 
alliance between B. T. Washington, the Tuskegee Institute, and the white public, traveled 
to Tuskegee on March 30, 1939. The Tuskegee Choir sang to the President as he sat in an 
open car. In his subsequent speech, Roosevelt recalled his thirty-year-old pledge to B. T. 
Washington that he would make the journey to the Tuskegee Institute. Roosevelt’s long-
anticipated visit to Tuskegee occurred only a few months before Germany invaded 
Poland, when the possibility of war became a fixture on the horizon. In his speech, 
Roosevelt expressed his wish “that almost every American could come to Tuskegee and 
see what has been done.” The “almost” served to exclude perhaps those who harbored 
prejudice or ill will toward African Americans. “I did not come to make a formal address 
to you,” he said, “This is a homey gathering. Tuskegee is a homey place.” In a manner 
that only an accommodationist stance could evoke—from a white president to his 
African-American audience—FDR expressed his personal comfort in a place that made 
him feel at ease. With his express intention of not making a formal address, Roosevelt 
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made it clear that he had come to be among African Americans, in a “homey place” such 
as Tuskegee. 
 Soon after military leadership announced its plans to establish a segregated air 
base at Tuskegee, First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt was dispatched there to visit and publish 
her impressions in a pair of her acclaimed “My Day” columns.50  Prior to her visit, she 
was one of the few white national figures who consistently addressed the need to end 
racial inequality in the U.S. In her visit to Tuskegee, she could demonstrate support for 
the African-American pilots. While at Tuskegee, Eleanor Roosevelt observed flight 
training at Kennedy Field. 
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Figure 2: Eleanor Roosevelt and Charles “Chief” Anderson, 1941, cropped photograph (Tuskegee Airmen 
Collection, Tuskegee University) 
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She asked Charles “Chief” Anderson, Tuskegee’s head trainer and the first black pilot to 
hold an air transport license, if “Negroes really fly airplanes?” Anderson offered her a 
ride in his J-3 Piper Cub, and she accepted. After the ride, Mrs. Roosevelt reportedly 
concluded, as public memory reflects, “I guess Negroes can fly.”51 Taking to the skies in 
order to demonstrate social equality was not a novel practice for the First Lady. In 1932, 
she had flown from Washington, D.C., to Baltimore with Amelia Earhart. The difference 
this time was that, unlike Earhart, who had not been trusted to actually fly the plane, 
Anderson was allowed to demonstrate how a black pilot could safely take off and land 
with the First Lady on board. Reflecting upon her flight with Chief Anderson, Eleanor 
Roosevelt wrote simply: “These boys are good pilots.”52 In her column, Roosevelt 
affirmed the possibility for social equality, touted Tuskegee’s philosophy of racial 
accommodation, and reported on her “comfortable” stay at the Institute’s guesthouse, 
where she was pleased to see a portrait of her uncle, Teddy Roosevelt.  
 Seven months after the First Lady’s visit, the Tuskegee Institute appeared on the 
radar of the mainstream white public once again with the Time Magazine story about 
Tuskegee professor George Washington Carver.53 Carver, a scientist who had come to 
teach at the Tuskegee Institute in 1896, was dubbed the “black Leonardo” by Time, and 
had just published a cookbook on edible weeds. The article celebrated both Carver’s 
resourcefulness and his frugality in finding uses for ingredients such as rabbit tobacco 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For an example of the circulation of this quotation in public memory, see, for example, the 1995 HBO-
produced historical film Tuskegee Airmen, dir. Robert Markowitz. 
 
52 Eleanor Roosevelt, “My Day: How Tuskegee Helps Its Neighbors,” Atlanta Constitution (Apr. 1, 1941), 
p. 14. 
 
53 “Art: Black Leonardo,” Time 38.1 (Nov. 24, 1941), p. 83. 
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and sour grass leaves—items that “no housewife would ever recognize.”54 Carver’s 
ingenuity was depicted as representative of the kind of resourcefulness the Tuskegee 
Institute fostered among African Americans. Carver’s kitchen tour, given to a white 
reporter from Atlanta, demonstrated the legacy of B. T. Washington’s rhetoric of place in 
operation. Through a folksy spin, Carver continued, into the last years of his life, to draw 
resources and attention to Tuskegee, in his own version of making whites comfortable 
enough to appreciate the school. 
 The efforts of the Roosevelts, combined with the Time Magazine coverage of 
Carver, amounted to an uncoordinated public relations campaign to make Tuskegee a 
household name on the eve of the U.S.’s entry into WWII. War would demand 
manpower, and Tuskegee could train a labor force willingly subordinate to white 
leadership and eager to work where needed. Frederick Douglass had once said that, as 
long as African Americans were willing to be assigned their place, they would be liked, 
and—at least in the (untested) early years—Tuskegee was well liked among the white 
public.55  
 
“Experiment Proved?” 
 
 The goal among the African-American leadership and the men of the 99th Pursuit 
Squadron was to demonstrate the success of the Tuskegee Experiment through excellence 
in air combat. Authors of the 1925 Army War College Report had based their measures 
of African-American inferiority on their observations of ground warfare during WWI. In 
the skies, there was the potential for the segregated AAF to present themselves as 
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55 Wilson, The Reconstruction Desegregation Debate, pp. 7-8. 
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superior in war tactics, an opportunity that had not been possible for the black soldiers in 
WWI. And yet, rhetorical constructions of what was called the “negro problem” 
permeated most reflections in the mainstream media of the “Tuskegee Experiment.”  
 During the first two years of training at Tuskegee, the program did not attract 
external scrutiny. Its first fatality, in 1942, was not even picked up by mainstream papers 
(although it was covered by the black press), perhaps because the remoteness of rural 
Alabama might have assuaged a skittish white public that any rookie pilots falling out of 
the sky would fall into fields of sweet potatoes, corn, beans, cotton, and peanuts—not 
into a populated metropolitan area.56 Therefore, the events leading up to the very 
mainstream Sept. 1943 story in Time Magazine deserve careful scrutiny.57   
 For two years, the men of the 99th waited in Tuskegee to enter the war. Once the 
99th set sail for Fez, Morocco, in April 1943, both the black and mainstream presses 
debated whether or not African Americans could succeed. On June 2, 1943, one month 
after arriving in North Africa, the 287 enlisted men and 42 officers set out for their 
mission over Pantelleria Island in Italy. In the grand scheme of the war, this was a 
relatively minor operation. The European theatre had become a site of massive 
destruction, but “Operation Corkscrew”—the Allied mission to take Pantelleria from the 
Axis Powers was the 99th’s first combat mission.  
 The 99th Squadron was a latecomer to air combat, and because of the wait in 
Tuskegee, had received more training than most of the white squadrons. However, one 
pernicious byproduct of the Tuskegee Experiment was that there were no veteran pilots: 
segregation made it impossible to add veteran white pilots to an all-black rookie 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See John W. McGaffey, “Many Attend Rites for Flyer,” Atlanta Daily World (June 26, 1942), p. 5. 
 
57 “Experiment Proved?” Time Magazine 42.12 (Sept. 20, 1943), p. 66. 
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squadron.58 An all-rookie squadron was atypical of other air units serving in the European 
theatre, making the black airmen vulnerable to the charge of inferiority, if and when their 
mistakes in combat were more the result of inexperience than intentional disobedience. A 
week into their assignment in Pantelleria, thirteen black escort pilots approached German 
planes and five broke away from the bomber planes they were escorting in order to attack 
the Germans themselves. As the German aircraft retreated, the black pilots went rogue 
from their assigned white bombers, in hopes of gaining their own first “kills.”59  
 After the surrender of Pantelleria Island to Allied Forces, the 99th was assigned 
fewer and fewer opportunities for air combat. That September of 1943, the War 
Department reorganized the leadership structure of the 99th Pursuit Squadron and sent its 
leader, Col. Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., back to the U.S. to become the first black 
Commander of the segregated 332nd Fighter Group, also stationed at Tuskegee.60 In 
Washington, D.C., Davis held a press conference in which he conveyed to reporters that 
the black pilots in Pantelleria had, as one news article reported, “made the grade, and 
training them should no longer be regarded as an experiment,” that in “every mission his 
men met superior enemy forces and managed to break a little better than even.”61 Davis 
concluded that the Allied victory over the Axis powers for Pantelleria Island had proven 
that the “Experiment” had “ended.”62 Davis also told reporters that “members of the 99th 
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realized that the unit was a test to determine whether the Negro pilot was physically, 
mentally, and emotionally suited to the rigors of combat flying,” an acknowledgement 
and rebuke of the criteria cited to prove racial inferiority in the 1925 Army War College 
Report.63 Davis memorably added that his men no longer dreamed about the girls back 
home, but instead about encounters with German pilots.  
 
     Figure 3: Benjamin O. Davis Jr. and Sr., photograph accompanying the article “Experiment Over,” 1943 
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 Kathleen Campbell argues that a speaker’s presence can come to embody a 
rhetorical argument.64 This rhetorical strategy of enactment was evident at Davis’s initial 
press conference, which was attended by both the black and white press. Time Magazine 
described Davis as “lath-straight” and a “West Pointer,” two attributes that lent credence 
to his commentary.65 Through enactment, his example alone would have made it 
impossible to claim the inferiority of all black pilots. If it was, then could the men of the 
99th and the eventual 332nd be seen in the same light as their fellow white airmen? The 
Time Magazine article concluded only with more questions. Although Time 
complimented Davis’s leadership, it also gestured toward what had all along been 
identified as the “negro problem” of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries66: 
      [T]he question of the 99th is only a single facet of one of the Army’s biggest 
 headaches: how to train and use Negro troops. No theater commander wants them 
 in considerable numbers; the high command has trouble finding combat jobs for 
 them. There is no lack of work to be done by Negroes as labor and engineering 
 troops—the Army’s dirty work. But the American spirit of fair play, which 
 occasionally devotes some attention to Negro problems, would be offended by a 
 policy of confining Negroes to such duty, and the Negro press has campaigned 
 against it. There are plenty of Negro combat troops, but almost none of them have 
 been tested under fire.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 See Kathleen Campbell, “Enactment as a Rhetorical Strategy in The Year of Living Dangerously,” 
Central States Speech Journal 39 (1988): 258-68. 
 
65 Time Magazine, “Experiment Proved?” p. 66. 
 
66 For perspectives on U.S. race relations during the WWII era, see Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: 
the Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944). See also Michael 
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         Most thoughtful Army officers probably would agree that the Negro will never 
 develop his potentialities as an airman or any other kind of soldier under the 
 system of segregation in training. But the Army is convinced, rightly or wrongly, 
 that any major effort to break up the system now would touch off outbreaks of 
 race prejudice and hobble the war effort. (p. 66) 
While the Time article called to question the efficacy of segregation within the armed 
forces, it also seemed to express sympathy with the white military leadership tasked with 
supervising black troops.  
 Soon after Davis’s press conference, a confidential AAF document began to 
circulate in the press and among congressional leadership. The Report on Combat 
Efficiency of the 99th Fighter Squadron—a memo drafted by Col. William Momyer under 
the signature of Maj. Gen. Edwin House—circulated first among military leadership, 
ostensibly to assess the military performance of the 99th Squadron.67 While the memo 
was complimentary of Davis’s leadership and the 99th’s “ground discipline and their 
ability to accomplish and execute orders,” it cited certain critical instances where combat 
efficiency was not “completely satisfactory.”68 Members of the Pursuit Squadron, it said, 
failed to display a desire for “aggressiveness” and “combat,” and lacked “the proper 
reflexes” to make first-class, fighter pilots. Citing the air war over Pantelleria Island, it 
said that “their formation flying has been very satisfactory until jumped by enemy 
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clio.com/ContentPages/ContentPage.aspx?entryId=1687628&currentSection=1687640&productid=45 
 
68 “Edwin House Memorandum: 99th Pursuit Squadron Combat Efficiency, 1943.” I will heretofore refer to 
this document as the Report on Combat Efficiency. 
 
190
	   	   	  
 
aircraft, when the squadron seems to disintegrate.”69 The five black pilots’ abandoning of 
the bombers they were escorting was interpreted not as inexperience but as inefficiency at 
best and insubordination at worst. The memo recommended ending black escort missions 
and aborting plans for the (black) 477th Bomber Group. It also raised the concern that 
“rapid moves” in war might make it necessary that black and white airmen would need to 
mess and sleep together, which would break the codes of segregation.70  
Given the content of this memorandum, the Time article “Experiment Proved?” 
was timely. Questions of whether or not the “Experiment” had proved anything 
conclusive were being debated within the military and in the mainstream press.  
 The Report on Combat Efficiency was discussed by the War Department’s 
Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies in October 1943. The Advisory Committee 
welcomed testimony by Davis, whose presence seemed to transfer a confidence to the 
committee members that neutralized the critique of the Report on Combat Efficiency. 
Davis represented the success of the 99th Pursuit Squadron, and his recent return from air 
combat seemed to elevate his authority. Historian J. Todd Moye argues that it was also 
Davis’s testimony to the Advisory Committee that refocused the black press’s attention 
on the War Department’s use of the 99th. With the vocal support of black papers—and 
given the not fully substantiated claims of the House Memorandum—the 99th was 
allowed to continue, and was reassigned to the 79th Fighter Group. After the transition, 
performance evaluations of the 99th improved, and black officers were purportedly 
treated equally to white officers. Additionally, the black escort pilots were provided with 	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70 Daniel Haulman, “Correcting a Historical Myth,” Five Airfields of Tuskegee During World War II (Dec. 
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the P-51 Mustang, arguably the best fighter aircraft of WWII, especially when compared 
to the P-39 or P-40 aircrafts assigned to them upon entrance to the war.71   
 Looking back on the timeline of the 99th, it trained for two years, finally got the 
chance to fly in combat over Africa and Italy, and, after five pilots made the rookie 
mistake of leaving their positions to attack a German plane, the entire squadron was 
almost immediately reprimanded. Because their participation in the war was an 
experiment, all eyes were on them, ready to pounce if and when they made a mistake. 
 
 
Circulating Text at the Color Line 
 
 In order to interpret the rhetorical conversation about the Tuskegee Airmen that 
occurred in both the mainstream and black presses, I reviewed black and white 
newspapers from 1938 to 1945. Because the term “Tuskegee Airmen” only entered 
common parlance in 1955, I did a search for the keywords “negro pilots,” “Tuskegee,” 
“99th Pursuit Squadron,” and the “332nd Fighter Group.”72 Each search term appeared 
more in stories printed in the black press than in the white press.   
 Before turning to these findings, it is productive to consider the state of the black 
press during this era more broadly. During WWII, the black press was at its zenith of 
power and readership. It had become the most established forum for expression of blacks, 
boasting, in 1940, a combined circulation of about 1,276,000—double that of 1933—and, 	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debates comparing the P-40 and the P-51. See www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/polls/mustang-mk-51-51a-
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by 1945, a circulation of 1,808,060.73 The papers were printed weekly and featured 
stories about black servicemen, as well as a wide range of columns by a diversity of 
columnists. The editorial and columnists’ page in black papers provided a forum for 
militant and conservative opinions, often paired side-by-side, and penned by a range of 
professors, race leaders, businessmen, labor leaders, and politicians, as well as syndicated 
columnists; the white papers, by contrast, largely printed columns by professional 
journalists.74  
 The black press, which carried a mission to fight discrimination and to help carve 
a way toward equal rights and fair treatment in the U.S., warily eyed the way that the war 
against fascism in Europe was creating more fascist policies stateside, as the military 
sanctioned the growth of Jim Crow into the North and West.75 It is important to 
remember that all black papers did not express the same political viewpoint with regard 
to the U.S. entrance into WWII. Some supported the fight against fascism and for 
democracy, and others voiced concern about contributing to a war between two 
aggressive colonizers.76 The press, therefore, adopted the Double V campaign, which 
pushed for a Victory at home (against racism) and abroad (against fascism), and, to 
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promote those goals, pushed to include blacks in every aspect of the war movement.77 
The federal government monitored the black presses for seditious sentiment.78 
 Because this chapter examines the differing reception of African Americans in the 
Army Air Force among black and mainstream presses, I have chosen to focus primarily 
on certain stories that afford insight into the differences between the two publics. I will 
focus on certain case studies that reflect a way not only to better understand how the 
rhetoric of place guided war coverage, but also to evaluate what appears to be a split 
screen of perception between black and white communities prior to and throughout 
WWII as it related to the segregated Air Corps. Quite simply, white newspapers ran 
relatively few articles before the war about the training or war combat of African-
American pilots. It was, as Tuskegee historian Moye has speculated, “entirely possible 
for white Americans, even relatively informed ones, to have no idea that the Air Forces 
trained black pilots in the war at all.”79 While the black press covered every step toward 
the recruitment, training, and combat record of the 99th and of the 332nd Fighter Group—
and while the black public often read both the black and white newspapers—the 
mainstream press only began to focus on the black pilots once they entered air combat in 
June 1943.80 
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Stories Circulated only in the Black Press 
 If the mainstream press cast mostly dispassionate interest and fleeting enthusiasm 
for the prospect and eventual reality of African Americans in air combat, the black press 
inked constant hope for the expansion of flying opportunities from the beginning of the 
CPTP in 1938 until the end of the war in 1945. Even as the 99th Pursuit Squadron waited 
in Tuskegee for their chance to fly in air combat, the anger present in many of the articles 
I found seems mixed with the belief that their efforts in the media would eventually turn 
the tide. Unlike the white press, which documented the progress of the Tuskegee 
Experiment from a distance, the black press advocated for change when they saw 
weakness or prejudice within the AAF.  
In order to advocate for African Americans and flight, the black press assembled 
rhetorical constructions of the ideal black pilot. The ideal black pilot aligns with B. T. 
Washington’s philosophies about the New Negro. During the first year of the CPTP, the 
NYC-based New York Amsterdam News reflected a hope among the African-American 
community that flight training would serve as a means to building character among the 
young people who trained to be pilots at other historically black colleges and universities:  
Airplanes will spread wide their wings over two Negro college campuses this fall 
 and colored student pilots, eager and courageous, will be at the controls. Never 
 before in all the romantic history of aviation has colored youth had such an 
 opportunity to learn the rudiments of flying.81  
Black newspapers featured regular articles beginning in 1939 that urged the federal 
government to increase opportunities for black pilots to fly. The possibility that African 	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Americans might participate in WWII through aviation spawned much discussion of the 
possible future benefits of a training program. James L. H. Peck, an African-American 
pilot and aviation journalist, discussed the possibility that black graduates of the CPTP 
might become aeronautical engineers. Peck acknowledged that black youth were more 
inclined to favor the glamor of flying over support roles in aviation, but he emphasized 
that there were so many other opportunities for young people interested in aviation 
besides being a pilot.82  
 In the years prior to WWII, the Army Air Corps’ lack of public support for black 
pilots continued to be a theme across black newspapers. In an article titled “Do They 
Mean Negroes?” the author wrote, “It has always seemed funny to us that certain 
business institutions and places of amusement go to such length to advertise . . . then, 
when someone who has read the ad or heard the invitation turns up, he is refused because 
of his color. While the army is begging for this number of men for the air corps, Negroes, 
well qualified in every respect are being forced to go to Canada to join the Royal Air 
Force.”83 Over and over, the black press appealed to the reader that the Army Air Corps 
must be open to black recruits, or else the most promising would move to Canada or 
Great Britain instead.  
 The concern all along was that there was a “color line” developing both on the 
ground and also up in the sky. Sometimes the represented need to fight against a color 
line emanated not from the U.S. but from Hitler’s racial ideologies. In a 1939 article, the 
New York Amsterdam News quoted Hitler’s autobiography Mein Kampf, to say that it was 
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“criminal madness to train a born semi-ape to become a lawyer.” But instead of placing 
the blame of racial prejudice on the Führer alone, the column continued, “Hitler’s idea of 
Negroes doesn’t, however, sound so strange to United States Negroes.”84 Early into the 
argument for black pilots was the argument that in order to defeat the Germans, the U.S. 
could not share their racist ideologies. This fear tactic continued to circulate in the black 
press in an article from 1940, which suggested that Harlem would be bombed first 
because of a German belief that “colored people are inferior.”85 The author seemed to 
offer only one logical response to the threat: to allow young black men to fly for the 
Army Air Corps.  
 As the wait continued for the War Department to respond to advocates for black 
militarization of the Army Air Corps, another reason established for the training of black 
pilots was the need to make amends for the injustices of WWI. The Philadelphia Tribune 
asked whether  “conditions are any different from conditions that existed in 1917.”86 The 
article’s author, John A. Saunders, wondered how it could be possible for blacks to be 
any better off twenty-two years later when they have been relegated once again to such 
jobs in the U.S. Army as “kitchen mechanic” or “boot slinger.”87 “Few power whites,” 
Saunders added, believe there is an advantage to sending African Americans to war in 
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order to keep black men away from the many white women at home.88 While his tone is 
somewhat tongue-in-cheek, his message of urgency crossed over any guffaw.  
 In December 1940, The Crisis published the cover story “When Do We Fly?” The 
author, James L. H. Peck, reproduced the acceptance letter to the Air Corps that he 
received from First Lieutenant Herbert M. West, Jr., who mistakenly assumed Peck was 
white.89 Peck’s article was one of two in the December issue that focused on critical race 
concerns within the U.S. Armed Forces. The other article led with the headline, “Jim 
Crow in the Army Camps.”90 Even before the U.S. entered WWII, there was concern 
among civilians that serving for one’s country might lead to greater injustices for 
African-American soldiers.    
 Once it was clear that black pilots would be allowed to enlist, the public 
discussion shifted from demanding inclusion to raising concerns about what inclusion 
would mean under the terms of segregation. On January 30, 1941, the National Airmen’s 
Association, headquartered at Harlem Field in Chicago, launched a campaign with the 
slogan, “Let’s not begin segregation in the air force.”91 Aviation leaders in Chicago spoke 
powerfully about the irony that the CPTP had functioned as a fully integrated program, 
and that, according to Cornelius Coffey, “Negroes and whites have worked harmoniously 
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together in the CPTP, even in the South.”92 Such terms of inclusion were no longer 
acceptable in military service. 
 When the Tuskegee Airbase prepared to send airmen of the 99th Pursuit Squadron 
to war, and even after they entered air combat, there were only brief reports within the 
mainstream press, mostly framing the participation of African-American pilots within the 
larger frame of air battle across the air forces. However, the Chicago Tribune ran a series 
of articles by Roscoe Simmons, a former columnist from the Chicago Defender, who 
provided more detailed information about the 99th Pursuit Squadron. Simmons, a nephew 
of Booker T. Washington and a Tuskegee graduate, compared the Tuskegee flying school 
to a “citadel.”93  
 
How the Black and White Presses Reported on the Same Events 
 During the Roosevelt Administration, African Americans became essential 
advisors to the Executive Branch. After a distinguished career as the first African-
American federal judge, William Hastie became the Civilian Aide to the Secretary of 
War in 1940. During his tenure, he made recommendations on how to incorporate and 
treat African Americans in the Armed Forces. He spent two years trying to convince the 
Army to integrate Tuskegee. Frustrated by the military’s adherence to policies of 
segregation, Hastie resigned in January 1943, prompting a flood of articles in the black 
press, including the publication of a letter written by Hastie to explain the circumstances 
surrounding his decision. To the Afro-American, Hastie said that, having appealed to the 
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War Department, he saw the more strategic route was to appeal to public opinion instead, 
a route that would only be open to him after his resignation. Hastie discussed 
discrepancies in training between black and white units, saying, “men cannot be 
humiliated over a long period of time without a loss of combat efficiency.”94 In effect, the 
conditions of segregation had diminished black pilots’ ability to succeed.  
 
      Figure 4: Editorial cartoon: “Who Will Fly with Them,” 1943 
 
Three weeks later, the Pittsburgh Courier published a column written by Hastie. The 
column was written in a much more direct manner than the earlier letter that detailed 
many of Hastie’s concerns but with a more measured tone: “There is not now and never 
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has been any good reason for the segregated training of Negro Flyers at Tuskegee. . . . It 
is not possible to train flyers in one small area as foot soldiers can be trained.”95 Combat 
in the sky simply cannot be contained in the same manner as battle on the ground.   
 In addition to more expansive coverage regarding Hastie’s resignation, the black 
press informed readers about low morale at the Tuskegee Base, partially because of 
Hastie’s departure and cited several reasons given for the malaise. The Pittsburgh 
Courier reported that those based at Tuskegee were “soul sick” over the hatred they faced 
by white Alabama, that there was no reason for segregation policies on base, and that the 
wait to depart for WWII combat weighed heavily on everyone.96  
 In articles that circulated in the white press, Hastie appears to be more 
circumspect about his future. The Chicago Tribune printed an excerpt of Hastie’s 
resignation letter. Hastie declined to tell the Washington Post and the New York Times the 
reason for his resignation while he was still at his post. Hastie declined to say why he 
planned to resign until after he left his post.97 He also mentioned that two of his assistants 
would continue in order to ensure a smooth transition.98 Unlike the black press, there is 
no mention of low morale at the Tuskegee Air Base, only a brief analysis of Hastie’s 
resignation. The story of Hastie’s resignation—a front-page story in black newspapers—
was tucked away at the bottom of page 15 in the New York Times, between stories about 
the sale of intoxicants at Army and Naval bases and an ad for Arthur Murray dance 
lessons. In this act of dissent, we can see how much more this act of protest mattered to a 	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black public and how it appeared to be just one news item among many in the 
mainstream press.  
 Likewise, stories concerning the combat missions of black escort pilots appeared 
much more in the black press. The first such story to appear in both black and white 
newspapers featured the first aerial victory credit awarded to a black pilot and his 
subsequent recognition by General Eisenhower. On July 3, 1943, less than one month 
after the 99th’s mission over Pantelleria, First Lieut. Charles B. Hall distinguished himself 
as the first African-American pilot to destroy a German airplane while flying with the 
99th Pursuit Squadron.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Caricature of Charles Hall, “99th Pilot Downs Nazi Plane,” 1943 
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Hall’s “kill” drew immediate attention, not only because of his aerial victory credit but 
also because General Eisenhower congratulated him in person. The story circulated in 
such white newspapers as the Atlanta Constitution, Baltimore Sun, Chicago Daily 
Tribune, and the New York Times. The article quoted from Hall’s testimony of the “kill”:  
 I headed for the space between the fighters and bombers and managed to turn 
 inside the Jerries. I fired a long burst and saw my tracers penetrate the second 
 aircraft. . . . I saw [the German plane] crash. He raised a big cloud of dust.99  
Not only was a mainstream audience being introduced to African-American pilots in 
combat, but they were also getting a first-hand account of a “kill” from a black pilot, not 
only a first-of-its-kind victory for a black pilot in WWII but also a rare accomplishment 
for any pilot.  
 Even before Hall’s victory, the black presses were imagining the first aerial 
victory credit. On July 3, 1943, the same day Hall shot down a German aircraft, the 
Pittsburgh Courier reported that a Nazi-controlled radio broadcast had said that the black 
pilots were, “extremely ferocious and cruel,” and that “they will be entrusted with the 
most risky and dangerous of the Allied Air Force.”100 The celebration continued after the 
aerial victory, when the Courier ran a feature-length story about Hall. The black press, 
which had dedicated increasing coverage to the possibility that blacks would fly in 
combat, greeted news of Hall’s success with jubilation.101 As the first black pilot to 
destroy an enemy plane, Hall became a symbol proving wrong all those who assumed the 	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inferiority of black pilots. Unlike the white newspapers, the Courier included a front-
page illustration of Hall, dressed in air gear and a sketch of his aerial victory, with his 
plane shooting at the German aircraft as it falls to the ground. The article includes 
familial details about his mother and his hometown of Brazil, Indiana, punctuated with 
exclamation points. Even though Hall’s aerial victory circulated within the U.S. 
mainstream audience, it did not seem to have lasting impact upon the public’s memory of 
the war.  
Once Hall returned home, he went on a three-month tour of the U.S. to promote 
the war bond drive, a mission only covered by the black press. Despite having been 
mentioned in the mainstream press for his aerial victory credit, Hall noticed on this tour 
that few of the white people he encountered even knew that there were black pilots in 
WWII combat, let alone that Hall had destroyed a German plane. Hall said, “It was a 
common thing” to be unknown to his audience before he shared his story of victorious air 
combat.102 While there was much interest in and articles about black pilots in the black 
press, as war heroes and as three-dimensional personalities, there remained few among 
the white population who knew of Hall’s accomplishment, until they heard about his war 
service from him.  
 As the story of Hall’s air combat illustrates, the black pilot in WWII had become 
a symbol of bravery among black audiences. Hall gave a speech at the December 1944 
All Southern Negro Youth Congress for 3,000 youth in Atlanta, GA, in which he said he 
saw “no difference between a white and a Negro pilot. Under fire, all are brothers, all 
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Americans.”103 Hall’s attention to civil rights extended now to the manner in which he 
charted the accomplishments of the 99th, not only within his segregated squadron but also 
within the larger fighter group of both white and black men. Hall said, “Our fighter group 
shot down more planes than any other allied pursuit squadron in the European Theatre. . . 
. Our men have proved themselves equal to the task under the most rigid of combat 
tests.”104 In his speech, Hall asserted his individual equality with the white pilots he 
fought alongside in WWII. This moment, in which a single, named individual recounted 
his personal experience, was a stunning one when we consider that, with time, the 
experiences of all of the individual black pilots would be collapsed into the nameless, 
collective identity called “Tuskegee Airmen.” 
 
Coverage about Tuskegee in Mainstream Magazines 
 
In addition to Time, the Tuskegee-trained pilots were covered in at least one other 
mainstream newsmagazine: Liberty Magazine. African-American War correspondent Roi 
Ottley published the article “Dark Angels of Doom” in March 1945.105 With a weekly 
circulation of three million readers, Liberty had the potential, like no newspaper, to reach 
a broader, and potentially more diverse, audience.106 Ottley introduced the concept of 
black aviators to the papers’ predominantly white readership and highlighted the fact that 	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they were highly educated and skilled individuals prior to their training at Tuskegee. As 
one of the few black war correspondents, Ottley wrote extensively about African 
Americans in WWII. Visiting Ramitelli Air Base in Italy presented an opportunity for 
Ottley to showcase what the black press already had covered extensively: the military 
record of the 332nd Fighter Group. In his article, Ottley drew attention to certain people 
on the base that he knew a white audience would admire. He described his tour guide, 
Lieutenant Jack Holsclaw, as a “poised, self-confident flier.” Another airman was a star 
football player from Northwestern University. In the midst of his tour narrative, Ottley 
said of the 332nd Fighter Group, “In more than 100 combat missions on which the Red 
Tails [African-American pilots] have given escort cover to their ‘Big Friends’ [the 
bombers], they haven’t lost a single ship.”107 When the article was reprinted in the 
Chicago Defender, the number of missions reported without losses had grown from 100 
to 200. That estimate was never contested. The “never lost a bomber” claim can trace its 
lineage to Ottley and to his piece in Liberty Magazine.  
 
 Stories of Black Escorts and White Bombers 
 
 In June 1944, both the 332nd Fighter Group and the 99th Pursuit Squadron attached 
to the Fifteenth Air Force. In order to evidence the “rhetoric of place,” one need not look 
further than to what circulated about the relationship between black escort pilots and their 
“big friends,” the white bombers.108 Despite a range of escort pilot policies across the Air 
Force, Lieutenant General Ira Eaker, the Commander of the Eighth and later, as 
Mediterranean theatre air command, the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces adhered to a 
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policy that insisted that the escort pilots “stick with the bombers.”109 The 332nd Fighter 
Group was one of seven fighter groups, all providing escort capabilities to the bombers. 
As close and roving escorts to white bombers, the mission of the black pilots was to 
protect the bombers during aerial combat with the Germans. In each individual Air Force, 
including the Fifteenth, there were white escort pilots whose mission it was to protect the 
bombers.  
 In order to adhere to an Air Force policy within the Fifteenth Air Force, escort 
pilots were instructed to fly close to the white bombers instead of breaking off to attack 
German planes further away. While there were several black pilots who achieved four 
aerial victory credits, none achieved the necessary five to earn the title “pilot ace.” That 
fact may be attributed to racist policies within the military; two black pilots who had 
scored their fourth aerial credits were quickly deployed back to the U.S. There were two 
other pilots who were not sent home immediately after their fourth aerial victory credit, 
making the question of injustice difficult to discern within the military record but easier 
to nuance in the analysis of war reporting. It is in the reports that document the 
relationship between black escorts and white bomber crews that the “rhetoric of place” is 
unmistakable.   
 While the relationship between a bomber pilot and his escort pilots should be one 
of interdependence—not subservience—Kirt Wilson’s rhetoric of place reminds us that 
“even under the best of circumstances, segregation communicated white supremacy”110 
and that there could be no equality in the bomber-escort relationship. For the black pilots 
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so excited for the opportunity to finally fly and fight in aerial combat, there was no 
opportunity to transcend institutional racism. No matter how great a hero one man is over 
the air in Pantelleria, he would come home to the same racism and the same subservient 
position he left.  
 The black newspapers focused not only on the military record of black and white 
pilots, but also on the interpersonal gestures of loyalty evident on the part of the black 
pilots toward the white bombers of the Fifteenth Air Force. Just after the black pilots 
were first involved in air combat over Pantelleria Island, a story ran in June of 1943 in the 
Chicago Defender about Lt. Paul Adams from Greenville, SC, who had just received his 
wings at Tuskegee. The impetus for his military service, he said, was to avenge the death 
of his white childhood friend Odus Stone, Jr., who had served in WWII. Adams had 
worked for Stone’s grandmother as a houseboy. Growing up together, Adams and Stone 
built model airplanes, from which Adams developed “the strong urge to become a 
flier.”111 The story testified to the loyalty between this black pilot and his white friend, 
and inherent in the story is the hope that black escorts would do the same for their white 
bombers.  
 One year after the story about the loyalty of an African-American pilot toward his 
white childhood playmate, the Courier featured the story of Lt. Harris, a black pilot who 
“spotted two Nazi bandits working over a desperately twisting Liberator (B-24 bomber)” 
and “dived in on them and broke up the attack.”112 After Lt. Harris got close to the 
bomber, the turret gunner fired a warning burst. Harris then “wagged his wings at the 
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Turret gunner” in order to let the bomber know that he was a friendly aircraft.113 After 
saving the U.S. bomber from a tragic end, Harris led the pilot and crew safely to an 
aerodrome. After both aircraft were on the ground, the navigator of the bomber pulled Lt. 
Harris from his cockpit and held him in his arms while the turret gunner—the same one 
who fired a warning shot at the black pilot—kissed the black pilot on both cheeks. The 
last line of the article informed readers, that “and the turret gunner was from Texas.” 
Racial prejudice had been set aside with the peril of war as a white Texan kissed a black 
man.  
 Toward the end of the war, the Courier published another story of loyalty about a 
white pilot who was looking for Capt. Luke Weathers, a black pilot who saved him 
before he returned home to the U.S.:  
 A white pilot came over with his Mississippi drawl to thank Weathers (the black 
 pilot). “One of you fellows saved my life.”  
Weathers soon realized he was the one who saved him. The white pilot begged 
Weathers to visit Mississippi. “Nobody’s going to hurt you there. I’ll see to 
that.”114 
Like the story of the Texas turret gunner, both stories suggest the possibility that the 
bonds built between white and black airmen of the Fifteenth Air Force would carry over 
to everyday relations back in the U.S. The article about Weathers and the white pilot ends 
by suggesting that their encounter just might cast  “down a little piece of prejudice” back 
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home.115 Both stories demonstrate a hope that the experience of air combat would erase 
any prior misinformed notions of inferiority.  
 Air combat was not the only way for an airman to die. According to an AAF 
Statistical Digest, there were more than 5,533 fatal accidents involving military aircraft 
flown by airmen in the Continental U.S. from 1941 to 1945.116 When an aviation fatality 
involved solely pilots and crew of the 332nd and the 99th, as was the case with the first 
fatality at Tuskegee Air Base, it was tragic. But when an air collision involved a black 
pilot and a white bomber pilot and his crew, a tragedy of this nature threatened the 
potential for all black pilots to continue to serve as airmen.  
 The event that received the most attention in the mainstream press was an air 
crash on a training mission near Charleston, SC, in December 1944, when a black pilot 
collided with a white pilot and his eleven crew members, killing all. The Baltimore Sun 
published a letter written by Earl C. Knowlton, the father of the white pilot, who 
expressed grief over his son but also anger over the inclusion of black pilots in WWII.  
The father protested the “sudden elevation of the Negro to duties he is not yet qualified to 
perform.”117 He knew that his son might have to give his life for his country but not for 
“the fanatical idea that all men must be allowed to perform on the same level regardless 
of background qualifications.” He went on to say, “My father’s people fought for the 
North; my mother’s for the South. . . . I hold no blame against the Negro who flew a 
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fighter plane into a bomber.” The father claimed he harbored no implicit anger for the 
black pilot. Instead, he said, he targeted his anger at the federal government. 
 Incorporating the spirit of the 1925 Army War College Report, the father argued 
against the trustworthiness of black pilots: “with rare exceptions, his mind is not prepared 
to make the split-second decisions which mean life or death in the operation of so swift 
and so complicated and so deadly a mechanism as an airplane.” The father denied that 
racial prejudice animated his emotions: “They loved him. He loved them. So, this is not a 
letter of hate.” Instead, he argued that the federal government’s decision to train black 
pilots was nothing more than “fetishism.” While the father’s critique of the federal 
government was strident, his appeal seemed to be founded more in anger and personal 
pain than any cogent plan to dismantle the black flying corps.    
 While black newspapers also described the accident as a tragedy, the incident 
appeared to be interpreted as a potential threat to the overall inclusion of black pilots in 
air combat. Fear and a defensive tone characterize the articles in black newspapers, which 
not only narrated the incident but also reminded readers that it occurred in the South. 
Accounts in the black newspapers depicted a grieving white father who could possibly 
have the influence to end the service of African-Americans in the War: “The South has 
had enough! Now they want a color line in the sky. . . . The War department was asked to 
bring down the Negro birds by an Anniston business executive whose son was killed in 
an air collision involving a plane piloted by a colored flier.”118 Both white and black 
newspapers extensively quoted the father as he pled with the War Department to stop 
using black pilots. The difference between the black and white presses is that within the 
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black community, the anger of the father appeared as a potential end to the black pilot 
program, while the Baltimore Sun presented it as a human-interest story. 
 Accounts of the incident in both the black and white newspapers depended upon 
the opinions of Roy Wilkins, Acting Secretary of the NAACP, to function as a racial 
mediator for the two audiences. In the Baltimore Sun, Wilkins said, “We can understand 
the grief and disappointment of a father who expected that if his son should lose his life 
in serving his country, it would not be in an accident.”119  About the father, Wilkins 
wrote, “Mr. Knowlton says his letter is not one of hatred and we believe him so far as his 
feelings for this one Negro pilot is concerned, but his main thesis which is that the Negro 
is still a kind of uncivilized, lower animal incapable of adjusting himself to civilization, is 
an underhand cut at the whole Negro race.”120 In his response, Wilkins made efforts both 
to address the private grief of the father and to address the racism that extended beyond 
the circumstances of the accident.  
 In this story, it was not only the increased amount of coverage but also the 
additional content in black presses that is worthy to note. The New York Amsterdam News 
included a letter from a well-known minstrel show actor and playwright, Billy King, who 
responded to Knowlton’s letter: 
 Death by accident is not a stranger to human existence. . . . Please be advised 
 that aeroplane gears are color blind—and are liable to jam up on any pilot, 
 regardless of race, creed or color.121  
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The letter sought to remove guilt from the black pilot by insinuating that a tragedy could 
occur in the air to any pilot, not just a black pilot. The letter echoed the same comments 
made by Charles B. Hall, the first pilot to receive an aerial victory credit, when he 
addressed a youth conference in Atlanta. Both King and Hall considered the nature of a 
sky that had been demarcated by a “color line,” where even with the victories of WWII, 
flying was not a color-blind pursuit. King asked the grieving white father, “Mr. 
Knowlton, would you have had the same bitterness toward the cause of your son’s death 
had the plane been in the hands of a white pilot?”122 King’s comment—read by a mostly 
black audience—sought a stance of neutrality or innocence until proven guilty for the 
black pilot. And yet, because the Tuskegee Experiment could never be fully proven, but, 
rather, tested and re-tested each time a black pilot climbed into his cockpit, it would be 
assumed that a black pilot flew in front of a white bomber.  
 One month after Knowlton’s letter was published in the Baltimore Sun, the 
Chicago Defender published a response from Luther H. Johnson, the father of the black 
pilot. Johnson’s letter took Knowlton to task for race baiting: 
  Did the tragic death of your son mean no more to you than an excuse to give 
 voice to your prejudice against colored people? It was unfortunate that your son 
 was killed in that fateful crash. My son was killed too. Your sorrow and your 
 anguish cannot possibly be greater than mine. . . . During the past three years 
 airplane crashes and collisions have occurred in various parts of this country 
 almost every week, with no colored flyers involved.123  
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Johnson’s letter ends in a less conciliatory tone, signing off with “We loyal Americans 
can thank God that you belong to a group as sure to vanish from American soil as 
America is to win this war.” By adding his voice to the national discussion of this 
accident, Johnson registered the humanity of his son in the midst of a tragedy. And we 
learn the name of his son, Robert M. Johnson, a man who had been identified only as 
“Negro” prior to the publication of his father’s letter. 
 
Conclusion 
It is crucial to reconcile the Tuskegee Experiment of the 1940s with its 
diminished presence in public memory. Public memory depends upon a resolution or 
victory that the Experiment could not provide. The airmen are claimed to have 
“overcome segregation and prejudice” by the end of the war.124 What this chapter makes 
clear, however, is that yes, African Americans were able to serve in WWII, and that a 
subset of pilots managed to achieve one or more aerial victory credits, meaning they were 
able to shoot down an enemy plane. And because the rhetorical strategy of inferiority 
influenced every aspect of the “Tuskegee Experiment,” there could be no overcoming of 
racism during the war, only later in its retelling through public memory.  
While the term “Tuskegee Airmen” has mostly supplanted any mention of the 
“Tuskegee Experiment,” in fact, most associate any experiment in Tuskegee with 
Syphilis, not flying. At the time, however, there was no overlapping or confusion. In both 
black and mainstream newspapers, the term “experiment” was associated with every 
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http://cr.nps.gov/museum/exhibits/tuskegee/airoverview.htm 
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accepted to reflect the work of the air base, once the 99th Pursuit Squadron began to fly in 
air combat in 1943, the term “experiment” began to be contested. In his regular column, 
Roy Wilkins was one of the first to ask if the work of the 99th was “still an experiment,” 
when pilots were beginning to fly in North Africa and Europe.125 Wilkins argued that if 
the term could be lifted, then more men could fly and more men could bomb strategic 
targets. To acknowledge any victory or end to the Tuskegee Experiment would mean 
transitioning toward a rhetoric of equality, when the prerequisite gateway to war combat 
was an assumed subservience from black escorts to white pilots and their crew. 
The “never lost a bomber” claim continues to circulate today and was stated as the 
primary reason for the Tuskegee Airmen’s receipt of the Congressional Medal of 
Freedom in 2006. At the same time as the awarding of the Medal of Freedom, however, 
research by an Air Force historian pointed to military records that black escort pilots had 
actually lost 27 bombers to enemy fire.126 While the “never lost a bomber” claim has 
been proven false in the rediscovery of the military record, the tenacity of the claim’s 
circulation within the public memory of the Tuskegee Airmen continues into the present.  
 While public memory has raised these pioneer pilots of color to heroic status, the 
circulating texts of their day reflect instead a more nuanced picture of race relations and 
an ongoing plea for respect. How white newspapers and black newspapers reported on 
the Tuskegee Airmen in their day is revelatory in that the latter documented a cultural 
revolution in the war presence of black men while the white press paid little attention at 
all. This chapter complicates the public memory of the Tuskegee Airmen by reading their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Roy Wilkins, “Wilkins Describes Trip in Big US Army Bomber,” New York Amsterdam News (May 15, 
1943), p. 13. 
 
126 Daniel Haulman, Eleven Myths about the Tuskegee Airmen (Montgomery, AL: NewSouth Books, 2012). 
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history through the lens of Kirt Wilson’s “rhetoric of place.” Remember that in 
Douglass’s understanding of the rhetoric of place, African Americans must situate 
themselves, always, at the pleasure of white men and women. Looking critically at the 
war record of the black pilot hardly detracts from their heroism in public memory. 
Instead, it casts a rhetorical and nuanced eye on the relations between black and white, 
both in combat and stateside. 
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Chapter Five 
 
  CITIZENS OF AIR AND SPACE 
 
“Without the spirit of adventure that animated these heroes of aviation, . . . [m]an would have remained 
forever a slave to gravity, a prisoner of two dimensions on the Earth’s surface.”1 
—Walter J. Boyne, Colonel United States Air Force, 
Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum Director (1981-1986) 
 
Technological advances can revolutionize how we see possibility in our everyday 
lives. In The Shallows, Nicholas Carr assesses the cognitive effect of the Internet on its 
users. He identifies computers as the most recent of five tools of the mind that have most 
shaped human thought. Carr points to the invention of the alphabet, the map, the printing 
press, the clock, and the computer.2 A corollary list of the most transformative, 
perspective-shifting, identity-shaping inventions would have to include the airplane. 
Once humans had the power of controlled, sustained, motorized flight, a revolution 
occurred that opened up a new public sphere and a new civic identity. It has been the 
work of this dissertation to identify the citizens of the air and to acknowledge the role that 
circulating texts, images, and stories have played in helping everyday citizens imagine 
themselves airborne. While the scope of this project is largely limited to the period 
beginning with the Wright brothers’ first successful flights and ending with the 
conclusion of World War II—1903-1945—the three iconic stories I highlight that 
circulated during these years have traveled through recirculation into the present, where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lon Tuck “The Shining Aura of Air and Space: After 10 Years, the Most Popular…,” Washington Post, 
Jul. 1, 1986, p. C1. 
 
2 Nicholas Carr, The Shallows (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2010). 
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they haunt and inspire and continue to telegraph messages about the triumph, wonder, 
and safety of flight. 
 In order to understand the lasting impact of this social imaginary of flight and its 
messages of safety, I land at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum (NASM), 
the most visited site on the National Mall and the repository of many of the most iconic 
air and spacecraft in American history. The museum promotes stories about epic flights 
and their safe landings, demonstrating how the dialectic of risk and safety has been 
popularized through enactments of public memory. As a way in, I draw your attention to 
a particular scene from the 2009 movie Night at the Museum: Battle of the Smithsonian, 
which features, among other characters, the Wright brothers, Amelia Earhart, and the 
Tuskegee Airmen.3 Admittedly, I recall scenes from this Hollywood fantasy adventure 
comedy with a certain sense of smug satisfaction since they coincidentally illustrate the 
very argument I make in this project: that the revolution ushered in by the invention of 
human flight has depended not only upon technological advancements but also upon a 
rhetorical construction of flight’s safety, and that three stories in particular prove it.  
 In the film trilogy, actor Ben Stiller plays a museum guard named Larry Daley 
who discovers that the exhibits come to life at night. In a rollicking set of adventures, 
Larry ends up at the National Gallery of Art with the beguiling Amelia Earhart, played by 
Amy Adams.4 In their dialogue, Daley and Earhart allude to the problematic fact that 
Earhart, though fully in the flesh, cannot possibly be human; Daley knows that she 
disappeared in 1937. The fact of her disappearance opens the door for humorous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Shawn Levy, dir., Night at the Museum: Battle of the Smithsonian (United States: Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corporation, 2009).  
 
4 In order to hide from the enemy, Daley and Earhart “dive” into Alfred Eisenstaedt’s V-J day photograph 
of the “kiss,” one of the eight iconic photographs Hariman and Lucaites highlight in No Caption Needed.  
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doublespeak, such as when Earhart kisses Daley and declares, “I just feel as if I have 
been asleep for a long time and now I am awake.”5 This theme of presence and absence 
continues throughout the entire movie, suggesting that the movie’s storyline has proffered 
the missing Earhart after all of these years.  
 The movie’s plot also incorporates the Wright brothers at the Smithsonian 
NASM. In order to rescue a friend who is being held against his will at the Smithsonian’s 
Castle, Daley and Earhart commandeer the Wrights’ 1903 Flyer. In order to make their 
escape, Daley and Earhart depend on the protection of the Tuskegee Airmen, who—just 
as in public memory—appear in the movie as a collective identity and are protecting 
white pilots. The nameless Tuskegee Airmen, led by actor Cuba Gooding, Jr., block a 
potential attack by Attila the Hun, Napoleon, and Al Capone, thus enabling Daley and 
Earhart to escape the museum using the Wrights’ Flyer.6 From below, the Wright 
brothers say, “God Speed, Amelia Earhart. God Speed,” echoing the real life Scott 
Carpenter’s send-off before the first manned orbital mission of the Friendship 7: “God 
Speed, John Glenn. God Speed.”7 Thus, in this one cinematic scene, we witness the 
confluence of the three iconic stories of flight, along with an astronaut, in a mishmash of 
storylines.   
The Night at the Museum: Battle of the Smithsonian did well in the box office, in 
part because the public recognizes and celebrates the historical figures that the film 
brings to life. How the nonfictional NASM has treated these historical figures and their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Levy, dir., Night at the Museum: Battle of the Smithsonian. 
 
6 Actor Cuba Gooding, Jr., was in The Tuskegee Airmen and Red Tails. See Robert Markowitz, dir., The 
Tuskegee Airmen (United States: HBO, 1995); and Anthony Hemingway, dir., Red Tails (United States: 
Twentieth Century Fox, 2012). 
 
7 Levy, dir., Night at the Museum: Battle of the Smithsonian. 
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stories, though, deserves attention. In Chapter Two of this dissertation project, I wrote 
about how the NASM staff made the decision to move the 1903 Wright Flyer—once 
suspended next to Charles Lindbergh’s Spirit of Saint Louis aircraft and flying over the 
Apollo 11 command module in the Milestones of Flight Gallery—to a second-floor room 
dedicated to the history of the Wright brothers.8 While this exhibit do-over could be cast 
as a promotion, especially since it ostensibly took place to honor the centennial of human 
flight, it also broke a promise made to Orville Wright in 1948 that his aircraft would fly 
in perpetuity just in front of Lindbergh’s Spirit of Saint Louis. In its current presentation, 
the flyer rests on the ground, a demotion of sorts in a museum that honors particular 
aircraft of distinction by “flying” them from the ceiling. Though there is an extensive 
exhibit surrounding the airplane, the museum patrons no longer see the 1903 aircraft 
“flying” from the rafters alongside other milestone aircraft.   
The public memory of Amelia Earhart at the NASM has also been controversial. 
In March 2003, the Smithsonian released a list of Ten Great Pilots, which included such 
iconic figures in aviation as Jimmy Doolittle, Charles Lindbergh, and Chuck Yeager.9 
After naming six additional male pilots who have little to no name recognition beyond 
the enclaves of aviation buffs and historians, a woman pilot was honored in tenth place. 
Based on the legacy and massive circulation of texts related to the iconic story of Amelia 
Earhart, one might assume it was she who was named sole woman aviator on this list of 
Ten Great Pilots.10 Instead, it was Jacqueline Auriol, the first woman admitted to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 “Exhibitions,” Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum (Web), accessed March 3, 2015. 
 
9 Patricia Trenner, “10 All-Time Great Pilots: Machines Alone Could Not Have Pushed the Airplane 
Forward,” Air & Space Magazine (Web), accessed March 2, 2015. 
 
10 There also was no mention of the Wright brothers. 
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France’s Military Flight Test Centre, a pilot who swapped speed records with U.S. Pilot 
Jacqueline Cochran, the first woman to break the sound barrier. On the Air & Space 
website that listed the Ten Great Pilots was a comment section where respondents made 
recommendations for pilots who were not currently on the list and who, in the opinion of 
the respondents, deserved the honor. A couple of the responses identified Earhart as a 
great pilot, including one that opined, “I believe most children that come to this website 
for information will get zero percent on their exams, homework et cetera.” Next to the 
comment was the following: “EDITORS’ REPLY: Amelia Earhart as a great pilot could 
be a controversial proposition.”11 In order to be commemorated as exceptional, a pilot 
had to not only risk flight but also achieve a safe landing.  
Even though Earhart was not identified as one of the ten great pilots, it is her 
story—the record of her achievements and reassurances of safe flight—that has prompted 
the many engagements with her public memory at the NASM, certainly many more than 
Jacqueline Auriol, whose name yields a “no results were found” message in a search of 
the NASM website, despite her designation as one of the ten great pilots. Earhart’s Vega, 
the plane she flew solo on her transatlantic flight in 1932, is prominently displayed in the 
Barron Hilton Pioneers of Flight Gallery on the museum’s second floor, a gallery 
dedicated to aviators from the 1920s and ’30s whom the NASM has deemed pioneering 
in they way they pushed the “technological” or “social limits” of flight. Earhart’s absence 
from the ten great pilots list and her framing within the museum as a pioneer pilot, not a 
milestone pilot, reflects a larger and persistent discourse that questions Earhart’s 
competency as a pilot but also depends upon her reassurances of the wonder and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Patricia Trenner, “10 All-Time Great Pilots: Machines Alone Could Not Have Pushed the Airplane 
Forward,” Air & Space Magazine (Web); accessed Feb. 15, 2014. 
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possibility in flight. In the time I have engaged in research concerning the social 
imaginary of early flight, I, too, have been asked, “Was Earhart really just a bad pilot?”  
The Tuskegee Airmen, too, are recognized by the NASM. The exhibit “Black 
Wings” has been on display and on a national tour since 1983. This exhibit includes a 
brief video featuring General Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., repeating the contested claim of the 
Tuskegee Airmen that they never lost a bomber. The exhibit helped to gel in public 
memory this relationship between the Airmen and the superlative claim made about 
them, even though the claim also threatens the integrity of their war record in its 
exaggeration.  
Describing the treatment of the three iconic stories by Smithsonian’s NASM 
prompts me to reflect upon, and cement, the social theories at the heart of this project. 
For nearly forty years, NASM has been the acknowledged home of aviator and astronaut 
historical narratives. It can also be a read as a commemorative site worthy of 
interpretation through the lens of Taylor’s imaginary, as a place organized by the stories 
and legends of flight. The NASM has made legible the social imaginary of flight in its 
broad gestures toward patriotism and freedom, which were so often associated with 
flying. Interpreting the NASM through the rubric of Warner’s publics and counterpublics, 
it becomes clear that there are no aircraft in the Milestones of Flight gallery that had been 
flown by women aviators or by aviators of color. Instead, this counterpublic and their 
aircraft have been situated in a more muted location on the second floor. While there 
exists an established tradition of scholarship among aviation historians—several of the 
premier scholars being at the employ of the NASM—there has been little scholarly 
analysis of flight as a public imaginary, beyond some historical interpretations. Taylor 
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and Warner, in separate but also related theoretical understandings of the public, help to 
interpret aviation’s public memory on the National Mall. The NASM has the potential to 
serve as a critical future commemorative site for public memory research regarding 
human powered flight. 
I see the scholarship of this dissertation as demonstrating the importance of 
interrelating the historical narrative with both archival research and public memory. Such 
theoretical commitments afford the possibility for future analysis, not only of the NASM 
but also of other archival and historic sites related to aviation. These museums and 
historic sites deserve analyses that both incorporate and extend the reach of historical 
narrative through the social imaginary of flight and public memory. Such analyses, within 
rhetorical studies, American Studies, and cultural history, would be both timely and 
relevant for intervention within academic scholarship and a larger public audience.  
It is my hope that readers will see, in a new light, the three iconic stories analyzed 
herein. In so doing, readers will prove true the first of Dickinson, Blair, and Ott’s 
“consensual assumptions”: that commemorative processes pay more attention to the 
present than the past.12 The stories I investigate are ones that popular culture has already 
played with. During the 1990s, for instance, two major advertising campaigns invoked 
the story and the example of Earhart: Gap’s Khaki ads (1993)13 and Apple’s “Think 
Different” ads (1997).  In 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton held a press 
conference in which she pledged financial support from the State Department in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Dickinson, Blair, and Ott, “Introduction,” Places of Public Memory, pp. 6-11. 
 
13 Stuart Elliott, 1993, “The Media Business: Advertising—Addenda; Gap Ads to Feature Celebrities in 
Khakis,” New York Times, Aug. 18 (Web); accessed July 1, 2012. 
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search for Earhart’s long missing plane.14 Earhart’s legacy provided Clinton the 
opportunity to identify with a feminist agenda, just as Ms. Magazine had done in the 
1970s when it put Earhart on the cover. During television coverage of the Sochi Olympic 
games in 2014, an advertisement ran of a U.S. woman ski jumper, with a sound overlay 
of Earhart discussing the importance of taking risks, despite the hazards.15 The public 
memory of the Tuskegee Airmen continues to recirculate in films and television movies, 
such as the HBO made-for-television movie, The Tuskegee Airmen, and the George 
Lucas film Red Tails. There have also been several documentaries that feature the WWII 
veterans.   
What do these iconic stories mean to a modern audience? The Night at the 
Museum: Battle of the Smithsonian, I believe, proves there is a public that knows the 
three iconic stories of flight that I analyze, and knows them in relation to the NASM. 
These stories have come, in fact, to influence the everyday experience of flying, both 
private and commercial. The public knows Amelia Earhart and we know that she 
disappeared. We know that two men in suits and caps—one mustachioed and the other 
not—must be the Wright brothers. Finally, we know that a group of African-American 
men in bomber jackets most likely are the Tuskegee Airmen. What has often been 
overlooked are circulating texts within the social imaginary of flight that reveal Amelia 
Earhart as an aviator who not only broke records but also peddled flight’s safety. Such 
knowledge is simply too ironic in the certainty of her disappearance. Most do not realize 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks at an Event Celebrating Amelia Earhart and the United States’ Ties 
to Our Pacific Neighbors,” U.S. Department of State:  Diplomacy in Action, Mar. 20, 2012 (Web); accessed 
June 6, 2013: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pBNVjNUdjXo 
15 “Flying” (television commercial), dir. Michael Spiccia, by Arts & Sciences, produced by BBDO New 
York Worldwide (2014). 
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how radical it was for the Wrights to resist the temptation of turning their flying 
experiments into spectacle, as had the Montgolfier brothers and Alberto Santos-Dumont. 
Finally, we know the Tuskegee Airmen to be heroes, which they were. What many have 
never perused are the administrative and public texts that contributed to deep levels of 
racism undergirding the military record of the black pilots. Some know that they “never 
lost a bomber,” but in the refutation of this claim, rarely do we consider the “rhetoric of 
place” that made any military achievement an unsuspected or overlooked victory. 
Given the manner in which I have analyzed the rhetorical power of stories to 
shape the public perception of flight’s safety, I have illustrated how the sky has become a 
public sphere populated by the people I identify as the citizens of the air. This scholarship 
brings together the rigor of archival research and theoretical concern in order to interpret 
a social imaginary of flight and its recirculation in accounts of public memory. This 
rhetorical construction of the sky—in messages that depend upon both risk and safety—
has made it possible for commercial flight to seem mundane, such that being relegated to 
a middle seat is the greatest risk of air travel most air passengers will ever face. Human 
powered flight, for pilots and passengers alike, has little apparent risk anymore.16 
 When I think about the potential significance of this study for future 
Communication researchers, I imagine the possibility of gathering together a group of 
scholars—be they rhetorical, organizational, performance, or interpersonal scholars—to 
discuss how their research might involve or address the domain of the sky. While the 
opportunity to discuss common concerns has appeal, it has always seemed to me that any 
study involving the sky must continue to focus on those concerns related to the everyday 
matters of citizenship on the ground. My project, if it has done its job, will inspire others 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For comparison, see William F. Ogburn, The Social Effects of Aviation (New York: Houghton, 1946).  
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to focus on flight and the sky, but always at its intersection with the earth. While this 
study draws from a vast literature and archival record of human powered flight, it 
remains focused on the rhetorical messages of safety related by pilots, passengers, and 
the airminded public—those who became the citizens of the air.  
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  APPENDIX A: AVIATION TIMELINE 
 
1485   Leonardo da Vinci draws potential aircraft 
1783   Montgolfier brothers take first human balloon flight  
1834   Birth of Samuel Langley 
1856   Birth of Booker T. Washington 
1867   Birth of Wilbur Wright 
1871   Birth of Orville Wright 
1884   Birth of Eleanor Roosevelt 
1896   Otto Lilienthal dies in flight 
1897   Birth of Amelia Earhart 
1900-1903   Wright Glider Experiments 
1902   Birth of Charles Lindbergh 
1901    “Man will never fly for a 1000 years” (Wilbur to Orville) 
1901   Alberto Santo Dumont flies dirigible around Eiffel Tower 
1903    Langley attempts flights of the Aerodrome 
1903    Wright Brothers-First Four Flights, Kitty Hawk, NC 
1905   First Passenger Air Craft 
1906   Death of Samuel Langley 
1906    Santos Dumont flies fixed wing aircraft in France 
1907   Birth of Charles “Chief” Anderson  
1908   Thomas Selfridge, Death of first aircraft passenger 
1909   Rheims Air Meet 
1912   Glenn Curtiss’s flight of Samuel Langley’s Aerodrome  
1912   Birth of Benjamin O. Davis, Jr. 
1912   Harriet Quimby dies while flying over Boston Harbor 
1915   Death of Booker T. Washington 
1917   Department of Aeronautics             
1918   U.S. Air Mail Service begins 
1925    Army War College Report 
1926   Air Commerce Act (Pilot License now enforced) 
1926   Bessie Coleman dies in flight 
1927    Lindbergh Transatlantic Flight  
1927    First Air Traffic Controller (no runway) 
1927   Lindbergh Tour of US (80 cities, 48 states, travelling 22,000 miles) 
1927   Archie League-Saint Louis, First Air Traffic Controller (no runway) 
1928    Earhart’s Transatlantic Flight (as passenger)  
1928   20 Hrs, 40 Min.  
1928   Orville Wright sends 1903 Flyer to London 
1928   Boulder put in location of first four flights 
1928   Spirit of Saint Louis to Smithsonian 
1928   Earhart establishes 99s 
1928   Orville Wright sends 1903 Flyer to London. 
1928   Kill Devil Hills Monument Commissioned 
1930   Anne Morrow Lindbergh earned first glider pilot license for a woman. 
1931   Lindberghs in the Artic 
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1931   Amelia Earhart and George Putnam Wed 
1931   Earhart flies across country in Autogiro 
1932   Lindbergh baby taken 
1932   Dedication, Wright Brothers Monument 
1932   Earhart solo transatlantic flight  
1932   The Fun of It  
1932   FDR and family fly to Chicago Democratic Convention 
1932   Earhart-Eleanor Roosevelt Flight Over DC 
1933   Wiley Post flies a northern route around the world. 
1935   Earhart flies from Hawaii to California 
1935   Wiley Post and Will Rogers crash in Alaska 
1935   First aviation casualty of a US Senator (Bronson Cutting) 
1935   DC-3 first commercial flights  
1936   Safety in Air Hearings (DC)     
1937    Earhart First Attempted World Flight Fails 
1937   Corrigan applies for permit to fly from NY to London, turned down. 
1937   Last Flight  
1937    Earhart disappears on second attempted world flight 
1938   Howard Hughes makes round the world flight 
1939   Earhart declared dead by Putnam 
1939   Civilian Pilot Training Program 
1941   E. Roosevelt’s demonstration flight with Chief Anderson 
1941     Chief Anderson-Eleanor Roosevelt Flight 
1941   Formation, 99th Pursuit Squadron 
1943   Report on Combat Efficiency 
1943   99th Pursuit Squadron first combat mission 
1944-5   Tuskegee Airmen as Escort Pilots in European Theatre, WWII 
1945    Publication of Ottley’s article “Dark Angels of Dawn” 
1946   Lindbergh retrieves Wright Flyer from London 
1948   Integration of Armed Forces 
1948    1903 Flyer returned to Smithsonian 
1948    Integration of Armed Forces 
1948   Independent Office of Air Safety 
1950   Air Safety Board 
1953   Kitty Hawk subdivides into Kill Devil Hills 
1954   Jet powered airline 
1957   Crash over the Grand Canyon (ATC rules established “on top”) 
1963   Marlon Green, Continental Airlines, first black pilot 
1982   Black Wings (NASM exhibit) 
1998   Bill Clinton, 4-Star Ceremony for B. O. Davis, Jr. 
2002    Opening of historic site in Tuskegee, AL 
2007   Tuskegee Airmen Congressional Medal 
2009   Night at the Museum: Battle of the Smithsonian 
2012   Secretary Clinton Press Conference re: Earhart     
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APPENDIX B: WRIGHTS’ PUBLISHED LETTER, 1904 
 
The Washington Post, Jan. 7. 1904, p. 5	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